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1 Introduction 
 
The opening chapter introduces the two research questions pursued in the thesis: 
First, why does the Council of Ministers fulfill its legislative tasks so efficiently and 
smoothly, despite the exogenous shock of membership change? Second, if the 
Eastern Enlargement has left the Council output unaffected, how did it affect the 
legislative dynamics within the institution? Subsequently, the chapter states the 
argument illustrated later in the book, namely that the legislative robustness of 
the enlarged Council of Ministers results from member states’ highly unequal 
ambitions and abilities to formulate and advocate their own policy interests in 
the Council arena. This diversity is strategically exploited by the Council 
Presidency, which employs its procedural prerogatives to boost legislative 
effectiveness, in line with its institutional interest. Thus, despite the presence of 
new actors at the bargaining table, the old large member states continue to 
control the politics within the Council, eventually taking advantage of the 
numerical strength of the Eastern bloc. The chapter closes with an outline of the 
book.  
 
1.1 The research question 
This study inquires about the impact of the Eastern Enlargement on the 
Council of Ministers. Both practitioners and academics have argued that this 
institution, being the core of the EU’s legislative system while also providing 
the forum for national interests, would be most susceptible to disturbing 
effects of large numbers and diversity (Wallace 2002: 329). The following 
section provides the background for this reasoning and introduces the puzzle 
concerning the enduring legislative robustness of the Council. Furthermore, I 
argue that investigating how such smooth accommodation of Enlargement 
emerged – and whether there is indeed no change at all – is relevant, as it 
touches upon fundamental questions about the relationship between the EU 
and its member states.  
Legislative dynamics and performance in the enlarged Council of Ministers 
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1.1.1 Background: EU institutions and the Eastern Enlargement 
In his famous book “Europe as Empire”, Jan Zielonka postulated that the 
Eastern Enlargement would change the nature of the European Union 
(Zielonka 2006). Zielonka argued that the dramatically increased diversity of 
economic, political and cultural conditions would have severe implications for 
European governance. Not only would more flexible forms of integration 
become necessary, but the hierarchic mode of governance would be threatened 
and the central policy steering weakened (Zielonka 2007: 198-199). Zielonka 
found a strong metaphor for his reasoning. The EU would lose its state-like, 
“Westphalian” characteristics and become a kind of neo-medieval empire: 
large, but immovable, versatile but internally incoherent. While criticized as 
too abstract and too far-reaching (Puchala 2006: 1109; Dannreuther 2007), 
Zielonka’s argument relies on a straightforward logic: what an organization 
does and how it works strongly reflects its composition.  
The very same logic underlines the vividly debated question concerning 
whether European integration is accompanied by a tension between widening 
and deepening. Does including increasingly more members make closer 
cooperation and more intense integration difficult, if not impossible? On the 
one hand, several analysts of EU integration have pointed out that the 
widening-deepening trade-off is a constructed narrative, rather than an 
evidence-based account “law” of integration (Nugent 2004a: 63-65; Wallace 
2005: 24-27; Kelemen et al. 2011; Schimmelfennig 2012). One the other hand, 
when broken down into analytical segments, the widening-deepening tension 
remains appealing. The assumptions that it is based upon receive empirical 
support and the mechanisms it implies are theoretically sound, according to 
our current understanding.  
From a historical perspective, the expectation that newcomers might be 
risky partners in terms of advancing integration is not necessarily wrong. 
Countries that had joined the EU in the previous Enlargement rounds often 
manifested reluctance to pursue further integration, for reasons related to 
political preferences, like the United Kingdom, or domestic institutional 
dynamics, such as Denmark and, to a certain extent, Sweden (Wallace 2005: 
27). Alternatively, newcomers were ready to accept deepening, but not for free. 
The emergence and expansion of EU-level regional policy is often interpreted 
as a side-payment accompanying the great political bargains of the late-1980s 
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and early-1990s (Pollack 2000: 523)1. As for the Central and Eastern European 
countries, prior to accession they were reputed to be particularly sovereignty 
conscious, owing to their political past, and keen to pursue more liberal 
policies, because they hoped to exploit their competitiveness on the labor and 
services markets (Baun 2004: 138-142). Given that both dimensions – 
harmonization and liberalization – are already present in the EU’s conflict 
structure, the Eastern Enlargement was likely to intensify conflicts or even 
shift majorities. Arguably, more intense and dynamic conflicts induce higher 
chances for gridlock and higher barriers to reach agreement.  
The theoretical reasoning behind the widening-deepening tension 
draws upon spatial models of decision-making and theories of collective action. 
The former claim that heterogeneity of preferences and more veto points 
within the system, which can multiply when new members join (depending on 
the decision rule), limit the scope for finding acceptable solutions for the 
majority (Tsebelis 2002). In turn, the theory of collective action postulates that 
the larger and the more diverse a group, the lower the individual willingness to 
contribute to public goods (Olson 1965). If deepening of integration is 
understood as a surrender of individual sovereignties to create mutually 
beneficial integrated policies, member states would be less eager to engage in 
such exchange in a larger setting. The larger the group, the higher the 
transaction costs of reaching agreement and the higher the uncertainty 
concerning whether the policies will be properly implemented by all members. 
Besides, the benefits of integration are no longer exclusive and might be 
perceived as smaller when compared to the costs of giving up autonomy. In 
both theoretical scenarios, membership change affects decision-making, 
introducing a status quo bias. The effect was expected to be the strongest in the 
Council, where the high procedural threshold for agreement is combined with 
a system of proportional representation (Hosli 1999). Accordingly, adopting 
new policies or modernizing the old ones was anticipated to become 
increasingly difficult in the enlarged EU. Rather, legislative inertia or gridlock 
had been expected (De Witte 2002: 247; Tsebelis and Yataganas 2002: 304; 
Baldwin and Widgrén 2004; König and Bräuninger 2004: 430).  
                                                          
1  Later on, Spain threatened to veto the Northern enlargement, until it was bought-
off with the creation of the Cohesion Fund (Nugent 2004b: 29). 
Legislative dynamics and performance in the enlarged Council of Ministers 
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While portraying the 8+2+22 accession as a danger to the management 
of the EU’s affairs – both the daily legislative ones and significant historical 
decisions – was not the only way of looking at the (Eastern) Enlargement’s 
implications, it became the most widespread and powerful one. In particular, it 
fed nicely into the path-breaking project of EU Constitution (Wallace 2005: 23). 
This major institutional reform aimed, among other things, at streamlining the 
decision-making process. It has not only occupied the EU policy-makers but 
also observers of various academic backgrounds for almost a decade.  
1.1.2 Puzzles and open questions  
As early as three years after the Eastern Enlargement, first empirical 
data on the legislative productivity of the Council had been gathered and a new 
narrative was proclaimed among Council analysts, namely “business as usual” 
(Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse 2007; Wallace 2007; Best and Settembri 
2008; Pollack 2009; Wallace et al. 2010). The Council had maintained the level 
of produced legislation, at least numerically, and there were no explicit signals 
of increased, destabilizing contestation. Of course, measuring “capacity to act” 
across time and policy areas remains a challenging task. Comparative inquiry 
about different dimensions of legislative performance, such as the duration or 
the legal quality of outcomes, is a research agenda still under development. 
Nonetheless, we can safely say that the scenario of legislative paralysis failed to 
materialize and the Council of Ministers has accommodated the Eastern 
Enlargement surprisingly smoothly.  
This observation leads directly to my two research questions. First, 
why, against all expectations, did a major membership change in the Council of 
Ministers not affect the legislative productivity of this institution? Second, even 
if the output remains “the same”, what are the implications of larger numbers 
and increased diversity for the dynamics of policy-making in the Council?  
One could argue that the “mechanic” linkage between membership 
change and legislative failure was an inaccurate expectation from the outset. In 
fact, in the late-1990s, Jonathan Golub (1999) and Helen Wallace (1999) 
                                                          
2  Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Estonia (8) joined the EU on 1 May 2004, together with Malta and Cyprus (2). 
Romania and Bulgaria (2) followed on 1 January 2007. On 1 July 2013, Croatia 
joined the EU as the first Western Balkan country. When referring to the new 
member states, I mean the eight CEE countries, only occasionally referring to 
Romania and Bulgaria (where applicable).   
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outlined two alternative ways of looking at Enlargement’s implications for EU 
politics. Having analyzed the output and the duration of Council policy-making 
during 1974-1995, Golub demonstrated that legislative efficiency does not 
directly follow from the decision-making rule (Golub 1999: 753-760). His 
observations suggest that reaching a decision in the Council is only loosely 
linked to the ways in which power is formally distributed among member 
states, as well as the formal decision threshold. Showing that the “Thatcher 
era” had influenced the Council’s productivity more than the accessions of 
Greece, Spain and Portugal, Golub drew attention to member states’ 
preferences and the ways in which they were articulated (Golub 1999: 753). 
The careful conclusion from his research for the Eastern Enlargement was that 
there would be more to collective decision-making than “just” numbers and 
individual voting power.  
Helen Wallace adopted a more “organic” perspective on the accession of 
post-communist countries to the EU, arguing that any form of transnational 
action strongly reflects the domestic dynamics within the participating 
countries. In other words, how countries practice their membership in the EU 
depends on how they manage the interconnections between the domestic and 
supranational arenas (Wallace 2005: 32). These links are of diverse kinds: 
functional, territorial and affiliational3 (Wallace 1999: 291-295). Functional 
interconnections are the most relevant ones for Council politics, because they 
relate most directly to specific instances of public policy and “national 
interests” manifest here most often. Wallace argues that post-communist 
countries have to construct, discover and learn to manage these 
interconnections from scratch and we do not really know what shape this 
process will take (Wallace 1999: 296, 303-305; 2005: 32-33). Thus, the impact 
of Enlargement on the Council will depend on how CEE countries will 
“domesticate” Europe. 
Wallace and Golub’s contributions did not offer any specific predictions 
about what might happen in the Council of Ministers after Enlargement; rather, 
they served as words of warning that an automatic linkage between 
                                                          
3  The functional dimension of integration reflects member states’ cooperation needs 
resulting from economic exchanges and public policy needs. Territorial dimension 
refers to member states’ (local) territorial concerns, such as the relationship with 
neighbors, safety interests or geopolitical concerns. Affiliational dimension 
encompasses shared value sets, both constitutional (democracy, fundamental 
rights) to socio-economic (Wallace 1999: 291-206).  
Legislative dynamics and performance in the enlarged Council of Ministers 
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membership change and efficiency might be too narrowly constructed. Indeed, 
their judgment was apparently correct, although this is not to say that we 
should refrain from asking how a “doomsday scenario” became “business as 
usual”. Accordingly, the following section explains why the inquiry about the 
mechanisms of Enlargement accommodation is an important one.  
1.1.3 Relevance  
If Enlargement does not pose any fundamental problem to the Council 
of Minister’s functioning, why should we care about it at all? There are three 
answers to this question. Firstly, analyzing the mechanisms of Enlargement 
accommodation will deepen our knowledge of how the Council of Ministers 
works. The main question that this thesis is asking is one of a how possible 
type. Next to whys, how possibles are fundamental questions in social sciences 
and they refer explicitly to complex systems (Little 1991: 4). A how possible 
inquiry acknowledges that an organization under consideration - here the 
Council of Ministers - comprises diverse parts and processes that contribute 
altogether to the performance of the system as a whole. The Council of 
Ministers seems to possess a high capacity to mitigate exogenous changes, 
such as the enlargement of membership. Thus, the purpose of this thesis is to 
demonstrate how this capacity comes about, as well as to explain where is 
comes from. Chapters 2 (literature review) and 3 (theoretical argument) of the 
thesis collect what we already know about bits and pieces of post-Enlargement 
Council politics and discuss how this knowledge can be related to the 
impressive legislative performance. While Chapter 2 discusses the hypothesis 
advanced in current research, Chapter 3 develops an alternative account.  
Secondly, the question of what impact the Eastern Enlargement has on 
the Council of Ministers touches upon yet another fundamental topic in EU 
research: the relationship between the EU and its member states. To what 
extent does the policy-making in the European Union reflect the membership 
of this organization? (How) does it matter who sits at the decision-making 
table? There is a normative and an analytical dimension to these questions. 
From the normative perspective, one could argue that the Council should be 
inclusive and responsive and member states should have equal control over 
the substance of the integration project. From the analytical perspective, the 
relationship between the EU and its member states touches upon the basic 
categories of political science, such as interests, power and influence.  
 Introduction
 
17 
 
Finally, the Eastern Enlargement was the largest and the most 
spectacular membership change in EU’s history, yet it was not the last one; on 
the contrary, the EU is continuously enlarging. Some accessions, like the 
Croatian one, passed without great attention, whereas others, like the potential 
joining of Turkey, have generated great contention. With the Western Balkan, 
the EU might one day be richer by another regional bloc. In the light of these 
changes, it is important that we understand how the legislative institutions 
deal with Enlargements. The intellectual ambition here is to delineate 
continuity and change, as well as understanding how membership change 
makes a difference to EU policy-making and under what conditions there is 
more to Enlargement than simply “business as usual”.  
1.2 The argument in a nutshell 
In this study, I advance a two-component explanation of smooth 
accommodation of the Eastern Enlargement by the Council of Ministers. I argue 
that the effects of diversity and large numbers on the Council’s productivity are 
mitigated by the asymmetries among member states, regarding their ability 
and their ambition to pursue own policy interests during supranational 
bargaining, combined with the procedural leeway, as the Presidencies enjoy 
and exploit it. My argument focuses on the legislative process, rather than on 
the structure of decision situations. 
For reasons related to their domestic politics, the new member states 
from Central Eastern Europe lack the capacity to formulate and effectively 
advocate policy positions in Council negotiations. This organizational deficit 
has two broader implications. First, it hinders these countries from influencing 
the negotiation process and the policy outcome directly. Second, it makes 
mimicry or fellowship towards old member states the CEEs’ default bargaining 
strategy. Therefore, I argue that the impact of changed membership on the 
legislative dynamics crucially depends on the interactions and alliances the 
newcomers engage in. When these alliances are well organized, the numerical 
strength of the Eastern bloc can be exploited and even contribute to policy 
change, as one of my case studies shows. Large, old member states are in the 
best position to provide these organizational resources. Thus, when willing 
and able to arrange reliable bargaining opportunity structures which the 
newcomers can use, these states are empowered by the Eastern Enlargement.  
Legislative dynamics and performance in the enlarged Council of Ministers 
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This “mobilization-mimicry” mechanism between the old and the new 
member states, which is the core of my explanation, can only operate when 
there are overlaps in policy preferences between the two groups4. Thus, I do 
not neglect that the already differentiated policy space within the Council and 
the fact that newcomers blend into the structure of fluid alignments, plays a 
stabilizing role in the post-Enlargement Council politics (Thomson 2009; 
2011). However, the lack of a permanent, cross-cutting preference structure 
does not provide a complete explanation for the Enlargement puzzle. One 
problem is that the hypothesis of diffuse reciprocity, which links the variable 
preference structure with the legislative performance, faces empirical 
problems, as Chapter 2 of this dissertation shows. However, beyond this 
question, even with a variable preference structure, majority shifts can always 
occur and threaten the pre-Enlargement (policy) equilibrium. Thus, we need to 
know whether and how majority shifts caused by membership change 
translate into open conflicts in the Council and under what circumstances they 
eventually have an impact on the legislative performance.  
I claim that whether the “Eastern bloc” makes a difference to Council 
politics depends on how it fits in the bargaining strategies of older member 
states, usually the large ones. They remain the pivotal players in post-
Enlargement Council politics, as they define the policy conflicts and determine 
the methods with which these conflicts are debated and dealt with. For these 
reasons, I argue, how individual member states prepare and organize their 
legislative action is central to further development of the bargaining dynamics 
under the conditions of enlarged membership. The organizational assets, 
highlighted by this project, are distinct from factors that have served as 
prominent explanations for legislative influence, such as size, which is deeply 
structural, or salience, which has an unclear time horizon and might be 
situational. I show that asymmetries of abilities and ambitions, relevant for 
Council politics, are enrooted in the domestic practices and policy-making 
styles. Clearly, differences in professional preparation of member states for 
intergovernmental bargaining had been present in the Council for decades. The 
Eastern Enlargement has deepened these asymmetries and most likely 
increased their relevance for the inner workings of this institution.  
                                                          
4  To put it in Tsebelis’ terms, the newcomers’ preferences are absorbed by the old 
actors and thus they do not count as veto players and do not contribute to the 
status quo bias (Tsebelis 2002: 28).  
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The fragmentation of the enlarged Council and the asymmetries among 
member states regarding their capabilities to contribute to policy discussions 
on a supranational level are conducive to a robust legislative performance, 
thanks to the strategic handling of decision-making procedures by the Council 
Presidency. I argue that the Presidency is guided by institutional interests and 
puts its powers to the service of legislative progress and negotiation 
conclusion. While the Presidency had been a constitutive feature of the Council 
for a long time, two brokerage strategies appear to work particularly well in 
the context of larger and more diverse membership: streamlining and 
exploiting diversity. In the former, the Chair applies time pressure, pushes the 
delegations to nail down their demands and recourses to surprise effects when 
handling the voting procedure. A side-effect of this brokerage style is path 
dependency and first movers’ advantage. I show that the first months of 
Council bargaining not only decisively shape how further process unfolds, but 
also have substantial implications for the outcome. In the latter strategy, 
exploiting diversity, the Presidency engages in divide and rule tactics, pitting 
allies against each other on the grounds of diverging preference orders, 
domestic constraints or bargaining resources. In fact, the larger and the more 
diverse the group, the higher the chance for the Presidency to find (or to 
induce) diversity and to craft majorities out of it. Thus, I argue that the Eastern 
Enlargement increased the leverage of the Council Chair. Interestingly, factors 
that effectively counter the Presidency’s efforts, such as politicization and 
constituency mobilization within member states – are not directly related to 
the formal membership of the Council.  
My explanation of the smooth accommodation of the Eastern 
Enlargement by the Council of Ministers represents an alternative to the 
“cooperative culture”, often invoked to account for the Council’s capacity to 
overcome contestation (Thomson 2011; Veen 2011). While I agree that hard-
nosed bargaining is rather an exception, than a rule, my results cast doubt 
whether it is the equalizing and accommodative nature of the Council 
processes which make member states use their formal powers only sparsely 
and refrain from proclaiming their interests too manifestly. Rather, my study 
draws a picture of a decision-making body driven by asymmetric participation 
of its members, these asymmetries going back to differential capabilities to 
contribute to cross-border policies. This fragmentation is not only gently 
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streamed by the Council Presidency, but it also triggers specific collective 
dynamics, such as mobilization-mimicry among member states or the path 
dependency of policy discussions. On the one hand, these dynamics reduce the 
complexity of the decision situation. Nonetheless, on the other hand, they do so 
at the expense of the process’ inclusiveness, since some governments find 
themselves in a better position than others to make the policy process respond 
to their needs. Member states governments value the manageability of the 
enlarged Council, irrespectively of their position as “leaders” or “followers” of 
collective dynamics. In contrast, the consequences of individual countries’ 
interests being less well reflected in EU-level policies are diffuse and delayed in 
time. In fact, they are no longer part of Council politics.  
1.3 Plan of the thesis  
The structure of the thesis is as follows. The subsequent Chapter 2 
discusses what we have learned thus far about the impact of the Eastern 
Enlargement on different dimensions of the Council’s work. An analytical 
synthesis of existing findings is of great importance for the thesis, given the 
richness as well as the methodological and theoretical diversity of recent 
empirical research on the Council of Ministers. Unsurprisingly, the literature 
provides evidence for both continuity (“business as usual”) and change of 
Council politics after the Eastern Enlargement. The Chapter makes two claims. 
First, it questions the argument that traces the continuity of the Council’s 
legislative performance back to flexible coalitions among member states. This 
argument has been advanced in large-n research and postulates that the 
Council’s variable political space induces cooperative culture, which absorbs 
membership change in turn. I show that this reasoning, while plausible, can be 
challenged on empirical grounds. Secondly, the chapter identifies two missing 
pieces in existing Council research: member states legislative behavior and 
institutional adaptation to large numbers. Exploring these two notions in the 
specific context of the recent Enlargement will help to answer the research 
questions and enhance our understanding of continuity and change in Council 
politics.  
In Chapter 3, I develop “educated guesses” about the nature of Central 
Eastern European member states’ contributions to the supranational 
bargaining. Subsequently, I hypothesize about the Council’s existing 
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procedural instruments of dealing with large numbers. I argue that, according 
to what we know about the domestic determinants of supranational agency, 
CEE countries have structural predispositions to passivity, rather than to 
strategic and assertive legislative action. Thus, they constitute a perfect target 
group for the efficiency-promoting procedures, and particularly the voting 
system that encourages majority-compliant behavior. Instead of shaping the 
policy-making process autonomously and directly, CEEs can be expected to 
mimic the old member states or, possibly, to shift the policy conflict upward 
the Council hierarchy, according to the assumption that ministers act more 
confidently than civil servants or diplomats. While these two compensation 
strategies might ceteris paribus increase the conflict within the Council, I argue 
that the Presidency retains several tools to counter these conflictive dynamics 
and catalyze the process towards formal agreement.  
Chapter 4 outlines the research strategy employed to support the 
argument empirically and develop it further. The type of explanation pursued 
in this project can be characterized as causal or mechanism-based. Thus, I 
briefly introduce “process tracing”, a technique to analyze sequential 
interactions in complex systems. Subsequently, I design the link between 
micro-level processes and the macro-level social phenomenon to be explained, 
namely the legislative robustness of the enlarged Council, whereby I recourse 
to the least likely case selection procedure. This procedure suggests that 
choosing hard cases for a given argument increases the confidence that the 
latter might hold across a population or a specific part of it. Before explaining 
what constitutes hard cases for my argument, I narrow down the scope of 
inquiry to regulatory policy-making and justify that choice. After the two 
legislative cases have been introduced, the chapter briefly discusses the kind of 
empirical data collected for the project.   
Chapters 5 and 6 present the case studies: the negotiations on the 
revision of the Working Time Directive and the negotiations on the Directive 
on Patients’ Rights in Cross-Border Healthcare, short the Patient Mobility 
Directive. The cases highlight different aspects of post-Enlargement Council 
politics, although they both represent instances of legislative success despite 
contestation and regionally organized antagonistic preferences.  
The Working Time case demonstrates how the new member states 
from CEE, without realizing or intending it, became part of an old conflict 
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between the proponents of “liberal” and “social” Europe. The case reveals how 
membership change has led to a policy shift and stresses the crucial role of 
individual strategies and negotiation sequences in that context. Finally, the 
case supports the claim that Presidencies enjoy considerable leverage when 
operating in a larger and more diverse environment. However, contingency 
also shapes the success chances of the Chair’s strategic brokerage.  
The Patient Mobility Directive shows how CEE countries together with 
their Southern colleagues failed to shape and, later on, prevent a piece of 
legislation that they opposed, despite their numerical strength as a coalition. In 
particular, the case exemplifies two consequential differences in member 
states’ legislative preparations and behavior. The domestic engagement with 
the policy in question has an impact on the quality of bargaining positions and 
on the chances of these positions being heard and dealt with by the Presidency. 
Furthermore, the type of power resource member states capitalize upon when 
engaging in alliances matters for their sustainability and prospects. In the 
Patient Mobility case, mobilized alliances based upon expertise and 
argumentative strength of their leaders were more successful than 
compounded coalitions, which were large, vote-rich but weekly organized and 
thus fragile. Confronted with asymmetrically distributed abilities to argue for 
own policy concerns and mobilize on these grounds, the Presidency 
strategically navigated towards formal agreement.  
Chapter 7 summarizes and discusses the results of case analyses. I 
argue that my argument has passed the plausibility test, as both cases provided 
similar insights on the core elements of the theoretical framework, from the 
new member states’ bargaining performance to the role of the Presidency in 
efficiency promotion. Even if we take the differences between cases into 
account, and particularly the different levels of politicization and the different 
degrees of conflict, the overall result of the study is that the CEE countries have 
only a secondary impact on the Council’s internal dynamics. The formal 
composition of the decision-making body is but one of several factors that 
shape the way towards agreement. However, the chapter makes clear that my 
explanation remains ambiguous on one fundamental point, namely the 
ultimate reason for CEEs’ poor legislative performance. Is it lacking ability or 
lacking ambition? This analytical differentiation is tempting, as the two 
explanations yield different predictions on CEEs’ future bargaining behavior. 
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While abilities can be enhanced by learning, ambitions are unlikely to change. I 
argue that further research on interconnections between domestic and 
European politics in the realm of interest intermediation or within the 
(national) public space(s) could enhance our understanding of these two 
notions and their relationship.   
The final Chapter 8 restates the argument and highlights the theoretical 
contributions of the project. The results nuance the consensual image of 
Council politics. Not only do the case studies provide insights into the 
organization-related aspects of member states’ power (such as domestic 
preparations or the management of alliances), but they show that legislative 
influence is exercised subtly: on the preparatory stage, through informal 
contacts with the institutional players or during intergovernmental 
interactions which escape a clear classification as adversarial (“hard”) or 
cooperative (“soft”). Furthermore, the project speaks to the literature on 
Presidency effects, suggesting that the Chairs switch their management logics 
throughout the decision-making process, depending on how the negotiation 
goes and on what stage the Presidency takes over. Both insights encourage 
abandoning the assumption of uniformity, which often accompanies the 
analyses of Council politics. Instead, researchers should focus on sequences 
and scope conditions for specific types of interactions and strategies. I argue 
that despite limitations inherent to small-n research, the mechanisms and the 
dynamics I have outlined here are likely to reappear in a particular subset of 
Council politics: cases of high conflict, of general concern, with cross-sectorial 
implications, which touch upon the fundaments and structures of member 
states’ regulatory regimes and in which democratic governments can be 
expected to become involved. The chapter closes with recommendations for 
future research.  
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2 Literature review 
 
This chapter discusses the empirical findings pertinent to the impact of the 
Eastern Enlargement on the work of the Council of Ministers. It starts with a 
reconstruction of the widespread “business as usual” narrative. I show how the 
continuity of legislative output and the continuity of the basic characteristics of 
the political space have led Council researchers to the claim that cooperative 
culture constitutes the reason for the smooth accommodation of Eastern 
Enlargement by the Council. Subsequently, I challenge this explanation on 
empirical grounds, demonstrating that the data on Council processes do not 
entirely match the predictions of the cooperative culture-hypothesis. Finally, I 
argue that in the light of contradictory empirical insights into the impact of 
Enlargement on the Council, two “blind spots” of the hitherto literature merit 
attention: agency and adaptation. Defining what the new member states’ 
legislative behavior can actually contribute to Council processes (agency) and 
understanding the means at Council’s disposal to deal with conflictive pressures 
(adaptation) will pave the way for an alternative explanation of why the 
disruptive effects of large numbers and diversity failed to appear.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The literature about the Council of Ministers has been developing 
rapidly over the last few years. In early days, research on this core institution 
of the EU’s legislative system was descriptive and relied strongly on 
practitioners’ and observers’ relations (Westlake 1995). Meanwhile, we are 
able to analytically disaggregate Council politics in smaller chunks and explore 
different aspects of the complex Council machinery with elaborately assorted 
data sets and modern political science methodology (Naurin and Wallace 
2008b). Models of decision-making processes have been formulated and tested 
(Thomson et al. 2006). The literature has advanced from “rags to riches” 
(Naurin and Wallace 2008a: 1).  
Reflecting a dramatic change in membership and one of the greatest 
transformations the Council of Ministers ever experienced, the Eastern 
Enlargement provided a fresh incentive to study the Council, simultaneously 
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representing a test and a window of opportunity for Council researchers. It 
was a test because analytical instruments and theories are only as good as they 
can help us to define and understand real-world puzzles. Indeed, the enlarged 
Council holds strong puzzling qualities. Seldom, in politics, were a priori 
expectations and a posteriori assessment by both practitioners and 
researchers so divergent as in the case of the historical accession of (mostly) 
post-communist countries to structures made for established capitalist 
democracies (see Chapter 1). Besides, the Eastern Enlargement constitutes a 
window of opportunity because change always stimulates new perspectives on 
the object of study and thus is conducive to new insights. 
The literature about the post-2004 Council politics has generated rich 
and diverse observations, which do not always lend themselves to a coherent 
interpretation. The present chapter systematizes available findings, exposes 
flaws in current theoretical reasoning about the Eastern Enlargement’s impact 
on the Council and identifies research gaps. I argue that the current narrative 
of smooth accommodation of Enlargement by the cooperative culture within 
the Council lacks empirical support. Consequently, an alternative explanation 
of the puzzling continuity of the legislative performance should be developed. 
Furthermore, research has hitherto neglected the notions of member states’ 
agency and adaptation to large numbers, both of which are prominent avenues 
for research on Enlargements’ effects.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section reconstructs the 
argument on continuity of legislative politics in the Council. This argument 
links the findings on legislative performance (2.2.1) with those on the political 
space (2.2.2) postulating that the culture of cooperation represents the 
mechanism that links the two (2.2.3). The subsequent section challenges this 
explanation on empirical grounds. Section four introduces the notions of 
agency and adaptation, which constitute blind spots in current Council 
literature but might contribute to our better understanding of Enlargement’s 
impact on the Council. The final section concludes.  
2.2 Continuity of Council politics after the Eastern Enlargement 
What is actually meant by “continuity” of Council politics after the 
Eastern Enlargement and why do so many observers of EU politics claim that 
nothing has changed after the Eastern Enlargement? In this section, I show that 
not much change has been found since 2004 in two important aspects of 
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Council politics, namely the legislative performance and the political space. 
These observations yield more than simply a descriptive value. Legislative 
performance conceptualized as “output” and the political space as “input” of 
decision-making, these two lend themselves to a model of Council politics. The 
model hypothesizes that variable structure of member state’s preferences 
leads to cooperative culture among them, which in turn enabled the group to 
remain productive despite the change of membership.  
2.2.1 Legislative performance 
The Council of Ministers is above all a legislative institution. As such, it 
can be empirically evaluated, with the quantity of the legislative output, the 
duration of the decision-making process and the quality of the passed 
legislation serving as indicators of performance. All three dimensions of the 
Council’s work have been empirically examined with a comparative focus on 
pre- and post-Enlargement period. By and large, researchers have found a high 
degree of performance stability. This particularly applies to the numerical 
output, where several studies have convincingly demonstrated how robust the 
Council’s legislative achievements remained after 2004. Admittedly, small 
differences between the EU15 and EU25 have been found in the one study 
dealing with the quality of the passed legislation. However, for methodological 
reasons, these results need to be approached with caution.  
The numerical output – the number of legislative acts passed by the 
Council every year – was and remains high5. Wallace calculated that between 
1999 and 2003 the EU adopted around 195 legislative acts every year. This 
number had been followed by 230 in 2004, with a peak in April 2004, just 
before the Eastern Enlargement. The EU25 came up with 130 acts in 2005, but 
197 in 2006 (Wallace 2007: 5). While the drop in 2005 could potentially be 
interpreted as a sign of legislative inertia. given the performance in the 
following year (2006), it is more likely that the lower number of acts adopted 
(2005) resulted from the legislative fervor in 2004. Indeed, very similar 
findings have been obtained elsewhere (Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse 
2007: 13).  
Hertz and Leuffen examined the level of monthly adoption rates 
between 1976 and May 2007 and obtained similar findings regarding the 
                                                          
5  Despite differences in the methods of counting (Hertz and Leuffen 2010: 71; 
Leuffen and Hertz 2010). 
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Eastern Enlargement. In the past 30 years, the monthly average of Council acts 
was 33 (Leuffen and Hertz 2010: 58), whereas EU15 has adopted 35,8 
legislative acts on average per month and the EU25 32.6. Nonetheless, the 
reduction of approximately 9% is not statistically significant (Hertz and 
Leuffen 2008: 16). The Enlargement only produced a short run effect – if any - 
in that the legislative output considerably increased in the months directly 
proceeding the accession of new members and temporarily dropped in the 
months following accession (Leuffen and Hertz 2010).  
Indirectly, the legislative proposals made by the European Commission 
might also serve as an indicator of performance. The reasoning relies on the 
assumption that the Commission proposes (legislative) action only when it 
sees realistic chances for those proposals to become adopted. Häge, who 
counted the proposals for decisions, Directives and regulations, noted a 
modest drop between 2003 and 2004, yet a subsequent increase in 2005 and 
2006 (Häge 2012b). In the long-term perspective (1976-2011), there is a small 
but a non-significant decrease in these numbers: between 1976 and 2004, the 
Council received 235 proposals every year on average (STD 46), compared 
with “only” 190 from 2005 until 2011. However, we have to bear in mind that 
the Commission has aimed for “less but better” legislation in recent decades, 
which might also explain the lower number of proposals (Wallace 2007: 2-3). 
The numerical output is not the only indicator of legislative 
effectiveness. The time needed to pass a decision is also important. Here, all 
Enlargement rounds in the EU’s history slowed-down Council decision-making. 
This effect is clearly observable despite Treaty changes designed to make 
decision-making quicker (Hertz and Leuffen 2011: 212). However, the Eastern 
Enlargement differs from the previous accession rounds in one respect. In the 
past, the slow-down effect of larger numbers disappeared for those acts that 
already needed more time to pass the Council (more than 450 days6). This 
particularly applied to the Southern and Northern Enlargements. By contrast, 
the Eastern Enlargement affected the duration of law-making on all stages, i.e. 
the effect is observable for those acts that spend around 200 days on the 
Council negotiation table as well as for those that take 600 or more days to be 
agreed upon.  
                                                          
6  The mean decision-making time for a directive is 938 days (Hertz and Leuffen 
2011: 211).  
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This finding lends itself to ambiguous interpretations. Slow-down 
effects in instances of (otherwise) rapid law-making could be attributed to the 
increase of transaction costs, as in all previous Enlargement rounds. However, 
additional slow-down of already cumbersome pieces of legislation might 
suggest a higher level of policy conflict. Problematically, the same effects have 
been observed in the case of Greek accession and it is highly unlikely that the 
same slow-down mechanism would operate in the 1981 and 2004 
Enlargements. The authors admit that the link between group size and the 
decision-making speed is underspecified (Hertz and Leuffen 2011: 212). 
What about the policy ambition and the quality of legislative acts 
passed by the Council after the Eastern Enlargement? Arguably, defining the 
criteria of high-quality legislation is conceptually challenging and such a 
debate had not yet taken place in the Council literature (Voermans 2009). 
Consequently, empirical research offers only a few clues about how the Eastern 
Enlargement affected this dimension of Council output. First and foremost, it 
did not have any impact on the “novelty” or innovation of legislative proposals. 
Similar to before 2004, slightly more than half of proposed Community laws 
are new regulations, whereas almost half represent either an amendment or an 
implementation of existing legislation (Settembri 2007: 21, 27).  
However, according to Settembri, the Eastern Enlargement changed the 
proportions of “important” legislative acts dealt with by the Council. He 
classified the examined acts on a five-point scale as “major”, “ordinary” and 
“minor” and concluded that the share of the first two decreased by 
approximately one-third, whereas marginal acts increased by almost one-fifth  
(Settembri 2007: 27). This decline in policy ambition, as the increased duration 
of decision-making, could mean that the Eastern Enlargement has intensified 
the policy conflict among member states.  
Unfortunately, Settembri’s descriptive study does not elaborate upon 
possible mechanisms that changed the nature of Council decisions while 
keeping the numbers constant. Despite being thought provoking, Settembri’s 
results necessitate caution, since he conducts the before-after comparison 
using data collected for January-December 2003 and July 2005-June 2006 only. 
Thus, he covers a very limited period and only considers decisions finalized in 
those two time units. Moreover, Settembri includes in his sample decisions 
from the realm of justice and home affairs, as well as foreign policy, i.e. the 
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former second and third pillar (Settembri 2007: Appendix I). However, the 
institutional decision-making mode and dynamics in those two domains differ 
from the policy-making in the Community mode. Accordingly, the diversity of 
decision processes included in the study as well as the limited period of 
investigation limit the validity of Settembri’s analysis.  
Finally, the Eastern Enlargement could potentially have a negative effect on 
the quality of EU legislation. The increased duration and the decline in policy 
ambition might suggest that the Council struggles with more intense conflicts, 
which - as we know - are often overcome by “editorial means” (Falkner 2011: 
12-13, 247-248). Extended preambles, vague formulations or the increased 
usage of flexible governance mechanisms enable the negotiation parties to 
save face when confronted with the domestic publics, although they also make 
the legislation less clear and can trigger implementation problems. If the 
Eastern Enlargement indeed increased the conflict within the Council, the high 
level of output could come at the cost of increased reliance on “editorial” 
conflict management strategies. Unfortunately, empirical research in this area 
is scarce. A study by Depoorter inquired about the quality of six selected pieces 
of transport legislation between 2003 and 2011, including quantifiable 
information on the length and usage of non-legal statements (recitals) and the 
clarity of the transposition requirements. She found that the Eastern 
Enlargement had no detrimental impact on any of those categories (Depoorter 
2012: 15-17). Here again, one could question the validity of the conclusions on 
methodological grounds, given that the mere counting of words, recitals or 
transposition modalities without any reference to the policy context or 
development over time appears to be a rather rudimentary strategy to grasp 
the “quality of legislation”.  
Overall, the legislative performance of the Council does not seem to have 
suffered too much from the Eastern Enlargement.  
2.2.2 Political space 
The previous section reported that the Eastern Enlargement generally 
did not have major detrimental effects on the Council’s legislative 
performance. After having dealt with the output, this chapter now moves to the 
input to the Council’s policy process. Researchers rely on the concept of 
“political space” when approaching this aspect of legislative politics.  
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The political space schematically represents how the demands voiced 
by collective decision-makers, here the member states, are structured. First, it 
informs whether there are systematic cleavages that divide actors: How many 
are there, and what might they mean? Second, it tells us about the alignment 
patterns: Who groups with, and against, whom? Accordingly, the concept 
allows grasping and explaining systematic conflicts that characterize a given 
decision-making system. Informing the concept of political space empirically 
necessitates a large amount of data, as information is needed on any single 
actor and a sample of decision issues. Moreover, it requires a spatial 
representation of policy-making, thus making it a rather abstract analytical 
tool (see discussion in Benoit and Laver 2012).  
Before the Eastern Enlargement, the policy space of the EU was 
characterized by multidimensionality and, in the special case of the Council, by 
the North-South dualism. “Multidimensionality” means that the policy conflicts 
– understood as the variation of positions or preferences among actors – could 
have been depicted with more than one line7. Existing research points towards 
two conflict lines that structured the political space of EU15, whereby authors 
only cautiously interpret them substantially as an “economic” and “integration 
dimension” (Thomson et al. 2004: 253; Veen 2012: 67).  
The North-South dualism means that countries from the respective 
regions exhibited spatial proximity in their policy positions or preferences8. 
Northern and Southern member states systematically differed regarding their 
views on EU-level policies. This result had been obtained in studies using a 
variety of methods and data, such as expert interviews on policy positions and 
party manifestos (Kaeding and Selck 2005; Zimmer et al. 2005; Veen 2012).  
Given that the geographic location was clearly not what caused these 
patterns, the substantial underpinning of the North-South divide was subject 
to debate. Some authors suggested that what systematically distinguishes 
Northern and Southern member states is their status in the EU budget 
(Zimmer et al. 2005: 411). Others claimed that the conflict is too pronounced 
to be explained exclusively in terms of financial flows and suggested that 
differences in socio-economic structures between the European North and the 
South brought about distinct regulatory preferences: Northern European 
                                                          
7  The dimensions are lines that follow from an empirical representation of actors’ 
position-taking and define the structure of the political space. 
8  Ireland was a non-geographic member of the Southern cluster (Veen 2012: 83).  
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countries would favor market-based solutions, whereas Southern countries 
would support state intervention (Thomson et al. 2004: 255). Both 
interpretations make clear that policy positions in the Council are motivated 
by diverging economic interests of the European North and South, whereby 
“economic interest” can be interpreted in narrow or broader terms, as fiscal or 
regulatory. Accordingly, such findings contrast with the few studies that claim 
to have found evidence for party-political cleavages in the Council (Mattila 
2004; Hagemann and Hoyland 2008)9.  
The interpretation of the North-South cleavage before the Eastern 
Enlargement is all the more complicated given that the bonds within the 
respective regional clusters have been shown to extend beyond the 
preferences and positions that these countries represented in the Council and 
include systematic, long-term cooperation among civil servants and diplomats 
(Beyers and Dierickx 1998: 314; Elgström et al. 2001: 126). The consistency of 
these cooperation patterns across policy-sectors and over time suggests that 
they might be motivated by something other than “interests”, given that the 
latter are assumed to shift on an issue-by-issue basis. Elgström and colleagues 
provide questionnaire-based evidence for a cultural explanation, which 
includes language and history of cooperation (Elgström et al. 2001: 123-125). 
Culture and interests are clearly not mutually exclusive, since “joint culture 
and shared history, combined with similar geographic position, have been 
translated into common interests” (Elgström et al. 2001: 126). Such diversity 
of explanations for the regional clustering of policy preferences in EU15 makes 
it challenging to delineate the changes that the Eastern Enlargement eventually 
brought about.  
What have we learned about the policy space in the enlarged EU? 
Having explicitly researched the distribution of policy positions, deriving the 
latter from expert interviews and government party manifestos respectively, 
the empirical observations by Thomson and Veen are only partly consistent. 
They both agree that the number of dimensions that the political space of the 
Council comprises did not change after Enlargement (Thomson 2009: 765; 
Veen 2012: 82)10.  
                                                          
9  These two studies are informed by an analysis of voting behavior within the 
Council.  
10  Veen has analyzed the political space year-by-year using the government 
manifestos. He concluded that there were three dimensions of conflict in the first 
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The fact that the basic architecture of the post-2004 Council conflict has 
been found stable - as indicated by the number of dimensions - is important, 
given that it tells us that the Eastern Enlargement did not introduce any 
additional division among policy positions of EU decision-makers. New 
member states do not produce distinct substantial conflicts; rather, they 
position themselves along the existing lines, whatever these are defined or 
interpreted. 
Whether and how CEE countries shift the regional groupings of 
countries along these lines is no longer uniformly backed by data. Veen claims 
that West-East has replaced the North-South division in the enlarged EU (Veen 
2012: 79). The cleavage becomes more intense over time. Compared with 2005 
data, in 2007, CEE countries group without exception and accompanied only by 
three old member states at the bottom of the data plot (Veen 2012: 81). 
Looking back at the type of empirical data that Veen uses, we can conclude that 
Eastern governments proclaim policy preferences in their electoral manifestos 
that are systematically distinct from those of their Western counterparts. 
Veen’s analysis extends to the question of which policies are concerned by this 
development. Prior to Enlargement, the North-South Council cleavage was 
systematically found in policies such as Common Agricultural Policy, Structural 
Funds and Market Regulation, whereas after Enlargement, significance has 
only been given to Environmental Protection and Strong European Governance 
(Veen 2012: 77). This means that Enlargement has affected both the “economic 
dimension” (albeit to a limited extent) and the “integration dimension” (Veen 
2012: 78-81). Here, Veen sees empirical support for the hypothesis voiced in 
earlier literature, namely that poor countries exchange support for further 
integration against redistributive side-payments (Veen 2012: 79). However, it 
is surprising that West-East conflict patterns were not as pronounced in the 
typical redistributive areas, such as agricultural or regional policy.  
Thomson’s research based upon interview-derived individual country 
positions on single policy issues questions the stability of the positional 
structures in the Council’s political space. Most fundamentally, Thomson 
inquired about the frequency of the regional groupings and concluded that the 
distribution of policy position typically did not exhibit any single structure at 
                                                                                                                                                           
year after accession, although this number was soon reduced to two, as before 
accession (Veen 2012: 78).  
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all - both before and after Enlargement - as the patterns were only observable 
in a quarter to a third  of all controversies (Thomson 2011: 76). New and old 
member states only disagree in some 30% of controversies.  
Among these 30%, all types of policy issues, which have been shown to 
generate EU-level conflict, are represented11: harmonization, regulation and 
subsidies (Thomson 2011: 69). “Subsidies” generate the most frequent old-
against-new contention (8 out of 18 cases, 44%), although the share is only 
slightly higher than in the “level of harmonization” (21 out of 56, 38%), yet 
clearly higher than the strength of regulation (15 out of 55, 28%). When 
conflicts with the older members arise, the new member states are consistent 
in the policy options that they support. When the levels of integration is at 
stake, the newcomers favor more state competencies; in issues related to 
regulation, CEEs support less regulatory intervention; finally, in controversies 
involving redistribution, the new member states prefer higher subsidies 
(Thomson 2011: 77). This means that the new member states systematically 
share EU-level policy preferences and can offer a collective input, at least in 
some part of the Council’s legislative business.  
Before Enlargement, the diverging positioning of the Northern and 
Southern countries represented the dominant pattern of controversy, even if it 
occurred only in 36% of all controversies. After 2004, the conflict structure 
flattened out and has become more variable. The North-South conflict 
persisted in 30% of cases, but has been complemented by several new 
configurations, such as old-new (30%), North vs. South-East (22%) and North-
East vs. South (15%)12. Thomson interprets these findings as signs of 
continuity – there had been no single, stable and dominant structure of Council 
conflict before and there is none after Enlargement.  
Admittedly, the accession of ten new countries did not lead to a major 
change of the conflict architecture, although this does not mean that the 
Eastern Enlargement left the Council’s political space entirely unaffected. 
Thomson’s data suggests that the pre-Enlargement North-South conflict, to the 
extent that it existed, has been complemented by a regional cluster (East) that 
                                                          
11  From the 158 controversial issues (i.e. particular questions of legislative 
contention), 52 have been classified as “no issue type”. Otherwise, there have been 
56 issues of harmonization, 55 issues of regulation and 18 issues of subsidies 
(Thomson 2011: 69). 
12  In (only) 4% of cases (6 out of 158), no regional alignment within the Council 
could have been found (Thomson 2011: 66). 
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positions itself variably and flexibly alongside these two potential coalitions. In 
the 37% of controversial cases in which the new member countries take policy 
positions close to either their Northern or Southern counterparts, they 
potentially shift the usual Council majorities, which might have implications 
for the politics within the Council. Despite being negligible when considering 
the big picture, Enlargement effects might selectively affect those parts of the 
Council’s legislative business in which intergovernmental conflict already 
existed.  
2.2.3 The mechanism behind legislative robustness  
Explaining the output by the input, while hypothesizing about the 
mechanism that links the two, is probably the most natural thing an analyst or 
a researcher would do. After it became clear that the scenario of the 
Enlargement-induced legislative blockage did not materialize – and this data 
was available as early as in 2008 - Council scholars, such as Thomson or Veen, 
transformed the knowledge they gathered about the political space into a 
theoretical account of the smooth accommodation of the Eastern Enlargement 
by the Council.  
According to these authors, the fact that delegations find themselves in 
different positional configurations on different issues of contestation combined 
with repetitive interactions that characterize EU policy negotiations, foster a 
cooperative attitude among Council members (Thomson 2011: 280; Veen 
2011: 7). National representatives are willing to accommodate and accept 
policy solutions different to those they themselves advocate, well knowing that 
one day they may also find themselves in a minority position. This image of 
Council politics finds confirmation in statistical analysis, in which the 
cooperative bargaining model outperforms the procedural model (Thomson 
2011: Ch.7). This means that there is no need to resort to institutional means 
of conflict management, such as voting, because member states have 
understood the long-term benefits of cooperation. Mutual accommodation has 
replaced hard-nosed bargaining.   
Council members do not need long-term experience in this institution 
to adopt the cooperative attitude. Through seminars and observations of the 
Council work before formally joining the EU, newcomers have had a chance to 
internalize this behavioral norm (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006: 248-249; 
Lempp and Altenschmidt 2008: 519-520; Thomson 2011: 280). Moreover, the 
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new member states made very soon after accession the experience of being 
alternately in the majority and in the minority. Thus, they understood that to 
be heard on their essential interests, they have to accommodate the interests 
of others (Thomson 2011: 281). Apparently, the prediction voiced by Field 
three years before accession fully materialized: “The new member states are 
likely to at least partly adopt the norm that they should allow the smooth 
functioning of the EU’s business to be impeded by their desires to further 
national concerns” (Field 2001: 67-68) 
To put it bluntly, Thomson and Veen claim that it was the cooperative 
culture – or “diffuse reciprocity” as the phenomenon is called elsewhere in the 
literature (Keohane 1986: 4, 19-24) – which prevented the shock of 
membership change from damaging the legislative output. In fact, the 
explanation is only a theoretical presumption. The empirical information it is 
based upon relates to the legislative output and on (positional- and 
preference) input by the member states only and there is no direct information 
on the processes. Nonetheless, Thomson and Veen offer a plausible explanation 
of the Council’s impressive legislative performance despite enlarged 
membership. In addition to the input and output analysis performed with 
reliable empirical methods on large datasets, the argument has the traditional 
claim of Council research on its side, namely that consensus is an important 
ingredient of EU-level intergovernmental decision-making (Heisenberg 2005; 
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006: 330). Furthermore, the argument is 
elegant. As it stands, it does not take stakes in the ontological debate 
surrounding the Council research and is compatible with different, highly 
debated, assumptions on individual behavior within the Council (Hörl et al. 
2005; Heisenberg 2008; Schneider 2008; Princen 2012). It is interesting to 
observe that in terms of the “culture of consensus”, researchers from different 
methodological and ontological traditions meet.  
Plausibility and elegance of an argument do not automatically make it 
persuasive and satisfactory. The remaining sections of this Chapter show that 
the (fragmental) empirical evidence we have on Council processes before and 
after Enlargement speaks against diffuse reciprocity as the main and only 
mechanism of accommodation of enlarged membership. The identified 
incompatibilities between the argument summarized above and the empirical 
picture of the Council’s inner workings pave the way towards alternative 
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explanations of the non-effects of the Eastern Enlargement on legislative 
performance.   
2.3 Challenging the “business as usual” narrative 
Previous section of this chapter summarized the most widespread 
narrative about the impact of the Eastern Enlargement on the Council of 
Ministers, the “business as usual” narrative. The reported argument claimed 
that the change in membership had been absorbed by the cooperative culture – 
or diffuse reciprocity – within the Council and thus did not disrupt the 
Council’s legislative performance.  
The following section challenges this reasoning on empirical grounds. As it 
stands, the argument advanced by Thomson and Veen implies three 
characteristics of the processes within the (enlarged) Council: diffuse 
reciprocity as the dominant logic of action, balanced rates of bargaining 
success across Council members and equivalent bargaining behavior among 
old and new member states. It is highly debatable, whether these claims hold 
empirically. I show that in the light of the available evidence, all three claims 
can be questioned. Accordingly, the current explanation for the Council’s 
legislative robustness after the Eastern Enlargement does not fully convince.  
2.3.1 How much “diffuse reciprocity” is there in the Council? 
Explaining the non-effect of Enlargement on Council legislative 
performance by cooperative culture implies making a general statement on 
how the Council arrives at its decisions, namely by means of mutual 
accommodation and self-restraint. These two make up for a cobweb of 
concessions, benefits and reparations (Veen 2011: 5).  
Per definition, diffuse reciprocity can hardly be observed empirically, 
precisely because it involves exchanges that are spread out over time and 
across policy areas. However, we do not know what the time horizon of Council 
members is. In particular, it is uncertain whether three to five years, which is 
the normal range of permanent representatives’ appointments (Blair 2001: 
140), allow sufficient time for national delegates to the Council to gain an 
experience of reciprocal benefits and thus develop a sense of obligation – one 
which would be stronger towards other member states than the domestic 
government.  
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One may also cast doubts about the willingness of Council officials to 
develop responsibility for potential policy decisions beyond their own 
portfolios. Note that the IR scholarship, where the notion of reciprocity has 
been developed, only described exchanges within one policy regime, such as 
international trade (Keohane 1986: 23-24). In the case of the Council, both its 
sectorial structure, as well as the fact that the bulk of legislative work is 
completed in highly specialized working parties, make exchanges across policy 
areas highly unlikely13.  
Therefore, we cannot tell whether sequences of executed debts and 
credits do indeed exist in Council politics. An analysis of bargaining outcomes 
over time – and how they relate to member states interests’ – is a possibility to 
approach this problem. However, we also do not have compelling empirical 
results on this point, as the next section (3.2) argues.  
 There is yet another argument which speaks against the diffuse 
reciprocity as a universal account of how the Council arrives at its decisions 
and how it deals with membership change. Council researchers identified 
different logics of action within this institution and they agree that no one 
provides an exhaustive account of how Council members act (Lewis 2008a: 
181-182; Warntjen 2010: 675). Representatives of the two (rival) theoretical 
traditions, the constructivist and the rationalist, agree that no theory captures 
the full story. Norm-guided behavior, associated with a strong orientation 
towards consensus seems to co-exist alongside power politics. As Lewis has 
put it: “being successful in the Council […] involves a mix of egoism and 
adherence to community standards” (Lewis 2008a: 181). Thus, there is no 
single and universal scheme of conduct that Council actors uniformly follow.  
Whereas the existence of two types of legislative behavior in the 
Council – a norm-oriented (cooperative) and utility-oriented (competitive) – 
has been confirmed in the broader literature, research on the scope conditions 
for the two main logics to operate remains in its infancy (Warntjen 2010: 675). 
Analyzing the GMO policy-making Pollack and Shaeffer enumerate the 
                                                          
13  The growing complexity of EU policies and the expanding nature of EU law 
exacerbate this trend. Indeed, country studies on EU policy-coordination find that 
“sectoralization” intensifies as Permanent Representations grow to adapt to 
expanding tasks and national ministerial officials commonly support Brussels-
based representatives in Working Party or COREPER meetings (Menon 2001: 88-
89). Besides, “sectoralization” tends to be strong in member states with high 
minsterial autonomy, such as Germany (Maurer and Wessels 2001: 123). 
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conditions, under which the Council cannot afford consensual decision-making. 
These include the time pressure (especially when a rule needs to be 
implemented quickly), high politicization and visibility (Pollack and Shaffer 
2008: 160-162). Moreover, they argue that the complexity of the legislative 
matter, which is generally supposed to strengthen the accommodative attitude 
of decision-makers and their consensual orientation, might led to 
empowerment of highly organized and resourceful interest groups who 
subsequently overtake the influence over the policy content (Pollack and 
Shaffer 2008: 161). Furthermore, the propensity to pursue more competitive 
bargaining tactics vary across countries and across governments (Dür and 
Mateo 2010a; 2010b). For instance, countries such as the UK or Spain have 
been reported to be systematically prone to power politics (Lewis 2008a: 182, 
184). The observation that Council logics of action are variable not only 
benefits from case study evidence and selective information by Council 
members, but also from quantified and systematically analyzed interview data 
(Naurin 2010: 32).  
Certainly, there are compelling indices that make the notion of diffuse 
reciprocity plausible. However, at a closer look and when confronted with 
empirical evidence, it seems that the notion covers only a part of the Council 
business. As such, it cannot offer an exhaustive answer to the question, how 
the Council has accommodated larger and more diverse membership.  
2.3.2 The distribution of bargaining success 
Diffuse reciprocity can only work, if, in the long term, the negotiations’ 
results equally satisfy the participants’ interests. The mechanism of 
“cooperative exchange” (Thomson 2011: 281) – or the “cobweb of agreements” 
as Veen has framed it (Veen 2011: 5) – assumes that Council members would 
refrain from competitive strategies in policy negotiations and relax their 
demands on some issues, knowing that they will gain their preferred deal in 
policies that are salient to them. The practice of self-restraint is expected to 
pay-off for everybody. Equal rates of bargaining success, to the same extent as 
the positional diversity, make the members cooperative and increase the 
productivity of the group as a whole.   
The empirical assessment of bargaining success across time and 
member states is methodologically and empirically challenging. The DEU 
project, which has collected interview information about the structure of 
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decision situations in a large number of issues (including the status quo, 
proposal, member states’ positions, outcome) as well as quantified this 
information, represents a milestone here (Thomson et al. 2006). Researchers 
who used that data to explore bargaining success of member states defined the 
latter as the absolute distance between decision outcomes and member states’ 
positions (Bailer 2004: 109; Arregui and Thomson 2009: 655). They concluded 
that there are no winners and losers of Council negotiations over time (Bailer 
2004: 112; Arregui and Thomson 2009: 671; Thomson 2011: 280). Moreover, 
Thomson and Arregui’s research suggests that the new member states 
systematically get a good deal. In spatial analysis of the controversial Council 
issues in the 2004-2005 period, policy outcomes are located very closely to 
new member states’ preferred policy options (Arregui and Thomson 2009: 
670).  
Interestingly, the claim that bargaining success is evenly distributed 
among all member states had recently been challenged on methodological 
grounds. Using the same data as the previous studies, Golub had shown that 
once salience is included in the measure of negotiation gain or loss, member 
states exhibit considerable differences in their bargaining success (Golub 
2012: 1302). This becomes particularly clear, if one compares member states’ 
performances in a dyadic way (Golub 2012: 1302). The pattern that emerges 
from his analysis seems to be that some large states lose disproportionately to 
some smaller member states, although the standard explanations such as the 
preference extremity, proximity to an institutional player or the network 
capital fail to account for this surprising finding (Golub 2012: 1306). Including 
issue salience in the dependent variable as Golub did, Cross confirmed that 
member states indeed achieve different rates of bargaining success (Cross 
2013: 14). Unfortunately, salience-enriched measures of bargaining success 
only exist for the pre-Enlargement period.  
Are there other means of measuring bargaining success? Some Council 
researchers interpret the cast of negative votes an admission of negotiation 
failure (VoteWatch Europe 2012: 11). From this perspective, the rejection 
rates per country might serve indirectly as a measure of bargaining success. 
Negative votes are not equally distributed among member states. In the past, 
large member states such as Germany or the UK (but not France) were those to 
cast most negative votes, followed by Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands 
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(Hayes-Renshaw et al. 2006: 169). In the first years after the Eastern 
Enlargement, the latter were those most prone to voting “no”, with the UK 
ranked fourth and Germany fifth (Hosli et al. 2011: 1256). According to latest 
calculations, the negative vote rates among large and smaller Northern 
member states has evened out, although the Northern European countries still 
lead the ranks of naysayers (VoteWatch Europe 2012: 12-13).  
Whether the voting behavior is a viable measure of bargaining success 
is highly debatable. Strangely, several countries most likely to vote “no” are 
also those attributed with quite rich power resources, especially when 
negotiation skills and information are taken into account. Bailer explored how 
member states’ bargaining power is perceived by the participants of Council 
negotiations and concluded that many Northern member states over-perform 
in relation to their voting power (Bailer 2006: 366-369).  
The fact that the countries thought about as powerful are those that 
most often reject the bargaining outcome is a paradox of Council politics. 
Potentially, the act of opposing the majority serves as a symbolic expression of 
determinacy in the usage of own resources, rather than as an admission of 
bargaining failure. As the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer once put it, 
“one has to become unpopular to be taken seriously”. Accordingly, the ability 
to manifest one’s discontent and the ability to advance convincingly one’s 
interests might be related and both lead to respect by negotiation partners.  
As we see, the mechanisms of winning and losing EU-level policy 
negotiations are not yet well understood. Neither the distances between 
positions and outcomes (coded a posteriori), nor the recorded behavior, nor 
the indices of subjectively perceived power provide convincing answers to the 
question whether all EU member states “get what they want” to a similar 
extent and in similar frequency. The problem might be methodological, as the 
abovementioned variables measure bargaining success only punctually, 
without taking into account the negotiation dynamics and context. At best, we 
can say that the proxies we currently have cast doubts in equal distribution of 
success.  
2.3.3 Are the new member states like the old ones? 
The final critique towards the existing explanation of the Council’s 
impressive legislative performance after the Eastern Enlargement is that it 
neglects the question of systematic differences in the legislative behavior 
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between the new and the old member states. The argument put forward by 
Thomson explicitly claims that the new member states had been perfectly 
prepared to participate in the Council’s legislative work thanks to the training, 
which the future EU officials received, and the observatory status these 
countries have enjoyed (Thomson 2011: 280). Having realized the 
consequences of positional diversity, the new member states soon started 
investing in long-term relationships with a broad range of allies (Thomson 
2011: 280). 
That CEE countries mastered the “rules of the game” from day one of 
their EU membership, is highly unlikely. Country studies show that newcomers 
experience a period of apprenticeship, which culminates in the assumption of 
the first Council Presidency by the given country (Laffan and O'Mahony 2008: 
35-42). Note that CEE countries are in a disadvantaged position here since, due 
to the larger membership, they have to wait for this function much longer and 
experience this privilege less often in comparison to EU15.  
In fact, if we consider the available data on legislative behavior of 
Council members, we discover that the new member states differ from the old 
ones on several dimensions, such as recorded behavior, the usage of 
arguments, interventions and networks.  
The new member states are less prone to cast negative votes than their 
old counterparts. For the 2004-2006 period, Hosli and colleagues calculated 
the average of 9.8 for EU25, 11.2 for the old and 7.7 for the new member states 
(Hosli et al. 2011: 1256)14. The new member states less often express their 
concerns in Council minutes, attached to the voting results (VoteWatch Europe 
2012: 12). Avoiding negative votes, or other forms of manifest disagreement, 
might be “typical” for new countries. However, empirical evidence does not 
support this reasoning. For instance, Sweden often opposed EU legislation 
after it joined the EU in 1995 and only few years later slightly moderated its 
behavior (Mattila and Lane 2001: 44; Lewis 2008a: 176-177). These findings 
suggest that there are indeed two logics of behavior in the Council – advance of 
own interests and consensus-seeking – and both have to be learned. The new 
                                                          
14  Hagemann calculated these rates on a six-month basis and showed that the rates 
for the new member states are changing rapidly (falling in 2005, rising in 2006). 
Unfortunately, she counts Hungary as a “Central” member state (together with 
Germany and the Netherlands) and Slovenia as a “Southern” member state 
(Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse 2007: 19).  
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member states have perhaps been very good in adapting to the latter and only 
slowly learn how to practice the former.  
If the new member states have been so good in adopting the 
“cooperative culture”, as many authors claim, it is surprising to note that they 
make only very limited use of arguing, which is often associated with 
cooperative, norm-oriented behavior (Warntjen 2010: 670-671). Naurin has 
explored the practice of giving reasons for one’s position in the Council, finding 
that the new member states explain their positions less frequently than their 
old counterparts (Naurin 2010: 47-48). Furthermore, newcomers rarely 
intervene in the legislative process. Cross’s data on member states 
interventions clearly shows that the new member states lag behind the old 
ones in how often they deploy the formal means of expressing their position 
(Cross 2012: 58).  
What the new member states certainly do, similarly to the older ones, is 
networking, understood as the maintenance of regular contacts with officials 
from other member states (Beyers and Dierickx 1998; Naurin and Lindahl 
2008; Naurin 2009; Naurin and Lindahl 2010). They are connected among each 
other, whereby the Baltics and the Visegrad countries form two distinct groups 
(Naurin and Lindahl 2008: 74). However, there is one interesting difference 
between old and new. Each regional group in the Council has its “network 
hub”. Germany and the UK hold the Northern countries together 
(Scandinavians, the Netherlands), France and Spain are the favorite contact 
partner for the Southern countries and Poland for the CEEs. Nonetheless, there 
are considerable differences in the network capital among these five players, 
which are all large-sized and centrally located in their respective regions.  
As the figure below shows, Poland scores tenth, with the network 
capital15 index disproportionately low to its size and voting weight (Naurin and 
Lindahl 2008: 71-72). This means that the intergovernmental contacts of CEE 
countries are less focused on the main player in the region. Poland’s relatively 
low network capital might not only imply that Poland has more modest 
negotiation resources at its disposal, but might also indicate distinct (if any?) 
leadership dynamics in the region. 
                                                          
15  Network capital is defined as the frequency of being mentioned as a cooperation 
partners by others (Naurin 2007: 8) 
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In sum, there are systematic differences in legislative behavior of old 
and new member states. These should not have occurred in the current 
account of post-Enlargement Council politics. In the “cooperative culture” 
argument, all member states were supposed to practice the Council’s 
legislative negotiations in a very similar way, at least in the long term. The 
picture that emerges from the data is one of the newcomers’ excessive self-
restraint when approaching the decision-making process. Nonetheless, there is 
no compelling (theoretical) reason why some countries would outperform 
others in the absorption of the cooperative norm. Rather, one would presume 
that Council politics is much more diverse and that systematic differences in 
legislative action between old and new member states might be relevant in 
approaching the question of legislative robustness. This observation will be 
further developed in the following parts of this thesis.  
2.4 Missing pieces: agency and adaptation  
The chapter has argued thus far that the current explanation of the 
Council’s stable legislative performance after the Eastern Enlargement is not 
sufficiently convincing. There are empirical problems with the cooperative 
culture – or diffuse reciprocity - being the main mechanism of absorption of 
large numbers. Evidence pertinent to the question which logic of action 
dominates the Council is highly inconclusive; Equivalence of bargaining 
success among member states – the condition of rational cooperation to work 
– is questioned. Finally, new and old member states differ in their legislative 
Figure 1 Network capital of EU member states  
Source: Naurin and Lindahl 2008 
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behavior – a phenomenon that should not have occurred if the newcomers, as 
the argument goes, have had a good command of Council practices already 
before their membership. Plausible theoretical reasoning and data do not 
speak the same language, which opens up the necessity to develop an 
alternative account of how the Council has accommodated the Eastern 
Enlargement and why the changed membership does not show any effects on 
the institutional performance. 
The literature discussed not only demonstrated the weaknesses of the 
current explanation of Enlargements’ (non-)effects, but also exposed a blind 
spot in Council research in general, namely member states’ legislative 
behavior, or agency. Note that the research reviewed deliver counterintuitive 
and even competing insights precisely on this point. Consider what we have 
learned about the eight new member states from Central and Eastern Europe: 
they constitute a group, systematically sharing preferences and maintaining 
contacts among each other. Nonetheless, they practice excessive self-restraint 
when entering the legislative arena. Interestingly, the apparent passivity of 
these countries does not inhibit their negotiation performance – as far as we 
can tell anything meaningful about the latter. Bargaining outcomes seem close 
to their preferences and they only cast few negative votes. As they stand, these 
isolated observations fail to provide a coherent picture of what the new 
member states actually contribute to Council politics. Their quality as a group 
contrasts with their passivity.  
Our knowledge about the relationship between membership change and 
legislative dynamics within the Council after the Eastern Enlargement is based 
upon selective snapshots, rather than on causal mechanisms. The reason for 
this deficit is of methodological nature. Instruments of quantitative research 
are ill-equipped to grasp a complex phenomenon such as legislative agency. 
Individual government’s behavior in a decision situation is based upon three 
sources – domestic preferences, material constraints and the choices made by 
others (Scharpf 1997: 38-43; Stein 1999: 198). Thus, legislative agency extends 
across political arenas (domestic and supranational), evolves over time, is 
dynamic and reflexive. These features make it very difficult to explore with 
standardized, large data sets.  
In fact, there have been few attempts to integrate agency-related variables 
in quantitative, statistics-based Council research (Bailer 2004; Cross 2013). 
 Literature review
 
45 
 
Their common conclusion is that individual agency explains the Council 
outcomes to a much lesser extent than factors beyond member states’ control 
(Bailer 2004: 116; Cross 2013: 21). However, both pieces of research 
considered only one small part of what the notion of agency encompasses, 
namely the number of formal interventions and attributed negotiation skills. 
The domestic preparation of negotiation positions or the reactive components 
of legislative agency have been entirely ignored in Council research to date 
(Golub 2012: 1308).  
Our hitherto rather rudimentary understanding of agency in the Council of 
Ministers opens up several questions related to the Enlargement’s impact on 
this institution: How, and to what extent, do the newly joined member states 
contribute to policy processes and affect Council outcomes? What does the 
presence of new member states imply for the rest of the group? Can the 
dynamics that emerge between the old and the new member states explain the 
robust legislative performance? Answering these questions would not only 
allow making sense of the seemingly contradictory findings on the newcomers’ 
action in the Council, but would also contribute to an alternative explanation of 
the Council’s legislative stability.  
The new member states’ apparently inconspicuous legislative behavior, 
despite their group qualities, is puzzling for yet another reason. While the 
Council’s numerical legislative output remained constant, there are subtle 
signs that the level of conflict within that institution might have increased. Two 
findings suggest such conclusion: first, the increased duration of the legislative 
process, which, for the first time in the history of accessions, meets both the 
“quick” and the more “cumbersome” legislation (Hertz and Leuffen 2011: 211); 
and second, the increased usage of Council minutes, in which member states 
express their dissatisfaction with the policy outcome, instead of rejecting a 
legislation in a formal vote (Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse 2007: 14). 
Whereas the first could alternatively be interpreted as a manifestation of 
increased transaction costs, the second is a convincing indicator of more 
intense conflict.  
Council minutes do not have authoritative, binding power and they do not 
change the substance of the policy formally agreed. However, they might be 
used in Court “as part of the argument upholding a particular interpretation” 
(Nicoll 1995: 122). Council minutes are not simply submitted by the member 
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states, but rather they are subject to lengthy negotiations with the respective 
Council bodies (such as the Presidency) and have to be formally approved by 
the group. The content and the expected impact of the minutes might be very 
diverse, but they all have in common the basic function, namely assuring that 
national interests play the key role in Council politics, even if they are not 
reflected in the policy outcome to the delegations’ satisfaction (Nicoll 1995: 
122). 
That the enlarged Council experiences more intense policy conflicts, 
understood as situations in which reconciling antagonistic parties is 
particularly challenging, appears plausible. The policy space research 
discussed earlier in the chapter (2.2.2) has shown that the new member states 
position themselves on already established conflict lines. They do so while 
aligning variably with both Northern and Southern member states, which 
themselves regularly differ in their positions. This means that, in cases of 
structured position-taking, the newcomers have the potential of changing 
majorities on the established conflict dimensions. Minority positions might 
benefit from new support and balanced actors constellations might experience 
power shifts. Ceteris paribus, this should lead to policy change and the 
accompanying conflict would subsequently manifest itself in longer decision-
making duration or higher rates of expressed disappointment.  
The high level of legislative output and constantly low level of negative 
votes suggest that Council conflicts continue to be successfully managed. For 
the areas in which, as hypothesized above, increased numbers brought about 
increased conflict, it would be obviously worth knowing how the Council of 
Ministers adapted. Given the EU’s impressive repertoire of conflict-minimizing 
techniques (Falkner 2011: 250), it is unlikely that the enlarged Council will 
reveal new modes of conflict accommodation. Rather the Eastern Enlargement 
might have highlighted the importance of the existing mechanisms, such as the 
institutions that organize Council processes. In statistical research, procedural 
factors, such as the majority voting system, did not exhibit very large 
explanatory potential on Council outcomes. Nonetheless, similarly to the 
notion of “agency”, “procedures” might by conceptually misrepresented in 
large-n studies. However, their relevance might be better understood if an 
empirical analysis not only takes into account their formal existence, but also 
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the ways in which they restrict or enable specific legislative action (Scharpf 
1997: 38-43). 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has made two arguments. First, the notion of “cooperative 
culture” as the explanation of the Council’s impressive legislative performance 
after the Eastern Enlargement does not fully convince. Second, despite being 
diverse and informative, the current literature on post-Enlargement Council 
politics leaves us with two open questions: How does the membership change 
affect the legislative agency within the Council? Moreover, with what means 
did the Council adapt to increased numbers, especially in cases of intense 
policy conflict? This thesis aims to inform these questions, as well as exploring 
whether the notions of agency and adaptation might provide an alternative 
explanation of why the dramatic change in membership has left the Council’s 
legislative performance undisrupted.  
The literature review has demonstrated that, when taken together, 
current findings on post-Enlargement Council politics cannot easily be 
interpreted into a coherent account of what enlarged membership implies for 
this institution and how it is coped with. The difficulty results from the fact 
that information about different stages of the policy process has been collected 
separately and in a synchronic way, i.e. across member states and negotiation 
issues. However, causal relations, which are an important component of a 
political science explanation, can be better explored when sequences and the 
context are taken into account. Therefore, informing the questions of agency 
and adaptation to large numbers requires an empirical approach, which would 
allow examining how Council negotiations unfold in time. Qualitative inquiry, 
and particularly the process tracing approach discussed in Chapter 4, are best 
suited for this purpose.  
What kind of account of Council politics will emerge when we take 
agency and adaptation as the analytical concepts of reference and study them 
qualitatively to retain conceptual validity? Being a small-n inquiry, the present 
research will certainly not be able to provide a universal formula of how the 
Council works. Rather, it will advance our knowledge of mechanisms, 
understood as sequences of legislative behavior that are likely to repeatedly 
occur under given conditions (Mayntz 2004: 240). The explanation of the 
Council’s legislative robustness that this dissertation aims to advance stresses 
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the relevance of processes and puts the “politics” within the Council forward. 
In this respect, it differs from the “cooperative culture” hypothesis, which 
empirically draws upon the structure of the Council’s input, namely the 
political space.   
To gain a sense of what these mechanisms could be, the next section 
outlines a loose set of theoretical expectations about the legislative dynamics 
in the enlarged Council of Ministers. In particular, it speculates about the new 
member states’ agency, while applying existing knowledge about the domestic 
underpinnings of supranational bargaining to these countries. Subsequently, it 
presents a few conjectures on how formal decision-making procedures enable 
the Council to deal with large numbers and what adaptation scenarios one can 
expect. 
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3 Theoretical framework 
 
Following the conclusions of the literature review, the present chapter formulates 
theoretical presumptions about the quality of the new member states’ 
contributions to the bargaining processes and about the institutional means at 
the Council’s disposal to cope with large numbers and diversity. I propose a two-
step theoretical argument to account for the legislative robustness of the 
enlarged Council. I claim that the new member states from Central Eastern 
Europe are unlikely to become influential participants of legislative negotiations, 
as they are less well endowed with domestic resources relevant for supranational 
action than their older counterparts. Having structural predispositions to 
legislative passivity, rather than to assertiveness about own policy interests, the 
newcomers constitute a perfect target group for the efficiency-promoting Council 
procedures. Although CEE countries can compensate for their bargaining 
deficiencies in at least two ways, I argue that the voting procedures and the 
Presidency’s management strategies retain their catalytic effects. Thus, the 
likelihood of the Council’s institutional advantages to induce agreement remains 
high even in a larger and more diverse Council.  
 
3.1 New member states’ legislative behavior  
The previous chapter revealed that there are instances of both 
similarity and contrast between the old and the new member states. The new 
member states from Central Eastern Europe take positions on established 
conflict lines, which have been structuring the EU’s political space for years, 
such as redistribution, harmonization and regulation. As the old member 
states, the newcomers sometimes position themselves as a regional bloc, but 
often their views do not correspond to their geographical proximity. In cases in 
which the Council tends to divide over regional lines, the newcomers have the 
potential to shift established majorities.  
While the newcomers largely blend rather well into the Council’s 
variable political space, they exhibit some differences in behavior, which, as I 
argued, are difficult to interpret coherently. The literature review drew a 
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picture of shy and reserved decision-makers, whose passivity contrasted with 
their group qualities and their apparently high level of bargaining success.  
In this chapter, I propose a conceptual framework to assess CEE 
countries’ contributions to the legislative process. I make two assumptions. 
Firstly, I subscribe to the view advanced in the earlier, more descriptive 
Council literature that being a Council member puts on member states 
significant demands. In order to exploit their position as decision-makers fully, 
governments need to be well informed and well organized, yet this criterion is 
not always and not uniformly fulfilled (Wright 1996; Wallace 2002: 335; 
Richardson 2006). Secondly, I assume that resources and incentives for 
governments to become active on EU policy arenas are largely located on the 
domestic level (Bulmer 1983; Putnam 1988; Börzel 2005). In other words, 
there are strong domestic drivers of EU-level legislative action.  
Adopting these two assumptions enables me to make “guesses” about 
the new member states’ bargaining behavior, based upon a brief analysis of 
these countries’ endowment with relevant administrative and political 
resources. I show that CEE countries differ systematically from their Northern 
and Southern counterparts regarding four domestic features, which as far as 
we can tell, are conducive to effective supranational bargaining strategies: the 
professionalism of the public administration, the density of economic interest 
groups as well as the EU-related opinions within the broad public and within 
the party systems.  
I argue that CEE countries will experience difficulties when positioning 
themselves in Council negotiations and crafting bargaining strategies with 
which they would see their eventual preferences accommodated. Relying on 
public administrations still undergoing organizational and quality reforms as 
well as having historically weak systems of interest intermediation, CEE 
countries might be poorly endowed to cope effectively with the complexity of 
the EU policy-making system. Furthermore, what appears as a largely 
uncritical public and lukewarm partisan opinion on EU affairs provides a 
rather discouraging context for top CEE policy-makers to become involved in 
the supranational legislative process. For these reasons, persuasive and 
distinct positions, which would make a difference to how Council negotiations 
develop, should not be expected from CEE countries. These countries seem to 
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have structural predispositions to legislative passivity, rather than to 
assertiveness about own policy interests.  
Clearly, legislative behavior is a complex phenomenon. To trace 
assertiveness and effectiveness back to just four simple domestic factors, two 
of which are merely contextual (public opinion and party systems), might be a 
simplistic way of approaching this notion. Nonetheless, my framework does 
not pretend to provide a deterministic scenario of how the newcomers will 
perform in Council negotiations. It merely employs the available knowledge 
about domestic determinants of supranational negotiation behavior to make 
educated guesses about these countries’ contributions to Council processes, as 
well as whether these contributions could make a difference to the legislative 
dynamics. While the public opinion and the party systems provide a rather 
loose context to supranational agency, the domestic deficiencies in public 
administrations and interest intermediation are likely to cause delays in 
position formation and prevent CEE governments from active lobbying for 
their own cause. I also argue that there are at least two compensation 
strategies that CEE countries might employ to shape Council negotiations and 
make them more conflictive, despite their underlying resource problem.  
3.1.1 Domestic resources for intergovernmental bargaining 
What is needed to make oneself heard when co-deciding policies in the 
European Union? To formulate a bargaining position, governments need to 
carefully screen the domestic environment to estimate costs and benefits the 
EU policies will bring (Laffan 2006: 688). This information comes from an 
interplay between the public administration and interest groups (Haverland 
and Liefferink 2011: 179). Interest groups possess specialized knowledge on 
how a given policy operates on the ground. They can best assess the needs and 
costs of different policy solutions. Moreover, interests groups tend to be highly 
“Europeanized”. They monitor policy developments in Brussels and have 
access to important fora of policy formulation. Thanks to this asset, they can 
make their governments attentive towards upcoming initiatives and alleviate 
the selection problems that overburdened governments face. In turn, public 
administration is important for supranational agency, because it brings in the 
relevant legal and procedural expertise. On both dimensions, Central and 
Eastern European countries lag behind their Western European counterparts. 
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3.1.1.1 Public administration 
In comparative research on the quality of administration, CEE countries 
make up the rear in Europe. Dahlström and colleagues have measured how 
“professional” bureaucracies are, i.e. to what extent recruitment and 
promotion are merit-based instead of politicized (Dimitrova 2002: 180; 
Dahlström et al. 2010: 22). The scores of EU countries form a continuum 
(Figure 2), whereby the Northern member states, and especially the 
Scandinavians, can be found at the top, Southern member states form the 
middle of the group and the Central Eastern European countries bring up the 
rear.  
Source: Dahlström et. al. 2010 
Qualitative research dealing with public administration in CEE 
countries argues that the reform of this area after the fall of communism had 
been disappointing. Modernization of bureaucracy failed to live up with 
expectations (Goetz 2001: 1035). The main direction of administrative reforms 
in the region is towards the Weberian public bureaucracy, rather than towards 
the new public management, which dominates in Western European countries 
(Goetz 2001: 1034). Coordination of EU affairs in CEEs might be inhibited by 
the fact that their administrations suffer from weak linkages between 
internationally oriented bureaucratic “enclaves” and those focused on the 
domestic scene (Goetz 2001: 1038).  
Domestic coordination systems for EU policy undergo many shifts and 
fall often victim to power politics (Dimitrova and Toshkov 2007: 982). As they 
stand today, CEE coordination systems exhibit rather comprehensive, in 
contrast to selective, coordination ambitions (Gärtner et al. 2011: 96). This 
clearly sets them apart from countries such as Spain, Portugal or Ireland, 
which might serve as models for CEEs given parallels in wealth, peripheral 
Figure 2 Bureaucratic professionalism in EU countries 
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location or size. Most CEE countries opted for strongly decentralized 
coordination structures, following the German-Austrian, rather than the 
British-French path (Gärtner et al. 2011: 96). However, there is no clear 
assessment how decentralized coordination impacts on legislative 
effectiveness. In the mid-1990s it was argued that decentralized structures 
have adverse effects on legislative action, centralization being conducive to 
credibility, coherence and consistency across national representatives 
participating in EU-level processes (Metcalfe 1994: 285-287; Spence 1995a: 
363). These views have been questioned in early-2000s as decentralized 
systems were praised for their flexibility and consensus culture, more fitting 
the alleged style of EU bargaining (Kassim et al. 2001: 330). 
In sum, while there is no institutional divide between public 
administrations in the CEE region as compared to the rest of the continent, the 
newcomers still grapple with the quality and stability of their administrative 
apparatus. Executive institutions are not very well shielded from personal and 
partisan power struggles and there is coordination improvement to be made.  
3.1.1.2 Interest intermediation 
The division between old and new member states is also clear if we 
consider the fabric of the interest intermediation systems. The density of both 
interest groups as well as business associations is visibly lower in CEE 
countries than in the rest of EU members (Figure 3). While there are numerous 
historical explanations for the weakness of trade unions in CEE countries 
(Avdagic 2003; 2006), it is also interesting to note that employers’ 
organizations are equally weak. This is surprising, given that CEEs often 
position themselves as liberal and business-friendly (Bohle and Greskovits 
2006: 3). On the other hand, given the foreign ownership of companies, a weak 
political representation of business is less surprising (Nölke and Vliegenthart 
2009: 676). Small and medium enterprises with domestic capital face severe 
organizational problems (McMenamin 2002: 301). 
Given the loose structure of the interest intermediation system, it is no 
surprise that the involvement of interest groups in the policy process in CEE is 
weak (Fink-Hafner 2011: 216). Indeed, transition and EU accession have only 
aggravated this weakness.  
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The domestic weakness of interest intermediation systems in the 
region is mirrored by a sparse representation of CEE interests groups on the 
European level, as evident from Figure 4. Poland, the largest and the wealthiest 
CEE country has less registered lobby organizations than Denmark or Austria, 
both considerably smaller states (Wonka et al. 2010: 468).  
Source: Wonka, Baumgartner et al. 2010  
 
Several researchers have argued that limited financial resources 
constitute the most significant challenge faced by CEE interest groups 
(Borragán 2006: 149; Pleines 2011: 516). Other observers claim that there are 
much deeper reasons for the weakness. Similarly to public administrations, 
interest groups seem to suffer from problems with multiple-level coordination. 
European organizations often do not receive quality input from their domestic 
Figure 3 Density of trade unions and employers’ organizations 
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Figure 4 Number of registered lobby groups 
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entities, which often fail to deliver solid background analysis that could be 
used as supporting material for lobby activities (Charrad 2010: 158; Cianciara 
2012). Furthermore, a negative attitude towards lobbying prevails in CEE, as 
the contacts between business and politics are associated with corruption, 
rather than with pluralistic interest representation (Charrad 2010: 165). 
Indeed, personal relations and informality seem to play an important role in 
lobbying activities of CEE firms (Sallai 2013: 948).  This type of “culture” might 
have negative implications on specific interests being openly pronounced and 
discussed as part of a country’s policy strategy or economic interest in the 
European Union. In addition, organizational deficits, such as low 
representativeness as well as superficial interest in EU issues prevent CEE 
interests groups from becoming natural partners of governments in 
determining the rights policy choices.  
3.1.1.3 Public opinion 
When negotiating EU policies, governments can increase their 
bargaining power while pointing at the skepticism of the domestic public and 
projecting future ratification and implementation problems (Schelling 1963; 
Putnam 1988). Finke has shown that the Schelling-conjecture applies to Treaty 
negotiations, where governments’ positions do correspond to the median 
voter’s preferences mediated by the strength of national scrutiny and the 
choice of ratification instruments (Finke 2009: 499-501). Dür and Mateo 
postulate that the more Eurosceptic the population the higher the likelihood of 
a government to recourse to hard bargaining associated with a firm 
commitment to the “national interest”  (Dür and Mateo 2010a: 566).  
In order to serve as an asset in EU legislative bargaining and provide an 
incentive for the government to become involved in policy formulation on the 
EU level, the domestic public should be critically attentive towards EU politics. 
Critical attention comes from high salience of EU issues for a given society, 
differentiated knowledge on EU issues and some degree of contention on this 
dimension. There is certainly a path dependent component in terms of how a 
society relates to EU issues (e.g. a history of referenda).  
Accordingly, it seems that “critical attention” is not what characterizes 
the attitude of the CEE public towards the EU. Not only is the level of support 
for the EU consistently higher in CEEs (see Figure 5), but citizens in the new 
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member states also have a much stronger preference for centralized EU-level 
decisions than their counterparts in the old countries (Ahrens et al. 2007: 463). 
They would like to see EU involvement even in those policy fields where 
decentralized administration is clearly more efficient, such as health and social 
welfare, education, as well as juvenile crime (Ahrens et al. 2007: 465). A 
possible explanation for this finding is a combination of high level of trust in 
EU institutions accompanied by a critical assessment of domestic 
administrations. Garry and Tilley find that the positive retrospective 
evaluation of the EU’s economic contribution to citizens’ welfare accounts for 
stronger EU support in the East compared to the West (Garry and Tilley 2009: 
537).  
Source: Eurobarometer 74, 2010 
 
The accession process certainly neither offered sufficiently time and 
opportunity for a critical debate about the EU, nor was its nature open to a 
deeper collective reflection about the type of policies the EU actually produces. 
Referenda related to EU accession were held in all these countries, but they 
were dominated by positive campaigns and overwhelming majorities have 
indeed been reached (average over 80% in favor of membership). Two 
countries, Poland and the Czech Republic, planned but never conducted 
referenda on the Lisbon Treaty. Thus, CEE countries only have a very limited 
experience with popular mobilization on EU issues. The turnout of EP elections 
is significantly lower among the new member states compared with old ones, 
Figure 5 Populations’ trust towards the EU in % 
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even if the gap is shrinking (Trechsler 2009: 5). This suggests that the 
enthusiasm about the EU among CEE populations might be rather superficial.  
3.1.1.4 Party politics 
Does the lukewarm and uncritical attitude of the CEE public lead to a 
moderately Europeanized party system? Do CEE parties care less about the EU 
than their Western counterparts? Indeed, country studies and qualitative 
research argue that EU issues do not play a major role in the partisan 
competition in the region (Innes 2002; Grzymalala-Busse and Innes 2003; 
Hloušek and Pšeja 2009). The presence of the EU in public communications of 
the parties has significantly declined after accession and, although the EU is 
regularly mentioned in party programs, there is no sign that its role might 
extend beyond a referential framework (Hloušek and Pšeja 2009: 518, 533).  
After accession, CEE parties have become slightly more critical of the 
EU than previously, although parties with explicit nationalist or cultural 
conservative aims have only made moderate political gains (Vachudova 2008: 
861; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2010: 68)16. CEE parties have integrated 
smoothly into the EU-level party system, with their “post-communist newness” 
having no predictive power on their left-right or pro-anti-EU stances (Schmitt 
and Thomassen 2009: 579). On the other hand, the fit could also be superficial. 
With specific reference to Euroscepticism, Taggart and Szczerbiak argue that 
strong rhetoric does not necessarily imply specific and clear policy ideas in 
CEE countries (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008: 358-361).  
 Quantitative evidence on the Europeanization of party systems is much 
less clear on this point compared to previous categories reviewed in this 
chapter. A Chapter Hill Expert Survey has collected data on parties’ positions 
towards the EU (on a scale from 0 to 7), concerning the salience of the EU for 
the parties (0-4) and the dissent about the EU within the party system (0-11). 
Parties in the CEE region are more optimistic on the EU and attach more 
salience to it (!) but disagree less (see Table 1). Although the first and third 
parameters confirm my presumptions of CEE policy-makers being supportive 
yet uninvolved about the EU, the numerical differences between CEE and EU14 
are very small. It is rather difficult to tell from the mere numbers whether CEE 
                                                          
16  Jackson and colleagues found that the EU found its way into the Polish 2007 
parliamentary elections, albeit only in that the public support for the EU brought 
about a government with a more cooperative attitude towards Brussels (Jackson 
et al. 2011: 151-152). 
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parties indeed lag behind their Western colleagues in terms of embracing EU 
topics.  
Table 1 Political parties and EU integration: CEEs vs. EU14 
  Position Salience Dissent 
CEEs Min 4,81 (SK) 2,47 (LT) 1,85 (SK) 
Mean 5,13 2,76 2,27 
Median 5,40 2,83 2,47 
Max 5,93 (EE) 3,24 (PL) 3,79 (LT) 
EU14 Min 3,6 (EL) 2,42 (BE) 1,55 (ES) 
Mean 4,53 2,80 2,31 
Median 4,78 2,91 2,61 
Max 5,44 (ES) 3,40 (EL) 3,31 (DE) 
Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
 
Although numbers are ambiguous, one can still argue that the structural 
features of CEE party systems - their volatility, the tradition of consensus on 
EU membership and a superficial engagement with specific policy issues – are 
hindering rather than conducive to a close scrutiny of EU-level day-to-day 
legislative negotiations. This might lead to a lower salience attached by 
governments to those negotiations, as there will be little domestic political 
pay-off from engaging in a policy conflict on EU level17.  Such a government will 
not be willing to mobilize and invest its resources into sophisticated 
bargaining strategies. It will either easily compromise or entirely refrain from 
engaging in policy discussion and rubber-stamp what others have agreed upon.  
3.1.2 Scenarios of CEEs’ contributions to the negotiation processes 
The chapter has demonstrated thus far that there are structural 
differences between old and new member states on several dimensions of 
domestic politics. I presume that underperforming public administrations, 
weak systems of interest intermediation and largely EU-ignorant domestic 
constituencies will inhibit CEE countries from formulating and prosecuting 
their policy interests on the EU arena. Admittedly, we lack systematic 
knowledge about how exactly domestic characteristics translate into 
supranational behavior and I acknowledge that postulating deterministic 
relations here would be inappropriate. However, one can still claim that if 
                                                          
17  Domestic political system is only one source of salience, whereby the other relates 
to the material costs that a given policy may bring (Warntjen 2012: 169). 
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these domestic characteristics matter for EU-level agency, they hinder rather 
than promote effective action. What kind of behavior can we actually expect 
from CEE countries and what benchmarks are there to assess effectiveness? 
3.1.2.1 Direct implications: late timing and passivity 
When the scanning of the domestic environment in the light of 
upcoming EU policy initiatives underperforms, governments are likely to need 
more time to formulate their bargaining positions. Indeed, there is empirical 
evidence on small member states which shows that the timing of instructions 
is a serious problem of CEE countries (Panke 2010a: 780). Late position 
formation is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, there is an intense exchange 
of policy ideas between the Commission and the member states already on the 
agenda-setting stage. The Commission is interested in member states’ input for 
the mere sake of policy expertise, as well as to anticipate the political chances 
of adoption (Princen 2011: 935). The benefit from these early contacts for the 
member states is that their particular needs might be already written down in 
the project (Bunse et al. 2005: 37). If a delegation does not know what it wants 
at this early stage, it will miss this opportunity to shape future policy according 
to its needs. Secondly, member states that need more time to determine their 
positions might be inhibited when reacting to new bargaining developments. 
For instance, it is well known that the Council Presidency strategically times 
the release of new proposals. It waits with spreading them until the very last 
minute to achieve the “surprise effect” and prevent the consolidation of 
potential opponents (Tallberg 2004: 1004). Clearly, such a strategy does not 
solve the policy controversy, but it enables the Presidency to apply 
“entrapment” strategies, such as exposing inconsistencies in the opponents’ 
negotiation behavior (Schimmelfennig 2001: 70-76).  
Passivity is another negative consequence of a low administrative 
competence or poor input from interest groups for a country’s bargaining 
behavior. In order to make specific wording proposals and support them with 
compelling examples, reasons and explanations, delegations need solid legal 
and policy expertise. We know from the literature that active lobbying and 
argumentation are important components of member states’ bargaining 
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strategies (Lewis 1998: 491; Naurin 2010: 32; Panke 2012: 144)18. We also 
know that CEE countries recourse to these forms of behavior significantly less 
often than their older counterparts. They refrain from approaching the 
Commission, the Presidencies or the EP with their concerns and they shy away 
from explaining the rationale behind their positions and outlining the merits of 
their policy ideas (Horvath 2008: 553; Naurin 2010: 47; Panke 2012: 132). 
Of course, one reason for this limited recourse to the informal networks 
might be that the new member states still learn how to act in legislative 
negotiations. Thus, their situation might be a different one in the future. 
Nonetheless, the process of catching up could become challenging for them. 
Precisely due to the Eastern Enlargement, the role of informal contacts in 
Council politics has increased. One of the formal adaptations to the larger 
membership involves keeping the time of meetings constant. Consequently, 
delegations have less time to present their opinions to the board19. In some 
Council formations, the tour de table has been entirely abolished. Delegations 
are invited to submit their written interventions or contact the Chair in the 
informal way (Lempp 2007: 41; Lempp and Altenschmidt 2008: 515).  
The general shift of consultation activities from the formal to the 
informal realm render the attention of the concerned institutional players, 
such as the Presidency, a scarce resource. In this situation, it might be even 
more difficult for the newcomers to establish an intense working relationship 
with them. Moreover, one additional source of difficulty for the CEE countries 
might be due to their staff in Brussels frequently changing (Puetter 2008: 487). 
This observation links well with Goetz’s finding that CEE administrations have 
not yet established a modus operandi for their new international activities 
(Goetz 2001: 1038). However, established personal relationships matter in 
negotiations and might indeed facilitate information exchanges.  
3.1.2.2 Compensation strategies 
I demonstrated that there is not much legislative activity to be expected 
from the new member states at early stages of the legislative process and in 
                                                          
18  Strangely enough, Cross found that formal interventions in the legislative process 
are not conducive to bargaining success (Cross 2013: 89). However, he only 
examined the number of interventions (not their substance or quality) and 
omitted informal approaches of member states towards the Commission or the 
Presidency.  
19  This not only concerns the ministerial meetings, but also the COREPER and the 
working group level.  
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the informal part of thereof. If the claim is right, CEE countries miss important 
opportunities to put their mark on both the legislative process and its outcome. 
However, there are at least two other options of how they can introduce their 
requests on the negotiation agenda and thus shape the legislative dynamics.  
First, the new member states might become more active on upper levels 
of the Council hierarchy. Once the negotiation reaches the ministerial level, the 
new member states have simply had a little more time to clarify their own 
stance on an issue. Besides, ministers are usually more assertive than civil 
servants, and more likely to see a negotiation as a “game” in which something 
needs to be “won” (Spence 1995b: 388). Council officials asked by researchers 
about the impact of Enlargement on the different Council layers, reported that, 
indeed, it is the ministerial negotiation that has become more difficult, not the 
working group discussions (Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse 2007: 13). Thus, 
it appears that the Eastern Enlargement might have pushed the 
intergovernmental conflict upwards, to the top Council level. I argue in the next 
section that the Council is quite well equipped to prevent conflict dynamics of 
this shape from jeopardizing legislative productivity.   
Second, to compensate for the modesty of their direct involvement in 
the negotiation process, the new member states might be interested in 
exploiting bargaining opportunity structures other actors provide. In other 
words, CEE countries might be not very skilled in crafting their own bargaining 
strategies, but rather they join member states with similar concerns. The 
likelihood that new member states’ policy concerns are in some loose form 
already represented in the Council, is high given the already differentiated 
political space (see section 2.2.2). The “fellowship” mechanism that one would 
expect to operate here strongly resembles jumping on the bandwagons, i.e. 
shortcutting one’s own position formation while subscribing to claims made by 
others (Daviter 2009: 1130-1136; Halpin 2011: 218-224). A similar 
mechanism forms the core of the directional theory of voting. In elections, most 
people have a rather confuse preference about a certain direction of policy-
making (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). In the decision situation, they 
follow the policy-maker (candidate) who provides an intense, but still 
reasonable, stimulation on the issue (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989: 109).  
Transferred to the Council of Ministers, this mechanism would 
comprise the new member states creating a demand for leadership and 
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organization of collective legislative action and some of the old member states 
satisfying it. Such a situation clearly empowers those who are willing and able 
to mobilize their fellow delegations, either by offering policy knowledge or 
through their strategic skills. The quantitative evidence lends some support to 
the hypothesis that some of the large old member states have benefited from 
the Eastern Enlargement, given that their network capital has increased and 
their negative voting rates have dropped (see sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3). 
It remains to be seen whether this type of coalition dynamics can 
indeed be found in the enlarged Council and how it relates to achieving 
legislative outcomes. Some Council observers have argued that coalition 
building has become more cumbersome and uncertain due to the increased 
fragmentation of the Council (Lempp 2007: 41). In turn, my perspective 
suggests that the Eastern Enlargement might have reinforced the functional 
need of Council members to align. The strength and internal dynamics of these 
alignments between old and new member states might be decisive for the 
impact of Enlargement on the horizontal dimension of the Council conflict, in 
contrast to the vertical dimension referred to above. In other words, although 
the new member states might not be particularly influential on their own - 
owing to resource reasons, compensation strategies at their disposal could not 
only shift Council conflicts but also make them more intense.  
3.2 Coping with large numbers: procedural advantages   
Before individual and collective contributions of member states become 
legislative outcomes, an important factor intervenes: the decision-making 
procedures. They channel the bargaining process, providing arenas and 
opportunities on which individual positions can be expressed. Furthermore, 
they structure the expectations of the participants, as parties are all aware of 
the method with which individual interests will be aggregated (Scharpf 1997: 
38-43). The procedures that govern the work of the Council of Ministers are 
designed to help this institution to fulfill its legislative tasks efficiently (Council 
2004a). The question is, thus, whether they can still effectively promote this 
goal under the conditions of larger and more diverse membership. In 
particular, will they retain their catalytic effects, when confronted with the 
type of contributions and dynamics that I outlined above? 
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 The legislative work of the Council is organized as follows (Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace 2006: 7-26; Nugent 2010: 147-159; Hix and Høyland 
2011: 61-68). When the Commission publishes the legislative proposal, civil 
servants and policy specialists from the member states’ Brussels offices, 
equipped with their ministries’ instructions, discuss it article-by-article. 
Contentious issues are forwarded to the COREPER, the assembly of higher-
ranked national diplomats and eventually to the ministers. Usually, a dossier 
travels the hierarchy several times back and forth before it is formally agreed 
(Häge 2008: 535-538).  
The Council Presidency orchestrates this process. Having in-depth 
knowledge about member states’ positions, it re-drafts the legislative dossier 
in a way to address member states’ concerns. While editing the proposal, the 
Presidency can use the legal and policy resources of the Commission, the 
Council Secretariat and the Council Legal Service. Subsequent Presidency 
proposals, and the reactions, which those proposals receive from the member 
states, mark the “progress” of a legislative negotiation. This process formally 
ends by a vote of Ministers, the vote being called by the Presidency. In practice, 
the Council rarely takes a vote. Most dossiers are agreed implicitly by 
unanimity. The predominance of this decision-making mode is one of the 
notable features of Council politics (Heisenberg 2005; Hayes-Renshaw et al. 
2006). Thus, Council procedures comprise two key elements: the Presidency, 
which controls the sequences of the negotiation, and the vote (explicit or 
implicit), towards which the process heads.  
Claiming that procedures can explain Council politics and outcomes is 
by no means a truism. For instance, quantitative researchers claim that 
procedural models receive much less empirical support than cooperative 
bargaining models, which assume that actors strive for consensus (Thomson 
2011: 185). An institutional argument clearly does not fundamentally 
contradict the cooperation-narrative, as one can claim that Council institutions 
formally embed the culture of consensus (Thomson 2011: 281). Indeed, 
institutions facilitate cooperative bargaining strategies, albeit only under 
certain conditions (such as isolation from domestic politics), which are not 
always fulfilled in Council politics (Lewis 2010: 648).  
I argue that procedures play an important role in the accommodation of 
the Eastern Enlargement. In particular, the new member states from CEE 
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constitute a perfect target group for efficiency-promoting Council procedures. 
While, arguably, passivity is easily transformed into agreement, I also advance 
the claim that Council procedures will retain their catalytic effects when the 
newcomers apply the aforementioned compensation strategies and indirectly 
contribute to more intense policy conflicts. I show that the Council’s voting 
system is designed and practiced in such a way that the more advanced the 
negotiations, the higher the risks and costs associated with manifested 
discontent. This mechanism could discourage the newcomers from overly 
disturbing interventions on the ministerial level. Moreover, the Council 
Presidency’s repertoire of actions enables it to expose and strategically exploit 
the weaknesses of intergovernmental alliances. In a larger and more diverse 
Council, these are likely to become more fragile and less cohesive.  
3.2.1 Voting 
As one diplomat put it, “a lack of official voting does not mean that the 
system of qualified majority is absent” (L.J.Bal cited by Novak 2010: 86). 
Indeed, the extremely rare recourse to the vote does not deprive this 
institutional device its enormous relevance for Council politics. In general, 
voting serves as a discipline device in complex systems of collective decision-
making. Being outvoted and being in the minority represent a situation most 
decision-makers would prefer to avoid. This might be all the more true in the 
Council of Ministers, where votes are taken so rarely and where the vote is one 
of few elements of the bargaining process disclosed to broader public. In fact, 
Kahler observed that an implicit pressure to join the majority exists in 
international organizations much younger and of much looser institutional 
fabric than the EU (Kahler 1992: 704-705). 
There are several explanations of member states’ reluctance towards 
the voting situation. One of them is the fear of marginalization (Novak 2010: 
92; Häge 2012a: 2). Opposing a measure, even without formal consequences 
for its adoption, might be deemed offensive by the Presidency and the 
Commission, who put significant effort into making a dossier as acceptable as 
possible. Consequently, one loses credibility and becomes less attractive as a 
cooperation partner for the future. While this explanation is plausible, it is not 
so tenable empirically. The data suggests that the Scandinavian countries are 
quite prone to vote “no” (Hosli et al. 2011: 1256; Beach and Pedersen 2012: 
168). At the same time, these countries are very well connected in the Council 
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and very effective negotiators (Naurin and Lindahl 2010: 494; Panke 2011: 
115). The same argument applies to the UK or Germany – both quite 
obstructive, but also highly influential and well connected.  
Another explanation points at the fact that voting is the part of the 
Council negotiations that is most visible in the domestic arena. A negative vote 
might be interpreted as a failure to defend the national interest and be used 
strategically by the domestic opponents (Novak 2010: 92). Moreover, the 
responsible minister could be weakened and the implementation of this 
measure inhibited (Novak 2010: 92). This explanation is also plausible. Again, 
one could question whether it applies equally to all member states across all 
policies; for instance, it could work the other way round, whereby a 
government might issue a negative vote or an abstention as a signal of 
commitment for the domestic audience and use it to blame the EU for 
unpopular policies later on.  
The two explanations have one element in common. Issuing a negative 
vote in the Council is a risky strategy, due to the eventual costs associated with 
it, both on the domestic and on the supranational arena. Moreover, voting “no” 
necessitates a good preparation, because member states are expected to justify 
such a vote (Novak 2010: 92). In turn, justification puts the act of voting in the 
context of the given governments’ previous actions. While consistency of 
arguments is highly valued in the Council, “surprise effects” considerably 
damage the naysayers’ reputation (Novak 2013: 1101). After all, there are at 
least two strategies, coalition building and individual lobbying, which 
negotiators can employ to ensure that there are demands accommodated 
(Häge 2012a; Panke 2012).  
The way the voting system is practiced in the Council can be expected 
to put strong disciplining effects on less assertive and less well prepared 
negotiators, which I expect the new member states from CEE to be. Arguably, 
under the conditions I described, passivity can be easily transformed into 
agreement. Clearly, there is a difference between one single country deviating 
from the majority and a blocking minority comprising more than two countries 
or consisting of a regional bloc. Both domestic and reputational costs of 
opposition appear smaller when they are shared by a group. However, there is 
always uncertainty how the coalition partners will behave once the voting 
situation approaches. Blocking minorities face pressure from the Commission, 
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the Presidency or from other member states to allow “moving forward”. It 
costs significant organizational and argumentative effort to maintain them 
(Nedegaard 2007: 707, 713). Council insiders claim that once a minority no 
longer has a blocking capacity, the constituting countries give up easily (Novak 
2010: 96). Arguably, the increased size of the Council will make the reliance on 
a blocking minority rather risky, because fragmented coalitions necessitate 
more organizational efforts and are harder to maintain. Thus, the deterring 
effects of majority voting are likely to hold in the enlarged Council.  
3.2.2 The Council Presidency  
The Presidency is responsible for the management of Council affairs. 
She is the one who can “dose” the disciplinary effects of the vote, as it 
determines the timing of the ballot and signals this to the delegations. As the 
Presidencies are evaluated according to the number of successfully concluded, 
or advanced, dossiers (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006: 149; Warntjen 
2008; Niemann and Mak 2010), we can assume that legislative progress is of 
utmost importance for them. This institutional perspective on the Presidency’s 
interests contrasts with the rationalist claim which stresses the power of the 
Char to advance the holding governments’ policy preferences (Thomson 2008; 
Warntjen 2008).  
The Presidency holds two assets that enable it to make Council 
negotiations more efficient and channel them towards agreement. First, it 
benefits from exclusive information, as it consults the delegations bilaterally to 
ascertain their “bottom lines” (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006: 150). Based 
upon this information, the Presidency can strategically shape the bargaining 
agenda, i.e. make proposals that are likely to gain broader support. In this 
exercise, the Chair is supported by the Council Secretariat and the Commission 
(Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006: 141-145). Consequently, the number of 
demands that it has to process is not necessarily problematic, given the 
institutional support to manage the increased transaction costs. 
Furthermore, the Presidency obeys two logics of action: that of an 
honest broker and a majority crafter. The Chair is free to apply them according 
to its own assessment of how the negotiation is going, which constitutes its 
second asset in efficiency promotion. As an “honest broker”, the Presidency 
invests significant effort in resolving all the problems that the delegations 
might have with a legislative proposal, putting all its powers into the service of 
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consensus-seeking (Niemann and Mak 2010: 730-731). On the other hand, it 
permanently assesses whether there is a qualified majority or a blocking 
minority (Novak 2010: 86). For instance, the Presidency declares that it sees a 
possibility of obtaining a majority, whether this is true or close to being true 
(Novak 2010: 87). Those who still oppose or are not yet part of the majority 
have the last chance to obtain concessions, given that they will be soon 
confronted with a choice between “take it” and “leave it”. The Presidency 
injects the costly perspective of becoming a minority into the delegations’ 
legislative choices. In this situation, there is a reasonable chance that small 
concessions, including the face-saving ones, will suddenly become quite 
attractive to some member states. Accordingly, the Presidency can target the 
(undecided) opposition with a strategy that resembles a soft version of “divide 
and conquer” (in analogy to the Commission, see: Schmidt 2000: 46-50). 
The combination of informational and procedural assets might greatly 
help the Presidency managing the enlarged membership. Coalitions with the 
new member states’ participation will have quite good chances to be heard by 
the Presidencies, as long as they will serve as a reliable basis for a future 
qualitative majority. However, the Presidency might equally choose to expose 
the weaknesses of such coalitions and aim to dissolve them. With larger and 
more diverse alliances, the Presidency has certainly more choice when 
targeting countries willing to engage in individual search for concessions.  
Clearly, the more salient and the more visible the dossiers, the harder it 
would be for the Presidency to put pressure on the delegations. In a most 
extreme hypothetical scenario, the Presidency will be confronted with a 
complex choice with several arguments to consider: the legislative progress of 
a given policy, the will of the majority and the “red lines” of the minority. As I 
argued before, the new member states from CEE are unlikely to be those that 
contour these lines in a particularly clear and compelling way.  
3.3 Summary 
The aim of this Chapter was to develop a theoretical framework that 
would help to understand the smooth absorption of recent membership 
changes by the Council of Ministers. I purposefully chose to search for a mid-
range explanation – one that would come very close to actual bargaining 
processes in the enlarged Council. To achieve this purpose, I first explored the 
ways of assessing and predicting CEE countries’ legislative contributions and 
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subsequently evaluated whether efficiency-enhancing Council procedures will 
deliver when confronted with a more diverse and larger environment. I argued 
that the newly joined countries have neither the resources nor the domestic 
incentives to decisively shape the decision-making processes in the Council. 
That said, their involvement could nonetheless shift the dynamics of conflict 
both vertically, i.e. push it up in the Council hierarchy and horizontally, i.e. 
empower those old member states that would make CEE countries part of their 
own bargaining strategies.  
I argued that even if the Eastern Enlargement intensifies the conflict 
within the Council, the procedures will continue to exercise their 
counterbalancing effects. In particular, the Council Presidency has both the 
incentives and the abilities to model the negotiation process in a way that it 
leads, more or less explicitly, to majority voting. The way in which majority 
voting is practiced in the Council confronts countries that have not managed to 
have their demands accommodated earlier in the process, with high risks 
deterring them from jeopardizing a (positive) collective decision. In addition, 
the Presidency can strategically exploit the internal fragmentation of alliances. 
The latter might have become even easier with a larger and more diverse 
membership.  
Clearly, there are no guarantees that the procedures will deliver, since 
situational factors can always feed into these effects. As I have argued above, 
the theoretical framework does not provide a deterministic scenario of how 
Council negotiations will exactly unfold. Rather, it offers educated guesses 
about sequences of Council politics, such as coalition formation or the 
interactions between member states and the Presidency, hypothesizing that 
these sequences have causal effects on the Council’s ability to make legislative 
decisions. In contrast to previous research, which dealt with the performance 
of the enlarged Council and which stressed the role of the input structure 
(political space) and the “cooperative culture” (see section 2.2), I offer a 
mechanism-based explanation that targets the inner workings of Council, 
eventually at the expense of a wider theoretical range.   
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4 Research design 
 
The methodological chapter defines and explains the research strategy employed 
in this project. I argue that the different solutions proposed to the Enlargement 
puzzle, discussed in the previous two chapters of the dissertation, represent 
different types of political science explanations: co-variational and causal. 
Solving the Enlargement puzzle with an explanation centered on causal 
mechanisms, as this project attempts, implies two methodological choices: the 
employment of process tracing and a selection of least likely cases. The former 
allows coming very close to actual bargaining processes in the enlarged Council, 
whereas the latter is a design tool for conducting plausibility tests with small 
number of cases. Before outlining what constitutes least likely cases in the 
context of this project and introducing the two legislative cases selected, I explain 
yet another research choice: the focus on regulatory policy-making. I argue that 
regulatory policy represents the largest category among EU’s highly diverse 
legislative activity. At the end of the chapter, I briefly discuss the different kind of 
data collected for this project.  
 
4.1 Different types of explanation of the Enlargement puzzle 
The methodological choices of this thesis reflect the nature of 
explanation advanced here as well as how this explanation is situated in 
broader literature on Council politics. The thesis deals with the question “How 
did the Council of Ministers accommodate the membership change that came 
along with the Eastern Enlargement?” (Chapter 1). The previous chapter 
argued that the reasons for the legislative robustness of the enlarged Council 
should be sought in two areas: the new member states’ agency and in the 
procedural endowment of the Council of Ministers. Why did the argument 
focus on these two? The underlying intention of the theoretical reasoning was 
to come as close as possible to the actual dynamics among member states 
within the Council. In other words, the purpose was to learn what the 
accession of the specific countries, the Central Eastern European member 
states, might imply for collective decision-making and what might be going on 
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in the Council to produce an (apparently) smooth integration of these 
countries into legislative negotiations.  
This is not to say that we do not (or did not) have any idea at all about 
the processes within the enlarged Council and how they can be made 
responsible for the accommodation of large numbers. Chapter 2 summarized 
how previous Council research went about this question. Researchers such as 
Thomson or Veen, relying on their throughout analyses of the political space in 
the enlarged Council, i.e. the aggregated structures of policy positions and 
governments’ preferences, developed the “cooperative culture conjecture” 
(Thomson 2011: 279-284; Veen 2011: 4-8). This conjecture relates explicitly to 
the way member states interact, as it postulates self-restraint and diffuse 
exchanges of concessions between delegations in the Council. In Chapter 2, I 
argued that the cooperative culture-hypothesis, although plausible, is at odds 
with the empirical insights we have on member states’ logics of action, the 
equivalence of bargaining success and uniformity of bargaining behavior of 
new and old member states. Therefore, we should strive for alternative 
explanations of the legislative robustness of the Council after the Eastern 
Enlargement.  
Thomson and Veen made an important contribution to the EU 
literature, as they convincingly demonstrated the variability of the alignment 
patterns among member states. Thanks to the richness of the data sets used in 
their research, we can surely say that flexibility of coalitions is a constitutive 
feature of Council politics. However, these authors might not have been right 
about how fluid coalitions cause member states to be more accommodative 
and that this mechanism evens out increased transaction costs of large 
numbers and conflicts that arise, when majorities shift or existing antagonisms 
intensify – both being likely effects of membership change on collective 
decision-making. When highlighting the political space as the very reason for 
the Council’s legislative robustness after the Eastern Enlargement, Thomson 
and Veen focused on the “big picture”. They pointed at overarching 
characteristics of decision situations in the Council. This factor is quite distant 
from the effect in question, legislative performance. Arguably, on the way from 
individual preferences to collective decisions many variables may intervene, 
such as power, strategies, coalition dynamics, conflict management strategies 
or contingencies.  
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If we were to stylize the two different approaches to the Enlargement 
puzzle, the one which focuses on the political space and the one concerned 
with member states’ agency and how it is channeled by Council procedures, a 
contrast between a “co-variational” and a “causal” explanation emerges 
(Gerring 2010: 1500). Whereas the former demonstrates that variable 
alignments and robust outcomes co-exist across a wide range of policies in a 
certain period after Enlargement, the latter is attentive to the causal pathway, 
which links the new member states’ legislative contributions, the interactions 
between old and new countries and the procedures in a sequential way.  
Both ways of arriving at knowledge about social phenomena have their 
value in social science theorizing (Little 1991; della Porta and Keating 2008: 
Ch. 2). Gerring argues that co-variations should ideally be transformed into 
mechanisms and mechanisms into co-variations; however, he admits that this 
is not always feasible (Gerring 2010: 1517). Since co-variations can be 
demonstrated with a considerable degree of assurance and mechanisms offer 
specific close-to-real-world knowledge, but are uncertain about the scope, 
“researchers invariably face a choice between knowing more about less, or less 
about more” (Gerring 2007a: 49). One way to stand one’s ground in this 
dilemma when working on a mechanism-centered explanation is to specify the 
scope conditions under which mechanisms in question are most likely to 
operate. Indeed, this will be undertaken in the concluding chapter of the 
dissertation.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next 
section, I outline two methodological implications of the ambition to explain 
post-Enlargement Council robustness with mechanisms: the recourse to 
process tracing and the strategy of choosing least likely cases. Subsequently, I 
proceed to case selection, in that I narrow down the policy-scope of the thesis 
to regulatory policy-making, explain what least likely cases entail in the project 
context and show how the two legislative cases meet the criteria. Finally, I 
briefly discuss the different kind of data collected for this project. 
4.1.1 Exploiting the strengths of qualitative methodology 
While suggesting that smooth accommodation of the Eastern 
Enlargement might relate to what the new member states actually do in the 
Council and how the Council procedures impact upon member states’ 
negotiating activities, this thesis advocates a particular theoretical interests. It 
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aims to explore the impact of individual action of the member states (old and 
new) and of the Council Chair on the collective dynamics in this legislative 
body. Such an interest advises a recourse to qualitative methods, given that 
they are best suited to provide nuanced, fine-grained explanations and deal 
with complex concepts. In particular, qualitative methods allow exploring 
causal mechanisms (Sekhon 2004: 288; Collier 2011: 824).  Indeed, this is a 
type of explanation that I aim to achieve in this project.  
4.1.2 Causal mechanisms and process tracing 
Mechanisms are processes in complex systems, likely to appear 
regularly, under given conditions (Bunge 2003: 183; George and Bennett 2005: 
8). They specify the pathways between causes and effects, as the sequences of 
action are their central component. Mechanisms are essential to causal 
explanation. Uncovering “how things work”, they complement other types of 
inference, such as the correlational inference, which gives us confidence 
concerning whether and how much a given parameter matters for the outcome 
(Hall 2008: 305-306). Gaining a solid understanding of social macro-
phenomena requires a specification of causal mechanisms that underline it 
(Mayntz 2004: 241; Sekhon 2004: 288; Collier 2011: 824). 
Nonetheless, there is no uniform recipe how to get at causal 
mechanisms in political science research. In fact, as Gerring noted, 
“mechanism-centered explanations are often ambiguous and mean different 
things to different people” (Gerring 2010: 1500). Recommendations diverge 
regarding the theoretical pre-specification needed for the analysis of 
mechanisms as well as the precise function of empirical observations. There 
are different opinions as for the question, whether (and how much) causality 
at work can actually be observed.  
In the present project, the analytical strategy of providing a 
mechanism-centered account of post-Enlargement Council politics is as 
follows. Theoretical priors are present. In the previous chapter, I not only 
identified factors that are supposed to produce effects, namely new member 
states agency and Council procedures, but also speculated how we can expect 
these factors to work. I hypothesized about late preference formation in CEE 
countries, as well as their passivity. I outlined two possible compensation 
strategies. Finally, I argued that while passivity of the newcomers would rather 
not obstruct agreement, they might shift the conflict dynamics in the Council 
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through either pushing up contestation towards the ministerial level or further 
entrenching existing policy conflicts. Council procedures are well armed to 
deal with both instances.  
The level of specification represented by the theoretical argument is 
arguably rather modest. I do not provide a deterministic scenario of legislative 
negotiations and discount potential intervening variables. Consequently, there 
will be no search for a smoking gun observation in the empirical work 
(Mahoney 2010: 128). Instead of pretending a definite “test” of any of the 
Council theories, this project rather engages in a plausibility assessment of one 
particular account of how the impact of the Eastern Enlargement has been 
mediated by legislative processes within the Council.  
It should be stated at this point that in terms of collective dynamics 
within this legislative body, existing theories are not sufficiently specified 
either. Council scholarship has produced robust and convincing meta-theories, 
such as the famous claim that the Council does not need to vote because 
informality prevails (Heisenberg 2005). Nonetheless, we lack mid-level 
accounts of how national interests aggregate below the diplomatic level or how 
the implicit majority formation in the shadow of the vote operated (Naurin and 
Wallace 2008a: 4-5). Recent work has demonstrated that, while consensus is 
indeed a powerful explanatory notion, it covers quite diverse types of 
mechanisms within the Council, such as adherence to norms or blame 
avoidance (Novak 2013). Furthermore, there is no agreement as to the 
operation of apparently key concepts of the inner workings of the Council, such 
as power, rules, norms or even preferences (Heisenberg 2008: 263; Princen 
2012). 
I argue that the analytical strategy applied in this project - the process 
tracing - turns the theoretical under-specification into an asset that allows 
employing inductive reasoning in a most fruitful way. Process tracing is a 
within-case analysis that concentrates on the temporary unfolding of events 
(Collier 2011: 823). Discerning the relevant sequences necessitates in-depth 
knowledge of the case and the context. Process tracing analysis, thus, employs 
a large number of (within-case) observations of different kinds. The multitude 
of observations make process tracing the tool of choice when the analysis is 
concerned with complex phenomena as well as with parameters which are 
otherwise hard to measure and hard to build a prediction upon (George and 
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Bennett 2005: 13; Hall 2008: 314). Arguably, the key notions of this thesis, 
such as “influential agency” or “procedural effectiveness” belong to that 
category.  
Two features of process tracing provide for its value in theory 
development (George and Bennett 2005: 209; Beach and Pedersen 2012: 
Chapter 4). Firstly, a process tracing analysis usually leaves ample room for 
new variables and sub-variables, yet to be discovered in the course of 
fieldwork. It can identify (new) elements that matter for the outcome, assess 
their role in the pathway and gauge whether there might be regularities in the 
causal chains responsible for certain outcomes (Hall 2008: 306). Thus, the 
method is sufficiently open to allow fresh insights into what (else) matters for 
the outcome or what aspects of the concepts in question are out there and 
deserve further specification. The latter merit of the approach might be quite 
important in research concerned with the Council of Ministers, where concepts 
such as power or consensus can have quite different empirical implications. 
Clearly, the empirical openness of the process tracing also means that it can 
bring about observations of situational, idiosyncratic nature. It will be a matter 
of interpretation and case-by-case judgment whether observed developments 
are due to systematic characteristics of the negotiation venue and negotiating 
actors or the specific configuration of circumstances, such as policy 
characteristics, timing or exogenous political conditions. Secondly, the ability 
of process tracing to go beyond “data set observations”, i.e. assessing scores of 
a case on a given variable, and collect “causal process observations”, i.e. unique 
insights on sequences or interactions, is how it provides empirical illustration 
to mechanisms (Brady and Collier 2004: 227-228).  
Pointing out the potentials of process tracing is important, because it 
provides guidance how legislative cases should be “told”. The theoretical 
framework provides an orientation concerning what to look at and what to 
expect. In turn, the analysis shall remain rather open regarding the different 
activities that make up collective interactions as well as timing and sequence 
within legislative negotiations. This is where a theory development could 
potentially be made.  
4.1.3 Performing plausibility tests with case studies 
The previous section explained the technique of process tracing to 
clarify how the qualitative methodology fits the theoretical interest of the 
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thesis, namely developing a mechanism-centered account of the Enlargement 
puzzle. Now, the research design has to perform a balancing act and show how 
the micro-level empirical work, inherent to a within-case analysis, can keep up 
with the project’s ambition to provide an explanation for a macro-
phenomenon, namely the Council’s legislative robustness after the Eastern 
Enlargement. I follow Gerring’s argument here, namely that a plausibility test 
can be performed with case studies, when the selection logic of “confirmatory 
crucial cases” is adhered to.   
Gerring outlines nine strategies for choosing cases in a qualitative 
inquiry (Gerring 2007a: 86-150). The choice of a strategy shall reflect how an 
inquiry is situated in a research area and what intention it pursues. In this 
project, I want to explain the puzzling non-effect of membership change on the 
Council of Ministers with factors related to member states agency and the 
Council’s legislative procedures. My mechanisms-based account of 
Enlargement accommodation differs from explanations advanced in the 
literature and thus it can be considered as an alternative explanation. 
Consequently, my aim is to find the strongest possible evidence to support this 
explanation (Gerring 2007a: 115). From the different logics outlined by 
Gerring, the logic of “confirmatory crucial case” appears best suited for a 
plausibility test. The objective of the crucial case is to provide a (most) difficult 
test for an argument  (Gerring 2007a: 115).  
Ideally, a theoretical argument to be tested allows for an exact 
prediction of a given outcome under given circumstances. Subsequently, the 
prediction is matched with empirical observations. In the practice of political 
research, such decisive tests are hardly possible. Theories are seldom specific 
enough to control for context or intervening factors and thus allow for an exact 
prediction. However, one can approximate a theory confirmation (or rejection) 
while concentrating on “least” (or “most”) likely cases (Odell 2001: 165-166). 
“Least likely cases” are characterized by conditions under which a given 
argument cannot be expected to work, and yet it does find empirical backing 
and can explain the outcome. “Such a least-likely case study would provide 
strong, albeit not unqualified, support for the inference that the theory is even 
more likely to be valid in most other cases where contrary winds do not blow 
as strongly” (Odell 2001: 165). Confirmatory crucial cases, or least likely cases, 
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are sometimes referred to as “Sinatra inference”: if it can make it here, it can 
make it anywhere (Gerring 2007a: 119).  
Before elaborating on what conditions would constitute a hard test for 
my argument, one general limitation of the “crucial case” selection strategy 
should be clarified. Crucial case methodology is one of the most controversial 
case selection techniques and the idea that crucial cases do exist is not widely 
accepted (Gerring 2007b: 231; 2007a: 115). Crucial case selection strategy 
involves a high dose of deductive thinking. To be clear, the success in the 
application of this method rests upon the quality of the theory under 
investigation. The more law-like the theory and the more specific (and risky) 
the predictions it makes, the more accurate the choice of crucial cases.  
As the previous section argued, this type of theorizing in rare in social 
sciences and EU scholarship is not exception here (George and Bennett 2005: 
209). Strictly speaking, the explanation that this project aims to advance is no 
theory either, given that it does not supply a rigorous explanatory model. 
Rather, a conceptual framework is offered here, understood as a type of 
knowledge that identifies and links topics seen as relevant for the given 
question (Christoph 1993: 824). These topics are agency and organization and 
the project will show that they are very relevant to the puzzling macro-
phenomenon of the legislative robustness. The value added of a qualitative 
inquiry is that these two concepts can be further developed and specified. Even 
if the plausibility test confirms the value of my reasoning, confidence about 
how much of the Council’s legislative business can be covered by it will be 
limited. However, the good news is that the criteria according to which I select 
my crucial cases point at a particular subset of Council legislation, namely 
contentious, salient dossiers that generate divisions among member states 
with strong regional components. While we do not know exactly how these 
cases relate to the entire population of negotiated dossiers in terms of 
numbers or frequency, we know that they are out there and that they matter 
for broader audience.  
4.2 Case selection  
How can one find the right crucial cases in the universe of Council 
decision-making? Two challenges lie ahead. First, the diversity of policies 
decided by the Council has to be dealt with. If we apply the policy typology 
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based upon the question of which EP Committee deals with a given dossier, we 
notice that the Council takes decisions in 17 policy areas. Such a high number 
is a challenge for a case study inquiry, because it implies a diversity of context 
factors and problems to be solved by EU secondary law. As Lowi has predicted 
some 40 years ago, the type of policy in question might influence the conflict 
dynamics which develops among actors (Lowi 1972). Second, the logic of 
“crucial case” must be tailored to the theoretical argument pursued in the 
project. These challenges are dealt with one after another, which makes up for 
a two-step case selection procedure. First, I narrow down the population of 
Council legislative negotiations to cases of regulatory policy-making and justify 
this choice by the prominent share this area takes in the EU’s overall legislative 
business. Second, I argue that cases of high conflict and high salience, in which 
CEE countries hold bloc-preferences, are those in which my theoretical 
reasoning is unlikely to hold, thus representing crucial cases for this inquiry. 
4.2.1 Choice of the policy area 
This project concentrates on regulatory policy-making. In other words, 
it focuses on this part of the Council’s legislative activity that is concerned with 
rules governing the economic activity across the EU. Two main reasons justify 
this choice. First, regulatory policy is the most representative for what the EU 
does20. Here, I follow the famous “regulatory state” argument by Majone 
(Majone 1994; 1996), but more importantly, I show that the highest number of 
decisions the Council takes is located in this area. Second, the redistributive 
policy, as the most important competitor of regulatory policy (regarding the 
share of decisions in the Council), is only shaped through the legislative 
procedure of the Council of Ministers to a limited extent. The level of EU 
budget and its structure is determined in high-level head-of-state negotiations, 
which take place every seven years. The Council does not decide about the 
allocation of financial resources, but merely fine-tunes the predetermined 
budgetary structures. For this reason, redistributive policies might not be very 
insightful to study, when individual strategies, interactions and collective 
dynamics are at the core of the theoretical interest. 
                                                          
20  As Nugent framed it: “The reason that EU regulatory policy is so wide-ranging and 
has displayed little sign of slowing down in its advance is that there is both a 
demand and a supply for it. The demand comes […] from large business which 
wants as integrated market as possible […] the supply comes largely from the 
Commission […] which plays a crucial role in setting the regulatory framework” 
(Nugent 2010: 285).  
Legislative dynamics and performance in the enlarged Council of Ministers 
78 
 
How is it possible to map the universe of policy activities pursued by 
the Council of Ministers? One such way is to consider the policy characteristics 
of the recorded votes. I relied on a new database Votwatch.eu21, which has 
collected all votes published by the Council since July 2009. The policy 
affiliation of a dossier is defined according to the responsible EP Committee. 
The data from January 2010 to December 2012 demonstrates that the Council 
took votes in 17 areas (see graph).  
The policy typology by Lowi offers a conceptual tool that might help to 
reduce the complexity of this picture (Lowi 1972). Lowi divided policies into 
distributive (where the “state” allocates own resources to specific purposes), 
redistributive (where the “state” shifts resources among groups within the 
population), regulatory (where the “state” makes rules) and constituent 
(where the “state” is concern with its own governance and maintenance). For 
mapping purposes, the typology can be applied to Council decisions (but see 
the discussion about the ambiguity of categories in Heinelt 2007).  
Indeed, most Council decisions seem to fall under the regulatory 
category: environment and public health, economic and monetary affairs (i.a. 
freedom of capital and taxation)22, transport and tourism, legal affairs (i.a. 
company law), industry, research and energy, internal market and consumer 
protection, employment and social affairs, culture and education. In sum, 154 
votes were taken in the two years. Redistributive policies are agriculture, 
regional development, fisheries and budget with 44 decisions. International 
trade could eventually be classified as distributive policy, because through 
external tariffs the EU accumulates its “own” financial resource. All policies 
which target the relationships between the EU and the “outer world”, such as 
justice and home affairs, development and foreign and security policy, as well 
as constitutional and inter-institutional affairs can be seen as constituent 
policies (44 votes). Lowi himself argued that, on the one hand, foreign policies 
serve the “system maintenance” purposes, yet, on the other hand, can also be 
covered by the remaining three categories (Lowi 1972: 310). Acknowledging 
                                                          
21  www.VoteWatch.eu [26.03.2013] 
22  The explanations in parentheses are based upon information obtained from the 
homepages of the relevant EP Committees.  
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that the boundaries between Lowi’s policy categories can be blurry23, one can 
nonetheless safely argue, in line with Majone, that the EU is a regulatory state 
and that the lion’s share of the Council’s legislative business belongs to 
regulatory policy-making.  
 
Source: Author’s own complication with data form VoteWatch.eu [26.03.2013] 
  
Although redistributive policies are almost three times less frequent in 
the Council, they generated significant concern before the Eastern 
Enlargement (Kandogan 2000; Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2004; Grant 2005; 
Kauppi and Widgren 2007). Central Eastern European countries have 
relatively low GDPs and most of them qualify for extensive financial support 
from both regional policy as well as agricultural policy. Thus, the worry was 
that they would put policy-making in redistributive areas such as cohesion or 
agriculture under stress with excessive demands for financial support. In a 
way, this worry came true as Thomson found that disagreements between 
“old” and “new” member states are disproportionately concentrated in areas, 
where subsidies are at stake (Thomson 2011: 69). Although these 
                                                          
23  Schmidt illustrated this critique in her analysis of the Services Directive, where she 
demonstrated that a regulatory piece of legislation might have severe 
redistributive implications (Schmidt 2009).  
Figure 6 Council votes per policy area Jan 2010-Dec 2012 
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controversies might appear as an important feature of EU policy-making after 
2004, I argue that the leverage they provide for a study of how the Council has 
retained its productive capacity despite membership change is limited. This 
has to do with the specificity of EU budget, which is set in multiannual financial 
frameworks decided in high-level negotiations (Laffan and Lindner 2010; 
Nugent 2010: 402-415). On the Council of Ministers level, only fine-tuning, or 
filling the predetermined limits takes place. Contestation is present, opening 
some room for strategic action or coalition politics, but these are heavily 
constrained by the financial requirements imposed by the multiannual 
frameworks.  
4.2.2 What constitutes “least likely cases” in the context of the project? 
What would a hard test of my argument look like? Roughly formulated, 
the argument claims that it is politics within in the Council - rather than the 
structure of the decision situations of Council decision-making - that explains 
the ease at which the membership change has been accommodated. The 
robustness of the Council is the macro-phenomenon to be explained. 
Therefore, we need cases in which the Council has found an agreement. 
Furthermore, we need cases with a puzzling outcome, i.e. cases in which 
according to our knowledge an agreement was rather unlikely. The basic 
assumptions of the rational-choice bargaining theory, as embodied in the 
major part of Council literature, are helpful in deducing the relevant 
characteristics of such decision situation: high level of salience and a positional 
divide among the member states provide unfavorable conditions for reaching 
legislative agreement (Moravcsik 1993; Tsebelis 2002).  
The second step of picking “least likely cases” involves an examination 
of micro-conditions under which my argument operates. The argument is 
twofold. First, it claims that the new member states are unlikely to be 
influential players during legislative negotiations in the Council. Secondly, it 
suggests that the voting rule and the Council Presidency effectively lead the 
Council to positive outcomes and that these effects do not come under 
pressure after a membership change. To test the plausibility of this argument, 
we would have to examine, first, cases in which assertive agency of the new 
member states can be expected and, second, those in which the organizational 
advantages of Council politics are unlikely to be effective.  
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4.2.2.1 Assertive agency of the new member states 
The condition that would encourage the new member states to act 
more assertively in the Council is a common, shared policy preference. 
Countries that have the same policy objective can, first and foremost, pull their 
resources together. Even if the new member states lack the soft resources, such 
as information, organization or skills, in cases of shared preference they can 
draw upon their formal voting power, which is significant given the number of 
the Central and Eastern European countries in the EU. In the current voting 
system, the cumulative number of votes of the ten CEE countries is 101, the 
four Visegrad countries come at 58 and with Slovenia at 62 votes. This is 
considerable when one takes the blocking minority as the reference (91 votes). 
Arguably, the network capital the new member states have can be transformed 
into real influence once it is put to the service of the common objective. 
Furthermore, knowing that others have similar demands or objections towards 
a given dossier considerably limits the danger of becoming marginalized – a 
Council norm that seems to drive conciliatory and self-restraining negotiation 
behavior (Novak 2013: 8).  
Finding areas of commonly held preferences of CEE countries is not 
without difficulties in an institution, in which variability of policy positions is a 
constitutive feature. However, thanks to Thomson’s research, we know that 
bloc or regional preferences exist in the EU. While not being a rule of Council 
politics, they manifest themselves systematically in policies related to 
redistribution, regulation or harmonization. When CEEs side together, they 
favor higher redistribution in EU budget, they exhibit a weak tendency for 
lower levels of harmonization and support higher levels of regulation 
(Thomson 2009: 777).  
These last two results support the pre-Enlargement predictions that 
market integration will be, next to the Eastern neighborhood, energy security 
or the EU budget, one of the areas in which CEE countries could make a 
difference to the EU-level policy process. In particular, CEE countries were 
associated with the promotion of free market and a general pro-liberalization 
stance (Copsey and Haughton 2009: 275-277; Lessenski 2009: 13). The reason 
was partly because access to the internal market of labor or services would 
allow them to exploit their competitive advantage of cheaper labor. For the 
same reason, these countries were expected to reject costly environmental or 
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social regulation that would harm the (foreign) business that settled down in 
the region. Moreover, the “liberal paradigm” that involves limitation of state 
interventions or protectionism, stands for the successful transformation from 
socialist to capitalist economy. It has a symbolic value, to which the elites of 
these countries are deeply committed (Copsey and Haughton 2009: 276; Tavits 
and Letki 2009).  
It is uncertain, whether the adoption of the extensive body of regulatory 
acquis, another historical common feature of CEE countries, would have any 
implications for these countries regulatory preferences. On the one hand, there 
might be rejection of further regulation motivated by “revenge” for strong 
compliance pressure before accession (Falkner and Treib 2008: 307). On the 
other hand, the achieved legal convergence might also encourage positive 
stances towards further regulation, precisely because no implementation 
difficulties are anticipated.  
Regardless the conflicting expectations and the different potential 
sources for policy preferences, it seems that economic policies – policies 
related to market integration – are those where collective position-taking and 
assertive agency of CEE countries can be expected. The deductive expectations 
and the empirical findings, taken together, suggest that the new member states 
have the potential to influence EU policy-making with their attitudes 
supportive to market values, business, regulation, but reluctant to 
harmonization24.  
4.2.2.2 Weakness of efficiency-enhancing legislative procedures 
Techniques of agreement-promotion do not work, or work less 
efficiently, in salient conflicts (Eberlein and Radaelli 2010: 787). Salience 
represents a harmful condition for both consensus-enhancing symbolic 
compensations as well as institutional mechanisms enhancing legislative 
output. Salience can be defined as the importance member states attach to 
                                                          
24  Clearly, caution is needed when making such bold predictions about “bloc 
preferences” and their manifestation in Community policy-making. The reality is 
likely to offer a nuanced picture. This has been the case in the environmental 
policy, whose ambitions were expected to suffer from the accession of countries 
that cannot afford environmental regulation, do not have green-minded 
populations or are not home to environmental technologies. Nonetheless, there 
was no Enlargement-induced setback, as CEE countries either represented a more 
neutral views than expected or failed to come up with one position, despite some 
effort by the alleged leader Poland or even eco-values promoted in the GMO-policy 
(Skjærseth and Wettestad 2007: 276). 
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their policy preferences (Warntjen 2012). It is associated with the visibility of a 
given policy for the domestic public or simply with the costs it causes for the 
government or important domestic actors, such as the relevant industries.  
Salient, conflictive issues pose several challenges for the catalytic 
effects of the Council procedures. When dealing with issues salient for the 
domestic publics, governments are attentive towards potential domestic costs 
of their supranational negotiation behavior and compare those with potential 
losses in reputation on EU level. Arguably, the domestic costs carry more 
weight in this calculation, since reelection is the governments’ primary 
objective. One could assume that governments might fear domestic reactions 
more than being outvoted or being stamped as a blocker on the EU arena. The 
QMV no longer works effectively. When a dossier is marked by entrenched 
policy conflict or when the conflict is of zero-sum nature, the Presidency will 
have hard time formulating a proposal that can satisfy both sides.   
Despite “salience” and “conflict” being crucial concepts in the Council 
research, it is very difficult to operationalize them and tell a priori which 
dossiers will turn salient and conflictive. The DEU project, which is empirically 
the most encompassing and methodologically the most sophisticated research 
endeavor on the Council, assesses salience a posteriori, while asking experts to 
assign values to how strongly individual governments felt about the dossier 
(Thomson and Stokman 2006: 41-43). In turn, the general level of conflict is 
associated with newspaper coverage (Thomson and Stokman 2006: 28). These 
strategies offer only a little help with the question concerning which legislative 
dossiers to pick when looking for contestation and governments’ involvement.  
One way to deal with this problem is to focus on dossiers with wide 
societal impact. The lion’s share of EU’s regulatory activity involves highly 
technical, specialized product regulations. Despite being important for the 
respective branches of the economies, these dossiers only concern very 
narrow groups of policy recipients (at least concern them directly). By 
contrast, with market logic expanding to services and labor, the EU is 
increasingly likely to deal with questions that concern broad societal groups 
(consumers and citizens), independently from their positions on the product 
markets. For instance, EU legislation of a cross-sectorial nature is likely to be 
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found in the areas of labor regulation and anti-discrimination25. Moreover, the 
increasing importance of EU law in public services and public procurement 
offers another example26. These type of policies are usually highly visible and 
likely to concern not just one but rather several organized interests. Moreover, 
cross-sectorial nature might involve high costs because the regulated economic 
goods are either widely consumed or involved in wealth generation on a larger 
scale.   
4.2.3 Cases chosen  
The last section elaborated upon several criteria that would constitute 
“least likely cases” for my theoretical argument. It was argued that the new 
member states are likely to overcome their bargaining disadvantages when 
they exhibit similar preferences. For instance, this could be found in policies 
related to market integration or labor policies. Furthermore, it was argued that 
salient and conflictive policies provide hard conditions for the procedural 
mechanisms to operate. Policies of wide societal concern are likely to generate 
high level of public visibility and high costs – both conducive to salience and 
conflict. This section introduces two legislative dossiers that have been chosen 
as the empirical core of the present research project and explains how they 
fulfill the selection criteria.  
The main part of the project involves an analysis of two Council 
negotiations: 
 The Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Directive 2003/88/EC concerning certain aspects of 
the organization of working time; 2004/0209/COD. Short:  The 
Working Time Directive (WTD)27.  
                                                          
25  See Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation; 
http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=197196#4148
27 [23.12.2013]. 
26  See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council the 
award of concession contracts; 
http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=201237 
[12.02.2013].  
27  http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=191740 
[12.02.2013]  
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 The Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
application of patients' rights in cross-border healthcare; 
2008/0142/COD, Short: The Patient Mobility Directive (PMD)28.  
The WTD regulates the weekly working time across the EU. The 
Directive contains various definitions of working time, framework rules for 
resting periods and provisions on the reference periods. The EU is concerned 
with these issues because it is mandated by the Treaty to improve and 
approximate the working conditions. While the WTD is actually an older piece 
of legislation, originating form 1993, it had to be revised in the mid-2000s due 
to the temporary nature of an exception that it contained (“opt-out”, 
introduced for ten years) and because member states wished to clarify the 
institution of on-call time in the light of recent contentious European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) rulings. The Commission proposed this dossier in September 
2004 and the Council found the political agreement in June 2008. However, the 
Directive failed in Trilogues between the Council and the EP. 
The ideas underlying the PMD were originally included in the Services 
Directive, as the circulation of medical services in the EU is the main concern of 
the project. Specifically, the Directive enables patients to assume medical 
treatment abroad and become reimbursed by their home insurance systems, 
setting the legal and procedural conditions to this end. The motivation for this 
first binding legal instrument in the area of healthcare came from the ECJ that 
claimed in several judgments that the freedom of service shall apply to public 
healthcare. Member states wished to see a legislative instrument, instead of the 
case law, to govern this area. The Commission proposed a Directive in July 
2008 and the Council found the political agreement in June 2010.  
The outcome (“dependent variable”), an agreement in the enlarged 
Council, is present in both cases. Arguably, the WTD represents a fragile 
agreement, as the dossier ultimately failed in the negotiations between the 
Council and the EP. Such a negotiation failure happens very rarely. However, at 
this point, it is impossible to tell the extent to which this failure is related to the 
negotiations within the Council, since only an in-depth empirical analysis can 
answer this question.  
                                                          
28  http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=197193 
[12.02.2013] 
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Regarding the difficult conditions for my “independent variables” to 
operate, both cases represent them rather well. Both dossiers were highly 
visible, generated much attention and were judged important by both EU and 
national policy-makers. Most certainly, they have a wide societal impact. The 
WTD applies to all standards work contracts in the EU; it is of interest for any 
employers and employee, conversely for business associations and trade 
unions. In turn, the PMD has legal and financial implications for any 
relationship between a patient and his public insurer; therefore, it can be 
expected to matter for the broad public, as well as medical associations and, for 
financial reasons, the public administration.  
Wide societal impact alone does not guarantee high conflict and 
salience. Fortunately, several process-indicators speak for the presence of 
these characteristics in the two dossiers. First, the proposals were extensively 
dealt with by ministers and not only by diplomats or civil servants. Because 
national ministers have very little time for EU affairs, it is the consequential 
and important dossiers they focus on (Häge 2007: 322). Both dossiers were 
dealt with on the ministerial level several times. In both cases, there had been 
two or more attempts to vote. Second, it took the Council a relatively long time 
to reach an agreement on both Directives: 23 months (690 days) for the PMD 
and 45 months (1350 days) for the WTD. Against the background of all we 
know about decision-making speed in the EU, this is a significant amount of 
time. Klüver and Sagarzazu show that 92% of legislative dossiers are agreed 
within the time period of 1-2 years (Klüver and Sagarzazu 2013: 7). Thus, our 
dossiers belong to the exceptional 8%. Moreover, our cases exceed the average 
number of days needed to pass a Directive. Golub estimated between 200-300 
days for the mid-1990s (Golub 1997: 36); in turn, König claimed that the mean 
for “B points” Directives is 690 days, with the median at 539 (Golub 2008: 
173). Our cases are placed in the upper field of legislative duration.  
What about the involvement of the new member states and their 
collective preferences? We expect high interests of CEE countries in both cases. 
The WTD is one of the most important labor regulations in the EU. In turn, 
labor is one of the new member states’ priority topics as they see their 
competitive advantage in a cheaper yet well-educated workforce. The PMD 
was initially part of the Services Directive, which attracted intense attention of 
the newly joined states in 2005. Back then, the newcomers all supported more 
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flexible rules to govern the transnational services trade. However, they had to 
accept a less liberal compromise brought forward by the European Parliament. 
Interest of CEE countries for supranational governance of health affairs can be 
expected because those countries attract patients from old Europe and thus, 
can benefit from patient inflows (Martinsen 2009: 800). Health systems of 
these countries are being intensely modernized, which, again, speaks for 
increased attention towards emerging regulatory framework.  
The voting records support the hypothesis that the new member states 
had collective stakes in these two dossiers. The PMD had been, until the very 
end of the negotiation process, opposed by Poland, Slovakia and Romania, 
while Hungary, Lithuania and Slovenia were part of the blocking minority 
earlier in the process. Apart from the Czech Republic, which performed as a 
Presidency during these negotiations, almost all new member states adopted 
skeptical positions towards the new Directive on the ground that the “market” 
should not interfere with public health insurance.  
In the WTD, which very quickly became politicized, all the new member 
states except Hungary favored a more flexible governance of working time and 
supported the contentious provision of the “opt-out”. However, the reason for 
doing so is puzzling, given that none of these countries applied the opt-out 
domestically when the Commission presented the revised Directive proposal.  
In sum, both the WTD and the PMD exhibit characteristics that provide 
for a hard probe of my argument. In salient, conflictive negotiations, in which 
the member states easily group into entrenched alliances and in which the new 
member states take a common position it is unlikely that the agreement can be 
traced back to the interplay of two conditions: weak supranational agency of 
the newly joined states and the effectiveness-enhancing Council procedures. 
Both factors are unlikely to develop the anticipated effects under the given 
conditions. If the analysis of the cases reveals that the expected mechanisms 
still worked and were conducive to the Council agreement, my argument 
passes the test and thus provides a plausible explanation for the successful 
accommodation of the Eastern Enlargement by the Council.  
 
4.3 Data 
This section makes a few remarks on the data collection. Qualitative 
research in general, as well as process tracing in particular, strongly rely on 
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numerous and diverse observations to measure the concepts used. In a 
research project concerned with individual agency and its impact on legislative 
dynamics, information will be needed concerning how actors prepared their 
positions (and what they were) as well as in what form were the positions 
articulated? Moreover, how did actors proceed and how did they interact? 
Finally, as the argument postulates an interaction of agency and procedural 
conditions, precise knowledge about the timing and sequence in the legislative 
dynamics will be required. 
A solid empirical reconstruction of a legislative process within the 
Council of Ministers is challenging. Although Council negotiations are carefully 
documented in reports, minutes and policy notes, public access to these 
documents is highly restricted. Decision-making in the Council is a diplomatic 
negotiation and as such, it had been subjected to secrecy ever since the Council  
existed (Curtin 2011: 12). Over time, the Council relaxed the access restrictions 
(Naurin and Wallace 2008a: 2). However, there remains much debate between 
the Council members and civil society organizations about the appropriate 
balance between transparency and protection of information vital for national 
interests (EU Observer 2012).  
To portray the dynamics of Council negotiations, this project relied on 
the following sources: The PreLex was used to reconstruct the basic inter-
institutional game, whereas the Council registry provided valuable information 
about the dates and agendas of the Council meetings. The registry contains 
progress reports, issued regularly by the Presidencies. These reports 
document what the contentious points in a given negotiation were, what 
hindered the Council from resolving them and how the policy conflicts have 
eventually been overcome. Progress reports are often accompanied by new 
proposal drafts that allow tracing the changes. Here, one can see the extent to 
which the interventions of member states have found their way into the 
dossier under consideration.  
The project has furthermore extracted empirical information from 
video-records of ministerial meetings. These are available for Council meetings 
from 2009 onwards and can be found on the Council’s homepage29. In the 
recorded Council meetings, each ministerial delegation has about two minutes 
to make a statement or answer the questions pre-formulated by the Chair. 
                                                          
29  http://video.consilium.europa.eu/ [24.07.2013].  
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While not necessarily insightful about the specific negotiation strategies 
pursued by the delegations, these statements transmit the positions and 
attitudes of the delegations, such as the salience they attach to a specific 
dossier. They also allow assessing which concerns are shared by which 
countries and whether there is mutual support or critique among delegations.   
Besides sources provided by the Council itself, for most contentious 
dossiers newspaper information can be found. Journalists established in 
Brussels often dispose of insider information from EU diplomats and are 
familiar with the policy context. Unlike the Council documents, newspaper 
articles are more likely to provide country-specific information, such as about 
policy preferences, positions held or specific negotiation strategies, such as 
alliances, lobbying activities or voting intentions. Since my analysis has a 
strong domestic component, national press had been consulted where needed 
and possible. Clearly, national press coverage of EU affairs varies across 
countries and issues. Including national press coverage within research 
focusing on EU-level interactions is demanding and time consuming, which is 
why this type of in-depth inquiry has only selectively been practiced.  
Finally, an empirical research on the Council can draw on the 
practitioners’ recollection. This study has drawn upon some 20 interviews 
with national diplomats established in Brussels or in home administrations. 
The value and the confidence of the information gained in this way varied 
considerably. Interviews with the respective Presidency officials proved the 
most informative regarding member states’ behavior and interactions. In turn, 
diplomats working for the Permanent Representations were often ambiguous 
while reconstructing the national strategies and positions. The interviews 
were conducted according to a pre-defined scenario based upon the theoretical 
priors. In several cases, the interviewees did not agree to being recorded. Here, 
an interview protocol served as the source for the subsequent analysis (Gläser 
and Laudel 2010: 192-193).  
The different observations and empirical information collected have 
been subjected to triangulation. Following the advice of Leuffen and colleagues, 
I used various triangulation strategies depending on the availability and the 
trustworthiness of the data (Leuffen et al. 2013: 49). One has to bear in mind 
that Council research concerned with legislative processes faces a dilemma 
involving the information content and the quality of data sources. Council 
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reports are trustworthy, yet they contain only superficial information on what 
actually happened behind closed doors. In turn, interviewees who possess this 
information might be biased, particularly in terms of the effectiveness of their 
own bargaining strategies and ex post evaluation of behavior (Berry 2002). 
Thus, as context-careful and time-sensitive as it might be, an analysis of 
intergovernmental bargaining has to settle for only approximating the real-
world negotiation process.  
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5 The Revision of the Working 
Time Directive (2004-2009) 
 
The revision of the Working Time Directive is a legislative case in which the new 
EU members took almost uniformly a stance in an old policy conflict - namely the 
question, how strict should the EU-wide working time regulations be. Central 
Eastern European countries affected the structure of the Council conflict, shifting 
the balance of power towards more liberal positions. These were in minority 
when the original Directive was agreed in the early-1990s. I argue that the 
negotiations on the revision, which took place between 2004 and 2009, contain a 
paradox. On the one hand, the enlarged Council carried out policy change, 
although coming dangerously close to a legislative failure. On the other hand, the 
contribution of the new member states to this development was solely an indirect 
one and highly conditional upon other players’ actions. The case exemplifies the 
relevance of mobilization and mimicry in intergovernmental interactions as well 
as the leverage of the Presidencies’ strategic brokerage. Both mechanisms are 
helpful in understanding how membership change has affected legislative policy-
making.  
 
5.1 Analytical leverage of the case 
The revision of the Working Time Directive (WTD) has been one of the 
most contentious legislative processes in the European Union since the Eastern 
Enlargement. The Council intended to revise a piece of legislation from the 
early 1990s to adapt it to recent ECJ case law. However, a debate whether an 
exception from the weekly working hours limit would be acceptable prevented 
the member states from moving forward. The so-called “opt-out” was 
introduced as a temporary provision in 1993, although its definite removal 
from the Directive proved impossible after the Eastern Enlargement. The new 
member states aligned with the supporters of the derogation, adding fuel to an 
old conflict between the advocates of “social Europe”, such as France, Spain, 
Portugal, Greece and Belgium, and the supporters of flexible regulatory 
arrangements in EU-level labor market policy, such as the UK, Germany, 
Legislative dynamics and performance in the enlarged Council of Ministers 
92 
 
Austria and Ireland (Copeland 2010). The Council managed to conclude the 
negotiations, albeit with a fragile agreement and one that lacked the support of 
seven member states and was subsequently rejected by the EP.  
The new member states’ collective position in an EU-level controversy, 
combined with a successful conclusion of Council negotiations, make the WTD 
a suitable case to study the accommodation of the enlarged membership. Two 
aspects of the case are particularly puzzling. The first one relates directly to the 
positioning of the new member states vis-à-vis other countries and their role in 
the conflict between “the social” and “the liberal” Europe. Why did member 
states, which implemented the old WTD in its more rigorous version, i.e. 
without making use of the exceptions, directly after accession supported a 
more flexible regulation and contributed to a “liberal” coalition within the 
Council? Second, what were the drivers behind conflict escalation and conflict 
smoothing, the two counteractive dynamics that defined the negotiations on 
the WTD? What role, if any, did the large numbers play in each of these 
dynamics?  
On the first question, the insights from the analysis allow a clear 
argument. The liberalism of the new member states was of exogenous, rather 
than of endogenous origin. From their domestic policies, especially at the 
outset of the Council negotiations, it was anything but evident that they would 
need a generalized opt-out. Their position formation was marked by 
uncertainty about suitable regulatory tools for reestablishing compliance with 
the contentious ECJ case law on the on-call time in medical emergency services. 
Despite being uncertain on the domestic level, CEE ministers vocally defended 
the opt-out on the European level, because the UK, which lobbied for the 
exception and mobilized all its power resources, provided legislative 
leadership and thereby a convenient and reliable bargaining opportunity 
structure for less assertive countries. While mimicking the UK, the newcomers 
opted for a safe bet. On this point, the WTD clearly supports the theoretical 
argument predicting that CEE countries would not provide a distinct and 
autonomous contribution to the negotiations but rather their interaction with 
older countries would define their impact on the legislative dynamics.  
Concerning the question of contradictory directions in the conflict 
development, as well as the extent to which they were shaped by large 
numbers, the results speak with a forked tongue. At the beginning of the 
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legislative process, the positioning of the new member states exacerbated the 
existing conflict. The newcomers became embedded in the UK-led liberal 
coalition and the Dutch Presidency, hoping for a majority to emerge, amended 
the proposal in favor of this coalition’s preferences. Socially-minded 
delegations reacted with heavy contestation and the dossier became stuck in 
the Council for months. However, at a later stage, it was the position (a more 
“social” one) of CEEs on another Directive that encouraged a package deal. 
Nonetheless, here too the (Portuguese) Presidency and another old, large 
member state, France, played a decisive role. When assuming the Chair, 
Portugal abandoned its earlier radical position on the WTD and, with the 
Commission’s assistance, proposed a package solution with the Temporary 
Work Directive. With France accepting it, the opposing minority lost its 
blocking quality and the path was paved for formal Council agreement.  
These observations demonstrate that the Eastern Enlargement might 
have an amplifying impact on both directions of conflict dynamics: Where 
there had been policy conflicts before, they might become heavier after 
Enlargement. Nonetheless, crafting a (thin) qualified majority remains 
possible, if not easier, with a larger and a more diverse Council. The Presidency 
appears to be central in this context and the case reveals that it proceeds 
highly strategically, once it assesses that unanimity is unrealistic to reach. At 
the same time, the Presidency’s managerial success might depend on 
situational or conjunctional factors – here, France (unlike other members of 
the social coalition) being sufficiently flexible to accept the package deal.  
As the case contains an explicit package deal, it obviously highlights the 
relevance of flexible coalitions for the enlarged Council’s capacity to decide 
(Thomson 2011: 279-284). However, it also demonstrates that the location of 
newcomers’ preferences vis-à-vis the old member states is only one element 
next to several others that contribute to a successful policy decision. On this 
way, the case backs my initial claim that the accommodation of the Eastern 
Enlargement took place on the process-level, rather than simply on the input 
level. In fact, what we observe as policy space – the distribution of positions 
among member states – might already be a result of intergovernmental 
processes, such as mobilization and mimicry.  
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section provides an 
extensive description of the case. It specifies the policy problems, 
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demonstrates how the Commission’s proposal aimed at solving them, 
describes the negotiations in the Council, Presidency after Presidency, and 
briefly discusses the outcome. Subsequently , the chapter moves to the analysis 
of the negotiation process. Following the theoretical argument laid down in 
Chapter 3, the analysis is divided in three blocks: the new member states’ 
position-taking, coalition dynamics within the Council and the process-
management by the Council Presidencies. The final section summarizes the 
findings and concludes.  
5.2 Case information 
The Directive concerning certain aspects of the organization of working 
time (93/104/EC), short the WTD, is a piece of EC social policy legislation from 
199330. It lays down minimum safety and health requirements for the 
organization of working time across the EU (Article 1)31. It contains provisions 
on daily, weekly and annual rest periods and breaks, sets the maximum weekly 
working time, as well as clarifying certain aspects of night, shift work and work 
patterns (Article 2). The Directive is based upon the Community’s competence 
to support and complement the activities of the member states in the area of 
working conditions and the protection of workers (Article 137 Par 2 TEC32). 
The underlying purpose of the Directive is to achieve an internal market that is 
undistorted by social competition and one that does not come at the cost of 
workers’ health (Hardy 2006: 563-565). This motivation was not universally 
accepted as the Directive was proposed in the late-1980s33. Since the early-
1980s, the working time on European labor markets had been experiencing 
contrary trends. In France, the Grenelle agreements set the purpose of 
reducing working time gradually to 35-hours per week. In turn, the UK headed 
                                                          
30  The Directive applies to all sectors of activity, both public and private. Air, rail, 
road, sea, inland waterway and lake transport, sea fishing, other work at sea and 
the activities of doctors in training were excluded from the scope of the 1993 
Directive. However, the European Parliament and the Council adopted, on 22 June 
2000, Directive 2000/34/EC which extended the working time Directive to all the 
previously excluded sectors. These two Directives were codified into a 
consolidated text (Directive 2003/88/EC) in November 2003.  
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2004/03/feature/tn0403108f.htm 
31  As Barnard notes, the Working Time Directive occupies the “grey area between 
traditional health and safety measures and the rights of employed persons” 
(Barnard 2012: 533).  
32  Now Article 153 TFEU.  
33  For instance, the Commission relied on studies that showed harmful health effects 
of long working hours. However, the evidence was disputed by both politicians 
and academics (Barnard 2012: 534). 
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towards the longest working hours in Europe since the seminal reforms of the 
conservative Thatcher government (Avilés and Vina Garcia 2009: 97-98). 
These two trends contributed to antagonistic preferences of the policy-making 
elites.  
The WTD had been agreed in a “diluted form”, as it allowed an 
abstention form the maximum weekly working hours (Szyszczak 1995: 20). 
The conservative UK government, on whose request the opt-out had been 
introduced, abstained from the formal adoption in the Council on 23 November 
199334. The British government sought a judicial review of the measure (C-
84/94), although it lost in the ECJ (Barnard 1997: 45). 
5.2.1  The policy problem 
The WTD came back on the EU’s legislative agenda, because it needed a 
revision, for two reasons. Firstly, the original Directive obliged the Commission 
and the Council to re-examine the provision that allows member states not to 
apply the maximum weekly working limit of 48 hours (the “opt-out”) within a 
period of ten years, by November 2003. Secondly, doubts were raised about 
the meaning of the core concept of the Directive, namely the notion of “work” 
itself. Specifically, members of the medical profession questioned whether the 
time they spend on-call in hospitals could indeed be qualified as rest periods, 
as widely practiced in most European countries. In the SIMAP judgment (C-
303/98) from 2000, the ECJ ruled that being present at the workplace and 
being physically on-call constitutes “work” according to Community law35. In 
the Jaeger judgment (C-151/02) three years later the Court went on to argue 
that on-call and stand-by time, during which doctors are allowed to sleep in 
specially prepared rest rooms cannot be regarded as “rest” (as it was the case 
in the German law in that time), even if the actual professional activity is not 
                                                          
34  The reason for the UK questioning the Community (or the EU’s) involvement in 
social policy and working conditions is that these matters had been traditionally 
decided in Britain by management on the company level (Barnard 1997: 43). 
Unlike many continental European countries, the UK lacks a tradition of 
centralized social regulation. Community labour law as well as the Social Charta 
that proceeded it had been severely criticized by the British Conservatives, 
declaring these measures as infringing on individual freedom and as being an 
insult to the free market (The Guardian 2011).  
35  The Court classified the physical presence at the workplace as the determinant of 
“work” or “rest”. It argued that when the employee is only requested to be 
contactable at all times when on call, only the actual provision of health care must 
be regarded as working time.  
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performed. From the Directive’s perspective, this time must fully be regarded 
as working time and compensatory rest has to follow. National working time 
regulations that had been treating on-call duties as rest periods were thus 
found to be in breach of the WTD.  
The interpretation of “working time” and “rest” pursued by the ECJ in 
the judgments went beyond the original intent of the WTD. Some observers 
even claimed that the Court went “too far” and was not “sensible to the needs 
of the healthcare systems” (House of Lords 2004: 36). It became evident that 
the Directive omitted to account for the specificities of certain professions36. 
Full compliance with the Directive in the light of the recent rulings became 
very difficult, as it would require hospitals to employ more staff.  
From the member states’ perspectives, the situation was characterized 
by high dose of uncertainty. On the one hand, they all had the legal possibility 
to apply the opt-out for the healthcare sector only. In that way, they would not 
be bound by the 48h working week in this one sector. On the other hand, the 
opt-out was only a temporary solution and all policy-makers knew that a 
revision of the Directive was coming up. On this occasion, the Commission was 
invited to suggest a solution to the contentious interpretation of on-call time as 
work. In fact, the Dutch Presidency in the second half of 2004, urged the 
Commission to take legislative action, pointing at vivid interests of many 
member states to find a solution (EUobserver, 09.07.04). 
Member states were uncertain, as they were oscillating between a 
domestic solution, i.e. the sectorial application of the opt-out, and a 
supranational one; for instance, a redefinition of the term “work” in the 
Directive37. Apparently, many governments had a preference for the 
supranational solution. Depending on the labor market governance, such as the 
degree of social partners’ involvement, the usage of the opt-out might be very 
                                                          
36  Derogations from the rules on breaks, rest, night work or reference period were 
granted to several professions, such as managers, family workers, religious 
celebrants, doctors in training, as well as those employed in activities that 
necessitate the continuity of production (Article 17).   
37  For instance, Germany adapted its labor code to ECJ ruling while suggesting that 
the relevant social partners at company (hospital) level will find an appropriate, 
derogatory solution. This was achieved “formally, to give social partners the 
opportunity, in fact, however, only as a mid-solution in hope for the EU legislator 
to re-consider the EU law” (Schliemann 2006: 1011)  .  
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problematic or even impossible. For political reasons, many governments 
preferred not to recourse to that contentious regulatory tool38.   
In sum, the policy-making process was driven by two main problems. 
First, there was the “old” contention whether a Directive that promotes health 
and safety at the workplace should allow derogating from the 48-hours cap on 
the working week. Second, a solution was needed that would integrate on-call 
duties in the regulatory system of the WTD, whereby the opt-out was clearly 
relevant in this context. However, experiences of practical opt-out usage were 
very limited during the time when the agenda for the amended legislation was 
set, with only the UK making use of the generalized opt-out provision.  
5.2.2  The initiative by the European Commission 
The Commission adopted a proposal for a revised WTD on 22 
September 2004 (Commission 2004b). The launch of this amendment had 
been carefully prepared. In January 2004, the Commission issued a report 
examining the operation of the Directive in EU member states and in candidate 
countries (Commission 2004a). The Council and the EP discussed the initiative 
informally few weeks later and some 20 business and employees’ 
organizations voiced their opinions (Commission 2004c: 7). These 
consultations confirmed that the old contention about the derogation from the 
48 hours working week, the “opt-out”, remains vivid and not only divides 
businesses and trade unions, but also EU institutions, as the European 
Parliament signaled its preference for a phase-out of the derogation as soon as 
possible.  
The proposal of the Commission contained following changes to the 
existing legislation: 
 New categories of “on-call time” and “inactive part of the on-call time” 
have been introduced in addition to “work” and “rest”. During the on-
call period a worker is at the workplace and for the employers’ 
disposal, the inactive part is when he is not required to carry out his 
duties. This part of the on-call time shall not be regarded as working 
time.  
                                                          
38  Interview, Member of the Dutch Permanent Representation and the Presidency 
Team, 26.10.2011. 
Legislative dynamics and performance in the enlarged Council of Ministers 
98 
 
 The reference period for the calculation of weekly working hours has 
been extended to 12 months, provided that social partners agree. 
 Derogation from the daily and weekly periods of compensatory rest has 
been introduced (previously: 11 consecutive hours of rest in each 24 
hours plus 24 hours per week). According to the new provision, 
compensatory rest has to be granted “within a reasonable time” and at 
latest within 72 hours. 
 The opt-out from the 48 working week would remain in place only for 
the next five years. Within that time, the Commission shall monitor the 
application of this provision and consider a phase-out. Moreover, the 
application of the opt-out has been made more difficult: a collective 
agreement is needed; where collective agreements are absent, the 
worker written consent is the condition. Furthermore, the Directive 
introduced several additional conditions for the opt-out application: the 
ultimate limit of 65 weekly working hours, the obligation to keep 
record of the hours worked when opted-out, the obligation to report 
these records to authorities, no detriment to workers refusing to be 
opted-out, the workers’ written consent to the opt-out must be granted 
after the probation period.  
The Commission itself called the proposal a “balanced package”39. 
Indeed, the Commission increased the flexibility of working time calculation 
allowing an extension of the reference period from four to twelve months and 
introducing greater flexibility in the compensatory rest. On the other hand, it 
considerably tightened the conditions for the opt-out. Moreover, it stressed the 
temporary nature of this provision – granting it only a five-year long duration – 
and considered phasing it out within that period. Finally, the Commission 
proposed a way out of the inconvenient ECJ rulings suggesting that the inactive 
part of the on-call time should not be regarded as work.  
The balance between flexibility and the social protection, combined 
with the pressure to comply with the WTD in the light of recent ECJ rulings, 
was supposed to increase the chances of this proposal to gain acceptance40. 
However, this was a risky endeavor given that several policy-makers held quite 
                                                          
39  Press release: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-04-
1129_en.htm?locale=en [20.02.2013].  
40  Interview, Member of the Dutch Permanent Representation and the Presidency 
Team, 26.10.2011. 
 The Revision of the Working Time Directive (2004-2009)
 
99 
 
strong views on the issue of working time. While the UK was not expected to 
accept the limitations of its hard-fought derogation, the EP emerged as a new 
guardian of workers’ welfare.  
5.2.3  Legislative negotiations in the Council: an overview 
The Council held first exchanges of views on its EPSCO meeting on 4 
October 2004 during the Dutch Presidency. After 45 months, in June 2008 it 
reached political agreement under the Slovene Presidency. Under eight 
Presidencies, the Council had carried out turbulent negotiations with uneven 
progress41. Only in the first one and a half years was the Working Party 
involved. In the remaining two and a half years, Council debates took place on 
the highest, ministerial, level, very often only in the form of bilateral talks. One 
of the Presidencies, the German one, refused to deal with the Directive at all, as 
it claimed to see no chances for adoption. The subsequent Presidency, the 
Portuguese one, merged the WTD with the Directive on Temporary Agency 
Work to facilitate log-rolling and create more room for member states’ 
individual bargaining success. Only with this procedural innovation – a 
legislative package – was it possible to get the stalemated proposal on track 
again.  
Stalemate around the opt-out 
Already during the initial, rather technical debates in the Working 
Party, it became clear that the question of “opt-out” continues to generate 
considerable contention among delegations. During a Working Party in 
October 2004, France, Spain, Hungary, Portugal and Italy demanded an 
immediate abolishment of the opt-out, pointing at the additional flexibility in 
the working time calculation which the Commission’s proposal has granted 
(Council 2004c: 6). During the very same meeting, opposition was raised 
against the tightened conditions for the opt-out usage. For instance, the 
maximum limit of 65 hours worked weekly was rejected by a group of 
countries. The British delegation expressed its “position of principle” that the 
opt-out should remain in the current form (Council 2004c: 7). Once isolated in 
the Council, this time the UK gained the support of Germany, Austria, Ireland 
and the new member states.  
                                                          
41  Council Presidencies that have dealt with the Working Time Directive are the 
Netherlands, Luxemburg, the UK, Austria, Finland, (Germany refused to deal with 
the dossier during its Presidency in early 2007) Portugal and Slovenia.  
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Delegations soon found an agreement on the definition of “on-call time” 
and on the compensatory rest (Council 2004b: 5-7). However, on the opt-out 
issue, nine delegations preferred to keep the provision as it stands in the 
current Directive, while seven delegations could not accept the Commission’s 
proposal for the opposite reasons: they wanted to abolish the opt-out 
straightaway or, as a compromise, phase-it out gradually (“within x years”). 
The third group consisting of nine delegations was rather flexible and open to 
any compromise (Council 2004b: 8-9). At each end of the political spectrum, 
there was a blocking minority.  
Luxemburg Presidency and the EP’s opinion 
The subsequent Luxemburg Presidency tried to figure out which 
delegations use the opt-out, which are planning to use it and for what reasons. 
It received more ambiguous than clear answers to those questions, as many 
member states were undecided about what to do42.  
In May 2005, the European Parliament provided a new impetus to the 
legislative process by issuing its first legislative resolution (European 
Parliament 2005). The Employment and Social Committee led by a Portuguese 
socialist Antonio Cercas changed the Commission’s proposal considerably in 
that it rejected many “flexible” arrangements introduced by the Commission 
and went much further in strengthening the protection of workers43. Among 
others, the EP demanded: 
 An inclusion of the totality of on-call time (active or inactive) to the 
working time, allowing only for a differentiated calculation of pay, upon 
social partners’ agreement. 
 Abolishing the opt-out within three years from entry into force of the 
Directive.  
Reacting to the EP’s opinion, the Commission amended its proposal in 
June 2005 (Commission 2005). It incorporated only some of EP’s suggestions 
and rejected the most radical ones. In particular, it tightened even more the 
conditions of opt-out application: the derogation was limited to three years 
(from five years) and the maximum weekly working hours limit lowered to 55 
hours (from 65). As the amended proposal came out two days before the 
                                                          
42  Internal note of the Secretariat General of the Council, obtained in the Interview 
19.10.2010 
43  EPs text was supported by 345 members, 264 voted against and 43 abstained 
(AFP, 11.05.2004).  
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EPSCO Council closing the Luxemburg Presidency, the Council did not have 
time to examine it in detail. Ministers’ discussions on 2-3 June 2003 only 
confirmed the entrenched fronts. Paradoxically, the delegations also stressed 
the “urgency of finding a Community solution to the question of how to treat 
inactive periods of on-call time, following the Court of Justice judgments in the 
SIMAP and JAEGER Cases” (Press Release 8980/05). The Council was thus 
trapped between a political conflict and a necessity to act. 
British Presidency: consolidation of conflict in the Council  
The next Presidency that dealt with the proposal was the British one. 
This time, the opt-out was not dealt with on the Working Party level, but was 
rather discussed on a bilateral basis instead (Council 2005e). The Presidency 
noted that 11 countries supported its approach to maintain the opt-out44. In 
turn, France and Sweden drafted a proposal to phase-out the opt-out within 
five years, albeit granting ten years to countries that use it at the point of 
transposition. Moreover, their proposal provided for a special regulation for 
the hospital sector, which would be allowed to use the opt-out for three 
additional years renewably (Council 2005c). Franco-Swedish proposal gained 
lukewarm support from Spain, Belgium, Greece and Finland (Agence Europe, 
09.12.2005). Reacting to this development, the British Presidency introduced 
several deadlines for reporting, monitoring and “further proposals” concerning 
the opt-out, but omitted the question of a potential phase-out (Council 2005a). 
However, this was not acceptable to the “social” camp and thus the proposal 
could not move forward.   
Austrian and Finnish Presidencies: search for a compromise  
The subsequent, Austrian presidency, no longer organized meetings at 
Working Party level; rather, it consulted the delegations on a very high level. 
Austria decided to keep the opt-out without providing for a date of a potential 
phase-out. As a compensation to the “social camp”, it sought formulations that 
would constrain the opt-out usage and assure that it will not harm workers’ 
health45. Nonetheless, the Austrian delegation knew well before the Council 
meeting that the blocking minority by France, Spain and others would stand 
united and that there would be no chance for a vote to pass. 
                                                          
44  CZ, DE, EE, IE, IT, LV, MT, AT, PL, SI, SK (Council 2005a: 12) . 
45  In its re-drafted proposal, Austria introduced few recitals and an obligation for 
employers to first check whether the extended reference period would not satisfy 
their needs before turning to the opt-out  (Council of the European Union 2006c). 
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Finland, the next Presidency, did not appear to be discouraged by the 
apparent stagnation of negotiations. With the intention to “balance” the 
Austrian proposal (Europolitics, 24.10.2006), it put forward two innovative 
ideas: First, an exclusive choice between two flexible arrangements provided 
by the redrafted Directive – the opt-out and the extended reference period for 
working time calculation; Second, a revision clause - obligation to at least 
consider a phase-out on the national level after two years, under the auspices 
of the Commission’s monitoring. Furthermore, Finland returned to the idea of 
an upper working time limit when the opt-out from the 48hours is used, 
raising it to 60 hours. The Presidency acknowledged that the opt-out might 
currently be needed in some European countries, but it aimed to encourage 
these member states to stop using it in the long term. The Commission signaled 
that it would go along with any compromise; however, if no agreement were 
found, it would withdraw the proposal from the agenda and proceed with 
action against the member states who failed to implement the ECJ rulings 
(Europolitics, 02.11.2006). This threat, combined with the “softly-softly 
approach” by the Presidency (Europolitics, 26.10.2006) raised hopes that the 
proposal might pass the Council.  
The Presidency counted very much on support from France that 
informally led the “anti-opt-out” camp46. The Presidency was convinced that, 
thanks to France, a vote would be successful47. Only one day before the Council 
did the Finnish minister learn from the French delegation on the phone that 
French position to be presented on the Council meeting would not be 
supportive, as previously intended. This has seemingly been a short-term 
decision, influenced by the involvement of the Prime Minister de Villepin and 
the President Chirac48 (Agence Europe, 07.11.2006). Germany, which was 
about to assume the next Council Presidency, declared at that time that it 
would not deal with the WTD at all (Agence Europe, 10.11.2006).  
Portuguese Presidency: the failure of the package deal strategy 
The Portuguese Presidency resumed the negotiations, motivated by the 
pressure from the member states. It followed the suggestion from the 
                                                          
46  Comprising France, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium, Cyprus and Greece 
(Europolitics, 08.11.2006). 
47  Interview, Ministry of Employment and Economy of Finland, 25.11.2011. 
48  http://www.euractiv.com/fr/europe-sociale/temps-de-travail-lepreuve-de-for-
news-234080 [27.02.2013]. 
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Commission to merge two labor market dossiers into one negotiation package: 
the WTD and the Directive on Temporary Agency Work. The Temporary 
Agency Work Directive provides for equal treatment between temporary and 
employed workers, following the principle that equal work demands equal 
conditions. The Directive was stuck in the Council, opposed by the UK which 
several years back managed to build up a blocking minority consisting of 
Germany, Ireland, Denmark and the new member states (Nedegaard 2007: 
707).  
The idea of the package deal was to make one of these two dossiers 
more “liberal” and the other one more “social”. On this way, the political needs 
of different camps in the Council would be satisfied. All member states, also the 
CEE countries, except the UK and Germany, supported this strategy.  
The Portuguese Presidency disregarded this opposition, at first. It 
worked out a compromise that, for the WTD, strongly resembled the Finnish 
proposal49. In turn, substantial compromises had been made to France, Spain 
and Italy in the Temporary Agency Work Directive, enabling those states to 
support the package (Europolitics, 04.12.2007). United Kingdom and Germany 
signaled their opposition (Europolitics, 26.11.2007). The vote has not been 
taken at all, although qualified majority could have been reached (Europolitics, 
07.12.2007). A vote would expose the UK and Germany’s isolation in the 
Council. This was politically not desired due to the uncertain ratification 
prospects of the Lisbon Treaty. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
contacted the Presidency personally several times, presumably threatening 
with ratification interruptions in the House of Commons (Europolitics, 
07.12.2007)50.  
5.2.4 The outcome 
The prospect of reaching an agreement in the Council on the package of 
dossiers emerged five months later, in May 2008, after the social partners in 
the United Kingdom reached agreement about equal treatment of agency 
workers. This agreement allowed the British government to agree to 
                                                          
49  One of the changes pertains to the weekly cap of working hours (60 in the Finish 
presidency). Here, Portugal allowed for 65 hours for certain sectors (health), at the 
request of Poland, supported by Slovenia and the UK.  
50  A member of the Portuguese delegation refused to comment on the interaction 
between the British Prime Minister and the Presidency in an interview for this 
project, although he suggested searching for the explanation in the media.  
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provisions in the Temporary Agency Directive and consequently to accept the 
negotiation merge of the Temporary Work Directive and the WTD. Reacting to 
this development, the Slovene Presidency put the package on the agenda of the 
Council meeting in June 2008 (Agence Europe, 23.05.2008). The danger that 
the opt-out opponents would block a decision diminished with the return to 
power of the conservative Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi in May 2008, as 
Italy withdrew its participation in the “social” camp (Europolitics, 29.05.2008). 
France was satisfied by the Temporary Agency Work compromise. A qualified 
majority in the Council has been reached. Spanish and Greek delegations voted 
against and the Belgian, Cypriot, Hungarian, Maltese and Portuguese 
delegations abstained (Press Release, 13028/08).  
The European Parliament held the second reading of the Directive on 
17 December 2012. As previously announced on informal arenas, the 
Rapporteur Cercas maintained his very critical stance towards the direction 
taken by the Council on the opt-out provision and on the inactive on-call time. 
Consequently, the legislative resolution of the Parliament in the second reading 
resembled very much the one in the first (European Parliament 2008). The 
Parliament maintained that, by default, all on-call time should be regarded as 
working time51 and that the opt-out should be phased out three years from the 
entry into force of the Directive52. On the way to the Conciliation committee, 
the Parliament was determined to keep its position, as was the Council53. The 
two sides were too far apart and an agreement was impossible to achieve. The 
legislative process has failed. Currently, the Commission is preparing a second 
attempt at the Directive’s revision. It released a report on the application of the 
Directive in the member states and is now consulting social partners on the 
issue54.   
5.3 Analysis 
I start my analysis of the negotiation dynamics in the Working Time case 
with the position-taking by CEE countries. I show that the new member states 
                                                          
51  Only by collective agreement might the inactive part be excluded. 
52  The reading passed with an absolute majority of 421 votes to 273; 
http://www.euractiv.com/socialeurope/parliament-gives-working-time-op-news-
220922 [28.02.2013]. 
53  http://www.euractiv.com/socialeurope/parliament-gives-working-time-op-news-
220922 [28.02.2013]. 
54  http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=706&langId=en&intPageId=205 
[14.11.2013]. 
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only very loosely engaged domestically with this dossier. Instead of domestic 
input, it was the bargaining agency of other member states, and particularly 
the UK, which provided CEEs orientation when they entered the Council arena. 
Drawing on counterfactual reasoning, I show that CEEs’ policy needs could 
have been realized with other tactics and alliances as well.  
Without intending or realizing it, CEEs contributed to an early and well-
organized liberal coalition under UKs lead. The group gained an open ear from 
the Dutch Presidency, who was willing to streamline the negotiations. In 
accommodating the liberals’ demands, the Chair saw a possibility to achieve 
quickly at a successful, albeit thin, majority vote. Showing that subsequent 
Presidencies stuck to the policy direction taken by the predecessor, I argue 
that Council negotiations are path dependent. Thus, the very first months are 
crucial for further development of the bargaining dynamics and for the 
outcome. The concluding section argues that large size and diversity of the 
group is conducive to agreement, since the Chair can exploit the different 
preference orders and motivations of the group members.  
5.3.1 CEEs position-taking in comparative perspective 
When acceding to the EU, the new member states were obliged to 
implement the “old” WTD from 1993. The Directive required only few legal 
adaptations in CEE countries (Falkner and Treib 2008: 300). The 
transposition has been timely and correct, despite political contestation. 
Political parties, trade unions and employers’ associations disagreed about 
the level of flexibility to be utilized. Nonetheless, no CEE country 
implemented the generalized opt-out, although this option has been part of 
the political debate (Schulze 2008: 105; Wiedermann 2008: 39).  
5.3.1.1 Position formation and negotiation behavior 
CEE countries, like some of their Western counterparts, initially 
ignored ECJ’s SIMAP and Jaeger rulings. The Czech government refused to 
go beyond the wording of the Directive itself when implementing it; The 
Slovak government claimed to work on the rulings’ implementation, but no 
specific legislative amendment was ever suggested, In Hungary, the 
Supreme Court dealt with the question of remuneration of on-call work and 
referred to ECJ’s rulings, albeit with no effect on legislation (Causse 2008: 
74; Schulze 2008: 105; Wiedermann 2008: 39) 
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Only Slovenia had dealt with the problem of on-call time in the light of 
SIMAP and Jaeger rulings at the time EU-level negotiations on the revision of 
the WTD started. Slovenia decided to include the on-duty services in the 
calculation of working time. In order to maintain the emergency services in the 
hospitals, it introduced an opt-out in the healthcare sector exclusively. In 
accordance with Slovenian neo-corporatist traditions (Guardiancich 2011), 
these decisions had been taken after extensive consultations between the 
Health Ministry and the medical trade unions (STA, 22.09.2004). Thus, in the 
Slovenian case, the support of the opt-out clause in the revised Directive was a 
direct result of a domestic arrangement. Slovene administration had been 
calculating whether an end of the opt-out would be possible in five, ten or 
twenty years but concluded that it would be too uncertain to agree on fixed 
limits55.  
Slovenia had made it clear that, being a small country with only one 
medical university, it faces the risk of staff shortages in hospitals (Furtlehner 
2008: 139). Slovene arguments have been included in the documentation of 
the negotiations, such as minutes and progress reports (Council 2005b: 4-5). 
This formal act is meaningful, because it suggests that both the Chair and other 
member states acknowledged Slovenia’s contribution as legitimate and well-
founded. Slovenia’s practice of giving reasons appears exceptional among 
other CEEs. Negotiation participants reported that the new member states had 
a difficulty explaining the domestic reasons of their voiced preference for the 
opt-out and remained quiet during the Working Party meetings56.  
In other CEE countries, such a clear link between the domestic situation 
and the negotiation position presented at the outset of the Council negotiations 
was lacking. When the Commission made its proposal in late 2004, Poland, 
Slovakia, the Czech Republic and the Baltics did not yet know how they would 
deal with the necessity to comply with the ECJ’s interpretation of the on-call 
duties. They were all very supportive to the Commission’s proposal to 
distinguish between the active and inactive on-call time and exclude the latter 
from the working time count. In fact, all the member states had the same 
position in relation to this question. According to experts interviewed for the 
                                                          
55  Interview, Permanent Representation of Slovenia, 25.11.2010. 
56  Interview, Council General Secretariat, 19.10.2010; Interview, Member of the 
Dutch Permanent Representation and the Presidency Team, 26.10.2011. 
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DEU project, all new member states attached higher salience to the exclusion of 
on-call time compared to the opt-out issue (Thomson et al. 2012)5758. However, 
there was uncertainty concerning the extent to which this solution – or 
perhaps a sectorial opt-out like in the Slovenian case – would be used 
domestically.  
This uncertainty became apparent when the Luxemburg Presidency 
conducted a “technical” inquiry about the actual opt-out usage among the 
member states and the compromise solutions they would be able to accept. 
Only Slovakia took a clear position in favor of the opt-out, alongside the UK and 
Malta. Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia signaled that they would accept 
the phase-out if there were a majority for it. Poland and Slovenia demanded a 
transition period as long as possible, and a cap on weekly working hours not 
lower than 65 hours59.  
In the case of the Czech Republic, the difficulty of formulating a clear 
position on this dossier was very outspoken. On the domestic level, the Czech 
government was for a long time refraining from taking a position at all, 
pointing at the necessity of consultation with the social partners (Hospodarske 
Noviny 12.05.2005, Lidove Noviny, 22.09.2004). Reporting to the Czech Senate, 
the responsible ministry admitted that there is no uniform view on the 
Directive in the Czech Republic and that the formal position of the government 
aims to respect the interests of both employers and unions60.  
During EU-level negotiations and specifically on the contentious opt-out 
provision, the Czech government has been manifestly changing its stance. On 
the one hand, it did not object the end of the provision (as envisaged originally 
by the Commission)61. On the other hand, it also accepted the proposal by the 
British Presidency, which kept the opt-out for infinite duration (Council 
2005d). Parliamentary debates on the Directive confirm the “evolving” 
                                                          
57  Since mid-2013, the dataset has been available for download under 
robertthomson.info.  
58  Interview, Permanent Representation of Poland to the European Union, 
16.12.2010. 
59  Internal note of the Secretariat General of the Council, obtained in the Interview 
19.10.2010 
60  Senate of the Czech Republic, Minutes of the 54th Meeting of the Committee on EU 
Affairs of the Senate held on 24 November 2004.  
61  http://www.euractiv.cz/socialni-politika/clanek/pracovn-doba-v-eu--svoboda-
nebo-regulace [15.10.2011]. 
Legislative dynamics and performance in the enlarged Council of Ministers 
108 
 
character of the governments’ policy62. Czech Republic, which had both social-
democratic and conservative government throughout the negotiations, 
maintained its lukewarm and conciliatory attitude until the end of the 
decision-making process63. After failed EU-level negotiations, the Czech 
Republic introduced a limited, sectorial opt-out in late 2008.  
The Czech case illustrates how domestic pondering has led to vague 
negotiation positions and unclear behavior. The Polish case, described in detail 
in the following section, shows that national authorities and policy-makers did 
not invest much effort in finding legal and regulatory solutions to the problem 
of the working time of doctors, until a scenario of individuals claiming their 
rights in Courts materialized in late 2006. In both these cases, the legal status 
quo – the domestic regulatory arrangement - could not have offered much 
guidance for the process of position formation on the relevant provisions of the 
revised WTD. Rather, uncertainty what to do and awaiting future 
developments on EU-level characterized this part of position-taking. In EU-
level negotiations, almost all CEE countries supported the opt-out and 
ultimately introduced it in their national legislations64. However, the timing of 
this step is telling, given that Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and 
Latvia did so in 2007 and later, whereas approximately around that time, the 
Finnish EU Council Presidency unexpectedly failed to reach compromise on the 
Directive and the German Presidency refused to deal with this dossier. The 
domestic re-regulation in the member states might appear as a sign of giving 
up the original hope that an amendment of the Directive would alleviate 
domestic non-compliance problems. Seen from this perspective, the stalemate 
of Council negotiations served as a motor that motivated CEE health policy-
makers to deal with the problem domestically.  
Regarding the timing of domestic reaction, CEE countries clearly 
differed from their older counterparts. In Germany, France, Spain and the 
                                                          
62  Senate of the Czech Republic, Minutes of the 22nd Meeting of the Committee on EU 
Affairs of the Senate held on 20 July 2005. 
63  Interview, Ministry of Employment and Economy of Finland, 25.11.2011. 
64  2010 Commission report on the opt-out usage. Five countries allowed the 
generalized opt-out in their legislations irrespectively of sectors: Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Malta, and the UK; 11 countries allowed a limited use of the opt-out in 
some sectors (Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain; and 11 countries did not allow 
the usage of the opt-out in their legislations: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania and Sweden 
(Commission 2010b: 7). 
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Netherlands legislative adaptation to contentious ECJ rulings has been 
performed as early as in 200365. These countries had experimented with 
sectorial, conditional and provisional forms of opt-out. This does not mean that 
they fully complied with the old Directive or with the ECJ rulings and thus did 
not value a revision of the Directive. For instance, in the Dutch and Spanish 
cases, the legislation explicitly referred to the ongoing legislative process on 
the EU level (Commission 2010a: 91-96). However, the comparison clarifies 
that CEEs had much less domestic legislative activity or policy experience to 
draw on when formulating negotiation positions at the outset of Council 
negotiations.  
5.3.1.2 Domestic engagement with the Directive: the case of Poland 
The Polish case provides a more detailed example of late domestic 
engagement with the working time problématique and its impact on both the 
position formation and the bargaining behavior.  
The Polish ministerial administration dealing with the dossier admitted 
that it was, at first, quite reluctant to use the opt-out as a tool to resolve the on-
call working time problem66. Although the opt-out has been discussed by 
politicians during the implementation of the (old) Directive, it was an 
unfamiliar and uncertain institution of working time governance in the eyes of 
legal and policy experts.  
However, while lacking experience spoke against the opt-out, the 
distinction between active and inactive on-call time, another possible solution 
to the contentious ECJ rulings, also raised doubts. In particular, practical 
implications of this distinction were unclear: How would the two parts of the 
on-call time be calculated? Who would control if there were no abuses? In the 
course of EU-level negotiations, it became uncertain whether the distinction 
would indeed be introduced at all, since the EP opposed it and argued in favor 
of counting all on-call time as working time. Observing these developments on 
EU level, Polish civil servants working on this issue were more and more 
convinced that the opt-out should be kept: “Why should we use a tool that is 
                                                          
65  In the Netherlands in 2005. 
66  Interview, Ministry of Social Affairs, Warsaw, 26.04.2012; Interview, Permanent 
Representation of Poland to the European Union, 16.12.2010. 
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cumbersome and uncertain [the distinction between active and inactive on-call 
time], if there is a clear and simple solution available [the opt-out]”67.  
It was clear for Polish policy-makers that complying with ECJ case law 
would be very costly and challenging from an organizational perspective. The 
Ministry of Health, which supported the Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs in 
coordinating the position, estimated early on that staff deficits would amount 
to approximately 15 000 positions and cost up to 170 million Euro (Gazeta 
Wyborcza, 02.06.2005). Against this alarming background, it is surprising to 
note that public administration and relevant policy-makers lacked a more clear 
preference for one or another regulatory solution. The ministry claimed in 
public statements that legislative work to establish compliance has been 
stopped awaiting EU-level proposals, yet there is no evidence that such work 
has ever been started (Gazeta Wyborcza, 07.11.2006).  
Pressure to take action emerged in late 2006, when an individual 
doctor, Czeslaw Mis, went to court demanding days off as a compensation for 
on-call duties he had carried out in the past. The Polish Medical Association 
(OZZL) took up this idea and complaint at the European Commission about 
excessive working times in Polish hospitals (Rynek Zdrowia, 10(15)-2006). 
The association published online a sample complaint for doctors willing to 
seek individual legal action (ibid). 
In December 2006, Czeslaw Mis won his case against a public hospital 
(Jonczyk 2008: 8-9). The ruling represented a new development in the Polish 
jurisprudence, since, few years back, the Constitutional Court ruled that 
excessive on-call duties and overtime in hospitals are justified, as they serve a 
higher good, namely the welfare of patients (Jonczyk 2008: 7). In the Mis case, 
the regional Court in Cracow referred to the ECJ case Marshall (C-152/84) 
arguing that a public hospital can be regarded as an “emanation of the state”. 
Thus, the provisions of the WTD would apply directly to Polish doctors. It was 
this line of argument, although contested among legal scholars in Poland, 
which motivated health policy-makers to amend the Polish medical law as a 
matter of urgency. 
In summer 2007, a new hospital law has been adopted, which 
provided that the on-call time shall be regarded as working time, in line 
                                                          
67  Interview, Ministry of Social Affairs, Warsaw, 26.04.2012. 
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with the ECJ’s rulings. The amendment also introduced an individual opt-
out upon doctor’s consent. However, with the opt-out being voluntary, the 
new law endangered the continuity of emergency services in Polish 
hospitals. Doctors unions’ called their members to agree to work more only 
in exchange for higher wages (Gazeta Wyborcza, 28.11.2007). Reacting to 
this, the government suggested postponing the entry into force of the new 
law, albeit exposing itself to the Commission’s threat of infringement 
procedures. An agreement on a revised Directive would delay 
Commission’s action. Moreover, it would grant Poland some more time and, 
with the distinction between active and inactive on-call time, more choice 
between different regulatory tools to reorganize the working time in 
hospitals.   
In that time, Poland realized that the stalemate in the Council is not in 
its interest. Not only did Poland relax its position several times, but it also - 
together with other CEE countries - pushed the Portuguese Presidency to 
continue the efforts to reach agreement (Europolitics, 26.11.2007). It seems 
that CEE countries shifted their previously rather “liberal” rhetoric towards 
more specific problems of hospitals’ struggle to manage medical staff’s 
discontent about uncertain regulatory situation. Needless to say, Poland 
manifestly distanced itself from the UK, of whom it had been a faithful ally at 
the beginning of the negotiation process (Gazeta Wyborcza, 22, 23, 
30.11.2007).  
5.3.1.3 Summary 
At the time the Council negotiations started, most CEE countries did not 
have specific ideas about the policy options they would prefer, when 
approaching the pressing problem of on-call duties. The process of position 
formation was characterized by uncertainty about what to do. The approach 
taken by CEE countries can be described as “wait and see”. In contrast to some 
old member states, the new member states did not exhibit extensive legislative 
ambition to respond to the on-call time problem domestically. The late re-
regulation of the hospitals’ working time regimes suggests that there had been 
little preparatory work in this regard at the outset of EU-level negotiations. Of 
course, this might relate to the timing, since the WTD’s revision coincided with 
the formal beginning of CEEs EU membership.  
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The case of Poland shows how policy focus, i.e. a more specific idea of 
what the domestic problem is, what kind of solutions might be needed and 
how pressing an EU-level agreement actually is, has been achieved late in the 
process – too late, in fact, to ease the politicization in the Council and 
eventually prevent stalemate. The insight into the Polish domestic dynamics 
revealed a reactive rather than a proactive policy style. The legislature 
responded to the compliance problem in the healthcare not only with 
significant delays, but also in a provisional way, as the law amendment even 
aggravated the conflicts between doctors and public hospitals. The 
intermediation system underperformed as well, as medical associations failed 
to transform a legal debate about working time compliance, which has been 
going on for several years in the Polish legal milieu (Jonczyk 2008), into policy 
messages, early lobby activities and into assistance towards its members68. In 
fact, it seems that the medical associations were equally surprised by the 
course of events, as was the government.  
In that respect, this part of the analysis provides empirical support for 
the theoretical expectations outlined in Chapter 3. The argument claimed that 
poor domestic resources and rather limited salience of EU issues to political 
constituencies in CEE would inhibit the new member states from finding out 
their interests, voicing their concerns and shaping the Council’s negotiation 
agenda. The reviewed evidence has shown that while most CEE governments 
had a position on the opt-out issue, the position did not result from a thorough 
scanning of the domestic regime and identifying the best applicable solutions, 
as one would otherwise expect. Moreover, a coherent explanatory strategy for 
the position was lacking in most new member states.  
Besides lending plausibility to the theoretical argument of the thesis, 
this observation is interesting in broader theoretical context. It sheds a 
nuanced light on the assumption that policy preferences are pre-existing and 
stable, as they reflect the underlying domestic conditions (Hörl et al. 2005: 
596-598; Thomson 2011: ch. 6; Princen 2012: 625, 628). Our case rather 
subscribes to the Council scholarship which acknowledges differences in 
professional preparation of negotiating delegations (Wallace 2002: 334-335). 
                                                          
68  These are key activities of interest groups in developed capitalist democracies 
(Schmitter and Streeck 1999: 88; Lang 2008). 
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The following section shows how the newcomers’ deficit in position formation 
mattered for their coalition behavior.  
5.3.2 CEEs vis-à-vis the “liberals” in the Council 
It might appear puzzling that CEE countries became important 
protagonists in the EU-level opt-out-conflict, while lacking both policy input 
and domestic motivations to become involved. The following section shows 
how this became possible. It is argued that CEE countries oriented themselves 
towards the anticipated bargaining dynamics. Furthermore, they went along 
with the British strategy of mobilizing allies, as they keenly responded to 
British lobbying efforts. Following a powerful and skillful member state, when 
uncertain about own position, can be seen as a rational usage of emerging 
opportunity structures. The alliance with the UK seems to have released the 
new member states from the effort of crafting own bargaining strategies. The 
counterfactual reasoning goes even further and argues that the new member 
states have missed other opportunities to see their policy needs satisfied.  
5.3.2.1 Anticipating future bargaining dynamics 
While facing domestic uncertainty about how to deal with the working 
time regulation, CEE countries anticipated what the positions in the Council 
would be. The history of the working time dossier was well known in Brussels. 
Moreover, actors such as the EP or the largest member states started 
communicating their positions already before the negotiations formally 
started. In particular, the United Kingdom was determined to defend the opt-
out, for the sake of economic competitiveness and the individual freedom. It 
engaged in a strategic vote exchange with Germany, gaining an important ally 
on its side. Moreover, the UK Presidency of the Council was coming up in the 
second half of 2005, followed by the German Presidency one year after that. 
Thus, the negotiation participants had good reasons to anticipate that the 
British government will use this opportunity to shape the proposal according 
to own views.  
The core of the “liberal camp” in the Council was the British-German 
alliance, which dated back to mid-2004, at the latest. Back then, the UK 
supported the German request to grant trade unions more influence in 
corporate takeovers; In turn, the German government agreed to side with 
London on the opt-out question (FTD, 26.04.2004). Both Germany and the 
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UK had social-democratic governments at that time: The Schröder government 
with SPD and the Greens in Germany and Tony Blair’s Labor government in the 
UK. Both governments experienced domestic tensions in their relations with 
trade unions. In both cases, EU Directives played an important role in the 
governments’ strategy to manage the relations with economic interest groups, 
trade unions and business associations.  
The British-German alliance was struck at a high political level and 
the German stance on the WTD was authorized by Chancellor Schröder. 
Observers report that the position was a “difficult one to defend”  for the 
German negotiation team, and especially for the Minister for Social Affairs, 
Müntefering69. In the past, Germany had shown more support for EU-level 
social norms and advocated a high level of workers’ protection70. This time, 
Germany was open to improving the level of workers’ protection in several 
provisions of the Directive, with the exception of the opt-out. Germany 
stood firm on this issue, defending the maintenance of the indefinite opt-
out as preferred by the UK.  
The British-German alliance also encompassed the Temporary 
Agency Work Directive, the dossier that has been compounded with the 
WTD into one negotiation package in late 200771. Ever since the Temporary 
Work Directive had been present on the Council negotiation table, 
Germany contributed to the blocking minority, again led by the British 
government which demanded extended waiting periods before granting 
temporary workers equal rights vis-à-vis statute workers. The UK 
criticized the procedure of pooling the two dossiers, as it did not want to 
be pushed to compromise on any of them. Germany adhered to this 
strategy72.  
                                                          
69  Interview, Member of the Portuguese Presidency Team, 09.12.2010. 
70  Interview, Council General Secretariat, 19.10.2010. 
71  The Directive 2008/104 EC grants temporary agency workers non-discrimination 
vis-à-vis contracted employees who undertake the same work. It is only possible 
to grant equal treatment after a certain period (“Qualifying period”) and provided 
an adequate level of protection. The Directive was proposed in 2002, but was 
blocked by the UK, Germany, Ireland and Denmark until 2008 – these states 
wanted a waiting period longer than six weeks (Nedegaard 2007: 702). Nedegaard 
reports after Financial Times that the Temporary Agency Work Directive was also 
part of the British-German deal on the Takeover Directive (Nedegaard 2007: 711) 
72  Arithmetically, the two countries could have been outvoted at the end of the 
Portuguese Presidency. However, a vote had not been called. Germany moved 
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In sum, the strategic alliance with Germany, as well as the British 
and German Presidencies coming up, made it plausible that the UK’s 
opinion will hold strong relevance in the Working Time negotiations.  
5.3.2.2 British lobbying and CEEs reactions 
Before the Council negotiations started, the British delegation 
mobilized its embassies throughout the EU and particularly in the new 
member states to contact the relevant ministries and lobby for the UK’s 
stance73. The embassies’ involvement in EU lobbying is one of the key elements 
of the British negotiation strategy in European legislative negotiations, and 
unique for this country (Wall 2008: 192). Shortly before the Council meeting 
that concluded the first Presidency working on the revision, the British 
Minister for European Affairs gathered in London the ambassadors of EU 
countries and lobbied for the British position. He claimed that policy-makers in 
Brussels intend to punish Britain for its flexible and successful labor market 
and urged the ambassadors to convey to their governments the need to “say 
goodbye to out-of-date thinking from the 1980s about how work time should 
be organized” (FT, 29.11.2004; Agence Europe, 02.12.2004).  
The UK was outspoken about its power resources. Prime Minister Blair 
was involved in the debate and regularly commented on the course of the 
negotiations. For instance, he reacted immediately and very critically after the 
contentious first vote of the EP (Market News, 12.05.2005). Furthermore, the 
British Prime Minister did not shy away from discussing the power balance in 
the Council in public, declaring that the UK has a reliable blocking minority on 
the opt-out issue (Market News, 12.05.2005)74. Finally, in parallel to the 
Council negotiations on the WTD, discussions about the ratification of the 
Constitutional Treaty took place across Europe. Given the involvement of the 
British Prime Minister in both debates, it was plausible to expect that a link 
between the two will be made sooner or later. In fact, such a linkage happened 
later in the negotiation process. The Portuguese Presidency, while certain 
                                                                                                                                                           
once the UK had been able to accept the modified Temporary Agency Work 
Directive.  
73  Interview Council General Secretariat, 19.10.2010; Interview Permanent 
Representation of Austria, 28.10.2010; Interview, Ministry of Social Affairs, 
Warsaw, 26.04.2012; Interview, Permanent Representation of Slovenia, 
25.11.2010. 
74  Speculating in public about possible vote outcomes is very uncommon in Council 
politics (Novak 2013: 1099).  
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about a qualified majority being achieved, did not call a vote confronted with 
Gordon Brown’s thread to inhibit the parliamentary ratification of the Treaty.  
The success of the British lobbying strategy can be traced in the 
reactions of the political elites in CEE. For instance, in Poland, the deputy 
Minister for Economy announced that Polish negotiation position would 
resemble the British one75. This declaration has been made before the Polish 
government has issued the formal negotiation instruction (Gazeta Wyborcza, 
22.09.2004). Strong references to the British rhetoric of economic 
competitiveness and individual freedom can be found in the statements of 
Slovak representatives (TASR, 05.10.2004; HNonline, 05.10.2004). Indeed, 
Poland and Slovakia were portrayed as the most faithful allies of the UK in the 
first half of the negotiation process. At the ministerial level, even the Czech 
Republic, otherwise lukewarm towards the Directive, vague in its positions and 
conciliatory in its attitudes, manifestly took the British side.  
Contrary to the administrative level, comprising civil servants and 
experts, on the ministerial level, the “liberal” positions of CEE countries were 
rather outspoken. This does not surprise, since ministers tend to portray 
Council negotiations as zero-sum-bargaining (Spence 1995b: 388). Taking 
sides is an integral part of this process, especially when it involves an alliance 
with an established and powerful member state. In fact, there are also 
theoretical reasons to expect that ministers will take more extreme positions 
in international bargaining. As Stasavage has argued, when negotiating in 
public, policy-makers might use the decision-making process to signal to their 
constituencies that they are fulfilling the mandate (Stasavage 2004: 672-683; 
2007: 59). However, this mechanism cannot fully account for the behavior of 
CEE ministers in the Working Time negotiations, since the opt-out was rather 
unknown to the general public in CEEs.  
Why, then, were CEE policy-makers so attracted by the British 
position? Admittedly, the new member states and the UK had a “special” 
diplomatic and political relationship in the early years of membership 
(Smith 2006: 2). The UK was one of the biggest advocates of the Eastern 
Enlargement. Moreover, in 2004, it was one of just three EU countries that 
                                                          
75  Strangely enough, this was not even the coordinating ministry: the Ministry for 
Labour and Social Affairs took the lead on the Working Time Directive. Interview, 
Permanent Representation of Poland to the European Union, 16.12.2010. 
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opened their labor markets for Central Eastern Europeans. The UK 
supported the famous “country of origin” principle of the Services 
Directive, which was regarded as favorable for CEE service providers but 
contested by countries such as Germany or France (Crespy and Gajewska 
2010: 1194). Therefore, it is plausible to assume that the political elites 
from the new member states were attracted to positions voiced by the UK 
on labor market issues and eager to follow them.  
The “diplomatic”, high-level political component in the new member 
states’ position-taking was by no means only a symbolic add-on to the 
negotiations on the lower, technical level. The WTD was submitted to the 
ministers very early on, whereby member states were pushed to voice 
unambiguous positions and establish clear alliances. In this respect, CEEs’ 
bargaining behavior proved consequential, as it entrenched established 
conflict fronts in the Council.  
5.3.2.3 CEEs without Britain – a counterfactual argument 
The chapter has argued thus far that the new member states’ 
positioning in the opt-out controversy was closely related to the bargaining 
strategy pursued by the UK. There were several reasons to expect the British 
voice to count in the Working Time negotiations. Besides the strategic alliance 
with Germany, the UK was about to benefit from situational, contingent factors, 
such as the timing of its Presidency. The assumption of the Council Chair 
strengthened the British government’s potential to shape the negotiations, 
enabling it to determine what is negotiable and in what form. Here, the British 
negotiation team decided to exclude the issue of opt-out from Working Party 
meetings and raised it explicitly to a status of a political question. 
Consequently, the “loyalty” dynamics between the UK and the CEEs described 
above consolidated.  
One could thus conclude that the negotiation behavior of the new 
member states in the Working Time case - both their positioning in the 
intergovernmental conflict and their coalition behavior – was strongly 
responsive towards, and thus conditioned by, the actions of other negotiation 
participants. This claim necessitates a counterfactual argument. How would 
the negotiation behavior of the new member states look like, if we “think the 
UK away”? The new member states would perhaps still prefer to keep some 
form of the opt-out, since one of them, Slovenia, already used it. As the Polish 
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case study showed, a sectorial opt-out, albeit unfamiliar to policy-makers, had 
some advantages over the differentiation between the active and inactive on-
call time, which encountered practical difficulties. On the other hand, 
standardized salience data suggests that CEE policy-makers were still quite 
interested in this policy option. One could speculate that, with the opt-out 
being less dominant in the Council debate, more energy would have been 
invested in clarifying how the distinction between active and inactive on-call 
time could be handled in practice. Thus, the absence of the UK’s assertive 
claims might have increased the diversity of the policy options taken into 
account during the negotiations.  
It appears also plausible that the UK’s absence would have changed 
CEEs’ reactions to other participants’ inputs. In particular, the new member 
states would have agreed to the Franco-Swedish compromise proposal from 
May 2005. The proposal differentiated between a generalized opt-out, which 
would be phased out in ten years, and one specifically designed for the needs 
of the healthcare sector, which would be renewable in three-year periods 
(Council 2005c; 2005d). The advantage of the WTD, agreed in this shape, was 
that the opt-out would still be available for healthcare, while member states 
would also have other revised provisions at their disposal, such as the 
distinction between active and inactive on-call time and the extended 
reference period for the working time calculation. In such version, the WTD 
would offer an even greater choice of regulatory tools.  
This proposal has been made while the UK held the Presidency. It has 
been submitted to ministers, and not to the working groups. No CEE country 
reacted to it. The lack of interest from the new member states is puzzling, 
because the Franco-Swedish proposal corresponded precisely with their 
perspective on the opt-out, namely as a tool to reconstitute compliance in the 
healthcare sector. The proposal differed from new member states’ 
expressed preferences only in one respect – it posed a cap on weekly 
working hours (under the opt-out) at 55, whereas the final agreement 
reached by the Council provided for 60 or 65 hours in the healthcare 
sector. However, remarkably there was no discussion between the new 
member states and France on that stage. Newcomers sided with the British 
Presidency (Europolitics, 10.12.2005). Their “conspicuous silence” reported 
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from this ministerial meeting suggests that they were loyal to their ally and 
Council President. 
Without the UK, it appears unlikely that the CEE’s openness to the opt-
out as a means of resolving the working time problems in the hospital sector 
would have contributed to a stalemate of the dimension the Council had seen it 
in the Working Time negotiations. This leads to the conclusion that what 
became a powerful collective position with new member states’ participation, 
can ultimately be ascribed to power resources and negotiation strategy of one 
member state, the United Kingdom. Domestic uncertainty in CEEs and the 
prompt recourse to the ministerial arena served as enabling conditions for this 
dynamics.  
5.3.2.4 Summary 
The insight in preference formation and position-taking of the new 
member states at early stages of the negotiation process sheds a nuanced 
light on these countries’ contribution to the opt-out conflict. The analysis 
has shown that the “liberal” position that these countries took concerning 
the opt-out issue was as much an expression of uncertainty about how to 
comply with contentious ECJ rulings on the doctors’ working time as a 
reaction to how other countries, especially the UK, intended to negotiate 
this dossier. Early ministerial involvement and the Presidency’s calls for a 
quick vote strengthened the reactive component in CEE position-taking, 
given that the member states had been compelled to take a position.  
From the new member states’ perspective, the UK’s negotiation 
strategy provided an element of certainty in an otherwise rather unpredictable 
policy process. For these countries, supporting the British position meant that 
the opt-out would remain a viable regulatory tool to manage working time in 
the healthcare sector. Thus, CEEs’ position-taking can be considered as a 
rational usage of the bargaining opportunity structures provided by another 
member state. CEEs’ influence on the policy conflict was indirect, because they 
relied on the UK’s bargaining agency rather than crafting their own 
contribution. 
These observations support the hypothesized mechanism whereby the 
new member states would compensate the difficulty of becoming involved in a 
negotiation process through pragmatic and opportunistic alliances with old 
member states. However, in our case, the leadership-fellowship dynamics that 
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materialized between the UK and the new member states extended beyond a 
mere compensation and brought about a powerful coalition that was not only 
able to shape the outcome of the negotiations, but also represented a historical 
shift of Council majorities. Nonetheless, nothing in the position-taking process 
of the new member states suggests that they intended such major implications.   
A leadership-fellowship dynamics between an old and a handful of new 
member states having such an impact on the legislative dynamics is 
exceptional in several ways. The necessary conditions for such a coalition to 
emerge are all linked to the UK’s power resources and their usage. Some of 
these resources were structural and related to the UK’s quality as a large 
member state, such as a viable log-roll with another large member state or top 
politicians’ involvement in the legislative negotiations. However, other 
resources were contingent, such as the upcoming Presidency or the 
constitutional debate, which was used here as a blackmail. Finally, the fact that 
the British government was willing to bundle all these resources and mobilize 
them was also of situational nature, since few EU-level legislative issues 
generate such interests and emotions in the United Kingdom as the WTD. In 
this sense, the WTD serves as an extreme and exceptional case rather than a 
usual one.  
The findings of this qualitative study of new member states’ position-
taking in the Working Time negotiations correspond to and complement the 
quantitative finding whereby the Eastern Enlargement did not bring about new 
conflicts but was rather absorbed by the existing conflict lines (Thomson 2011; 
Veen 2011: ; Chapter 2). In fact, the WTD is a case in which the new member 
states almost bloc-wise blended in an old intergovernmental conflict. 
Nonetheless, the case has shown that this absorption is not an automatic 
process driven solely by similar, domestically-derived preferences; rather, it 
resembles a sequence of moves – stimuli and responses - in which timing 
(being first), anticipation (having the information on other participants) and 
resources differentials greatly matter. The domestic deficits of the new 
member states in preparing own positions and strategies make them 
prototypical “followers”. In turn, old, large member states are prone and well 
able to mobilize resources necessary for effective interventions in the Council. 
They are those that orchestrate the leadership-fellowship dynamics and thus 
are in a better position to control the alliances within the enlarged Council.   
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5.3.3 Presidency’s conduct, collective dynamics and bargaining success 
The former sections discussed the domestic processes of preference 
formation as well as the mechanisms of introducing member states’ interests 
on the negotiation agenda. The following section moves on to the interactions 
within the Council and their development from the formal beginning of the 
process. It argues that the Council Chair, when confronted with an emerging 
conflict on the opt-out, took a risky decision to accommodate quickly the 
interests of the better organized group and proceeded directly to the vote. 
Although the strategy failed in the short-term, it had a strong impact on further 
course of negotiations. Subsequent Presidencies stuck to the policy direction 
taken by the predecessors. The mechanism granted the first movers, in our 
case the liberal coalition led by the UK, a power advantage. The analysis 
concludes that Council negotiations are path dependent in that the very first 
months disproportionately affect future dynamics, whether the protagonists 
intend it (the UK) or not (CEEs).  
5.3.3.1 The mechanism of first movers’ advantage 
The revision of the WTD by the Council of Ministers had been started 
after the Netherlands assumed the Council Presidency in late 2004. The 
Netherlands attached to the WTD high salience. On the one hand, the country 
urgently needed a supranational solution to the regulation of on-call work. 
While the Dutch government did not want to use the opt-out domestically, it 
also did not feel particularly strongly about the presence of this provision in 
the Directive76. Besides this particular interest, the Dutch government felt that 
the current legal situation whereby most EU countries breach the Directive 
owing to an over-interpretation by the ECJ requires urgent correction77. In fact, 
the Netherlands had been pushing the Commission to put forward a legislative 
proposal (EUobserver, 09.07.04).  
The preparatory work started some two years before the Presidency78. 
The Netherlands consulted the member states and, anticipating their future 
positions, prepared a range of proposals to put forward. The Presidency was 
                                                          
76  The salience scores collected by Thomson and colleagues confirm this. The 
Netherlands valued the opt-out issue with 30/100 and the active-inactive on-call 
distinction at 90/100 (Thomson et al. 2012).  
77  Interview, Member of the Dutch Permanent Representation and the Presidency 
Team, 26.10.2011. 
78  Interview, Member of the Dutch Permanent Representation and the Presidency 
Team, 26.10.2011. 
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determined to use all procedural means at its disposal to secure an agreement 
before December 2004. It chose to involve the ministers very early on, without 
the lengthy gradual way through the Working Party and COREPER. Usually, a 
dossier circulates between the Working Party and the COREPER for quite some 
time before it gets on the ministerial level (Häge 2007: 303). In this case, the 
ministers were confronted with the revised WTD already in October 2004, 
after it had been proposed in September 2004, and the Presidency announced 
that it is determined to finish it off before December 2004.  
Besides putting time pressure on the Council, the Presidency invited the 
delegations to put forward wording proposals on the contentious articles, in 
addition to the proposals it made itself. On this way, it was able to anticipate 
how assertive the delegations would be in supporting certain positions and 
assess possible majorities and minorities. The Presidency concluded that a 
majority would support the opt-out for an infinite duration at that point79. This 
majority comprised the UK and the allies it mobilized, namely Germany, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta and the Baltic countries. In addition, the 
delegations that did not have a strong preference about the opt-out, such as 
Denmark, Finland, Austria or Czech Republic, would have also gone along with 
the opt-out. Finally, it seems that the opponents of the opt-out had not yet fully 
organized at this point. They were in minority and “only one small member 
state needed to be convinced” to avoid blockage80. Indeed, this was achieved, 
as only five countries stuck to the Commission’s original proposal (Council 
2004d: 7): France, Spain, Belgium, Greece and Sweden81 (Agence Europe, 
09.12.2004). Luxemburg, Portugal, Italy, Hungary or Cyprus – countries that 
later on advocated the abolition of the opt-out – did not participate in the 
“social” coalition at that stage, at least not actively enough to contribute to a 
blocking minority.  
The Dutch Presidency made a compromise proposal that did not 
mention any abolishment of the opt-out (Council 2004d: 8). By doing so, the 
Presidency not only accommodated the interests of the “liberal” majority, but 
                                                          
79  The progress report states that nine delegations advocated a more flexible opt-out 
than in the Commission’s proposal, seven (later five) did not see a need for the 
opt-out at all and nine (later eleven) were “open or flexible” (Council 2004d: 7-8) 
80  Interview, Member of the Dutch Permanent Representation and the Presidency 
Team, 26.10.2011. 
81  These countries disposed of 90 votes of 99 needed for a blocking minority.  
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also suggested an amendment of the Commission’s draft, which foresaw a 
phase-out after five years. However, unanimity in the Council is needed to 
bypass the Commission, unless the Commission goes along with the Council’s 
amendments. In December 2004, the Commission refused to do so82 (Council 
2004d: 10). A member of the Presidency team suggested that the newly 
appointed Commission (November 2004) and the Commissioner for Social 
Affairs Commissioner Spidla anticipated the EP’s preference for a stricter 
regulation in the working time field83 and feared inter-institutional conflict. 
However, the Dutch Presidency did not share this assessment and insisted on a 
formal agreement in the Council. The Dutch team hoped that the enlarged EP 
would soften its preference for a more worker-friendly labor regulation 
(Agence Europe, 09.12.2004). The Dutch intention was presumably to confront 
the EP with a fait accompli. In any case, the EP’s opinion was scheduled for 
mid-2005, thus for the next Chair.  
Due to the Commission’s resistance, the vote in the Council would have 
been fruitless. The dossier had to be transmitted to the next Presidency. 
However, it was established in these first months that the opt-out supporters 
together with the neutral countries can provide for a majority of votes. This is 
an interesting move when we consider that the Council was divided in three 
groups: opt-out supporters, opt-out opponents and neutral countries and that 
the three groups were of approximately the same size. As the next section 
shows, no subsequent Presidency has explored another option.  
The pragmatism of the Dutch Presidency advantaged those countries 
that were able to offer both substantial input and support it with well-
organized, bundled voting power. The UK and its allies took initiative and 
demonstrated their capability to structure the collective decision-making 
process, as well as making it more predictable. If the Presidency is strongly 
guided by its institutional interests, as in our case, the first movers are its 
natural partners and allies. If accommodated by the Presidency, first movers 
are in a particularly strong position because, as the next section shows, 
subsequent Presidencies are “conservative” in that they stick to the policy 
                                                          
82  “For her part, the Commission representative maintained her Institution's original 
proposal as she considered that the Presidency's proposal did not represent an 
appropriate balance between flexibility and security.” (Council 2004d: 10) 
83  Indeed, the EP gave such an opinion in May 2005 (European Parliament 2005).  
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direction taken by the predecessor and rather avoid experimenting with 
reverse policy ideas.  
5.3.3.2 Path dependency of Presidency’s choices? 
During the Dutch Presidency, it was established that the opt-out 
supporters together with the neutral countries can provide for a majority of 
votes needed to pass the revision. This section argues that Council 
Presidencies that followed maintained this direction of the legislative work. In 
fact, no Council Presidency has explored another policy orientation. The 
laborious search for a compromise was a search for conditions under which 
the “social” group in the Council would be able to accept some form of the 
infinite opt-out. Legislative negotiations in the Council can be described as 
“path dependent”, because decisions taken at the very beginning of the process 
last upon further bargaining stages.  
Only Luxemburg, which assumed the Presidency after the Netherlands, 
undertook the effort of loosening up the apparently strong liberal coalition, 
while conducting a “technical” inquiry on the (intended) opt-out usage. The 
purpose of this inquiry was to show that the opt-out was a “political” question. 
Luxemburg, itself a critic of the exception84, intended to expose the limited 
experiences with the derogation and thus the speculative nature of most 
“liberals” preferences. Unfortunately, the Luxemburg Presidency did not put 
forward any proposal, claiming that the Council is awaiting the EP’s opinion 
(May 2005) and there will be no time to react to it before the mandate ends in 
June 2005 (Agence Europe, 02.06.2005; Europe Information Service, 
04.06.2005).  
With the EP’s involvement in the decision-making process, the social 
coalition consolidated, having not been very well organized thus far (see 
above). In particular, Spain and Portugal became more assertive, as they 
closely collaborated with the (Spanish) socialist EP Rapporteur Cercas85. Their 
negotiation position was identical with that of Cercas (abolishment of the 
opt-out, no concessions). The Presidencies reported that the bilateral talks 
with those countries were doomed to fail. Party-political bonds possibly 
                                                          
84  Luxemburg never allowed any kind of opt-out in its domestic legislation 
(Commission 2010b: 7). 
85  Interview Ministry of Employment, Social Affairs and Consumers of Austria, 
11.11.2011; Interview, Member of the Portuguese Presidency Team, 09.12.2010. 
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played a role here, since both Spain and Portugal had social-democratic 
governments throughout the negotiations86. As long as Cercas regularly 
intervened in the negotiation process, recalling EP’s position and the readiness 
to defend it (Europolitics, 26.10.2006; 07.11.2007), the “social” member states 
were able to refer to this powerful institutional ally, located outside the 
Council, but at the core of the legislative process. Cercas’ activity mobilized 
these countries and held them together.  
The consolidation of the social coalition did not have any impact on the 
Presidencies’ conduct. Unsurprisingly, the UK, which assumed the Council 
Chair in late 2005 (after Luxemburg), defended the change of the Commissions’ 
proposal, i.e. the maintenance of the opt-out, as suggested by the Dutch 
Presidency. The British Presidency excluded the opt-out from the Working 
Party negotiations and directed its attention towards the question, whether 
working time shall be calculated per worker or per contract (Europolitics, 
10.12.2005). According to a member of the Council Secretariat, the “worker 
versus contract” debate was simply a strategic maneuver to distract the 
delegations from the contentious opt-out issue and create an impression that 
there remains much to clarify before the Council can move on87.  
The coup seems to have worked, with the debate occupying the Council 
for several months. The debate on multiple contracts attracted interest of CEE 
countries, where many workers have more than one job (Der Standard, 
26.12.2005). However, CEEs could not count on the UK’s leadership concerning 
this question, as the WTD is applied to individual workers in this county, while 
the individual opt-out is only used when necessary (Europolitics, 10.12.2005). 
Supported by the Commission, Germany even submitted a wording proposal 
to define “working time” as the sum of all working hours carried out for 
one or several employers (Council of the European Union 2005d: 6, 14). 
                                                          
86  So did Hungary. Belgian and Luxemburg governments were led by liberal and 
Christian-democratic Prime Ministers, respectively; however both were 
coalitions with social-democrats. Party politics explain Italy’s changing sides , 
whereby the government changes (Berlusconi, Prodi, Berlusconi) led to very 
different approaches to the Directive each time. Greece was the only coalition 
member with a conservative government. Overview: Spain: government 
Zapatero (2004-2011); Portugal: government Socrates (2005-2011); Belgium: 
government Verhofstadt (1999-2008); Hungary: government Guyrecsany (2004-
2008); Luxemburg: government Junker (2001 – present); Greece: government 
Karamanlis (2004-2009); Italy government Berlusconi (2001-2006) government 
Prodi (2006-2008) government Berlusconi (2006-2011).  
Source: www.parlgov.org. 
87  Interview, Council General Secretariat, 19.10.2010.  
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Denmark proved to be CEEs’ ally in this matter, providing legal arguments 
for the view that the Directive should be applicable to contract and not to 
the worker. Indeed, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania 
subscribed to this view88 (Council 2005d: 7). The “multiple contract 
incident” provides yet another support for the claim that CEE countries 
lack the ability, in this case the legal expertise, to defend their standpoint 
on the bargaining arena.  
Having found a replacement topic, the British Presidency easily 
downplayed the proposal made by France and Sweden on the opt-out issue. 
The two delegations, independently from the remaining members of the “social 
coalition” proposed to establish renewable three-year opt-outs for 
healthcare and abolish the generalized provision within ten years (Council 
2005d: 9). Although the proposal found support of the neutral states, such 
as Finland or Denmark, the new member states, whose interests were 
served here, did not react to it. Neither did the Presidency (Europolitics, 
10.12.2005).  
The efforts of the British Presidency to maintain the Dutch 
proposals on the opt-out as the status quo on the negotiation table can 
clearly be explained by strong preferences the British delegation held in 
favor of the opt-out. However, this explanation does not account for the 
subsequent Presidencies’ decisions. Both Austria and Finland, although 
rather neutral on the opt-out question89, have built their compromise 
finding strategies on the assumption that the generalized and indefinite 
opt-out will be kept in the Directive90. The search for agreement 
encompassed small concessions towards the “social” group. The Austrian 
strategy relied on recitals (such as declaration that the opt-out shall not 
harm the workers’ health) and the employers’ obligation to check whether 
the need for working time flexibility cannot be satisfied by other means, 
before turning to the opt-out. Finland went much further and returned to 
                                                          
88  Only Slovenia, again deviating from other CEEs, supported the German 
proposal (Council 2005d: 6, 14) 
89  None of them introduced opt-out in their legislation after the revision  of the WTD 
failed in the Council (Commission 2010b: 7); According to DEU data, Austria 
supported an opt-out with strictly specified conditions and Finland demanded an 
abolishment of this option. There were medium salience levels in both cases, with 
50 out of 100 points (Thomson et al. 2012).  
90  Interview Ministry of Employment, Social Affairs and Consumers of Austria, 
11.11.2011.  
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the original idea of an upper cap of hours worked in case the opt-out is 
applied. It furthermore drew on the Franco-Swedish idea of introducing 
special conditions of opt-out application for the healthcare system (Council 
2006b).  
During the Finnish Presidency, the Commission declared that, in 
contrast to its original position on the opt-out (phasing it out within three 
years), it will now accept any compromise that the Council can ac hieve 
(Europolitics, 02.11.2006). Clearly, such a stance further cemented the 
Presidencies’ assumption that the exception will remain in the Directive. 
Another positive feedback the Presidencies received for their efforts was 
the readiness of many opt-out supporters to make concessions regarding 
the conditions of opt-out application (Europolitics, 24-26.10.2006).  
The new member states played an important role here. Although 
they originally declared their support for the UK’s claim to keep the opt-
out as it stands in the current Directive, i.e. with only minor constraining 
conditions, they now showed more openness to the different ways of 
assuring that the opt-out is not abused or otherwise harmful for workers. 
In fact, on this advanced negotiation stage, when the removal of the opt-out 
from the Directive became unlikely, the differences in labor market 
approaches between CEEs and the UK became apparent. By and large, the 
former were much more favorable to regulatory constraints and worker-
friendly provisions than the latter91, having adopted “coordinated” rather 
than “liberal” economic and labor market regimes upon accession (Hall and 
Soskice 2001; Bohle and Greskovits 2007). Furthermore, in the area of 
labor market regulation, most governments in the region are constrained 
by strong consultative rights of trade unions. Thus, agreeing to more strict 
regulation on the EU level may pay-off in the domestic processes of the 
Directive’s implementation.  
Although the contention on the opt-out was far from solved (there 
was a blocking minority on each end of the conflict spectrum), the Austrian 
and Finnish Presidencies suggestions have kept the Council negotiating. It 
created at least an impression that the Directive will be revised in the near 
                                                          
91  In fact, Council officials do not agree with the “liberal” image of CEE countries in 
social policy affairs. They admit that the domestic social policies pursued in these 
countries strongly contrast with those of the UK, although the Council-level 
positions are “not clear”. Interview, Council General Secretariat, 19.10.2010.  
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future and the member states will not be left on their own with the 
uncomfortable question of compliance with ECJ rulings. Such a 
development was in the interest of both the Presidencies and the member 
states.  
In sum, although the Council was divided in three groups, opt-out 
supporters, opt-out opponents and the neutrals, all the proposals put 
forward for discussion by the Council Presidencies assumed the 
maintenance of the derogation. The Presidencies moved the debate past 
the question whether to keep the exception or scrap it down, rather 
focusing on the details and conditions of the opt-out application.  
One possible explanation for such a development could be the “bias” 
of Presidency holders, which means that countries use the Chair to 
promote own policy preferences (Warntjen 2008: 317). The explanation 
appears plausible in the British case. While expanding the range of 
discussion (“replacement topic”) and ignoring alternative proposals, the 
UK preserved the policy direction taken by the Dutch Presidency, namely 
the one it favored itself. While subsequent Chairs did not have stakes in the 
opt-out debate, they nonetheless chose to do the same. One can suspect 
that elaborating on new, more nuanced proposals would be costly, given 
that it would demand significant legal effort and policy knowledge across 
different labor systems. Furthermore, it would probably be risky to predict 
support for new proposals, given that some countries had a more 
pragmatic attitude towards the opt-out whereas for others keeping or 
abolishing the opt-out was a question of principle. When choices made in 
the past are difficult to reverse due to the costs of change and the positive 
feedback which keeps occurring, political scientists refer to “path 
dependence” (Pierson 2000: 252-253).  
5.3.3.3 Summary 
The main finding of this section is that the very first months of the 
Council negotiations are decisive for how the process unfolds. The dynamics 
illustrated by the Working Time case builds upon two mechanisms – the first 
movers’ advantage and the path dependency of the Presidencies’ procedural 
choices. Making an early and well-organized appearance on the legislative 
arena pays off, because this is precisely the input the Presidency needs for 
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making corrections to the proposal and advancing the project. The more 
coherent and solid the first movers’ input, the more can the Presidency actually 
do at that stage. The size and diversity of the group further enhance this 
mechanism, because negotiations tend to be more cumbersome in such groups 
and thus the Presidencies might be more prone to take risky decisions. In our 
case, the (Dutch) Presidency anticipated difficulties and responded to this risk 
by pushing the process very far – almost to the vote – before the conflict fully 
unfolded. The new member states were part of this dynamics, since they lend 
their support to the UK. Ironically, nothing in their bargaining preparations 
suggests that they intended to generate such impact.  
Although the Council was divided in three groups (pro-opt-out, anti-
opt-out, neutral), with blocking minorities at both ends of the conflict 
spectrum, subsequent Presidencies maintained the policy direction chosen by 
the Dutch delegation. Interviewees for this project admitted that it is normal 
for the Presidency to proceed incrementally and never invent something fully 
new92. In fact, the mechanism resembles the famous “path dependency”, where 
the costs of change and the benefits of positive feedback encourage actors to 
stick to past policy choices.  
 These insights teach us two things about the enlarged Council of 
Ministers. First, the Presidency matters. It is determined to deploy the means it 
has to streamline the legislative process and it is ready to push through thin 
majorities, when it sees consensus as impossible to reach. As in larger and 
more diverse groups decisions are ceteris paribus more difficult to reach, the 
style of chairing might move from brokerage to steering (Warntjen 2008). The 
latter involves pragmatic and clear-cut decisions that increase the likelihood of 
formal agreements, eventually at the cost of deliberative consensus-finding. 
Second, power resources need to be mobilized early to be fully effective. The 
most apparent difference in power resources between the “liberal” and “social” 
bloc in the Council is that the latter has built strongly on EP’s position, which 
came in after the first Presidency already made decisions how to proceed. 
Thus, beyond the mere possession of power resources, such as numerical 
strength or support from outside the Council, how these powers are deployed 
matters greatly for bargaining process.   
                                                          
92  Interview, Member of the Portuguese Presidency Team, 09.12.2010. 
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5.3.4  Exploiting diversity and overcoming conflict 
This final section of the analysis describes how the conflict in the 
Council has ultimately been overcome. The package deal of two labor market 
dossiers helped to reshuffle the conflict between the “social” and the “liberal” 
member states, as the CEE countries were now able to make concessions and 
leave the UK-led coalition. Therefore, I argue that enlarged membership is 
conducive to positive outcomes, because diversity of preference orders and 
motivations makes issue linkages easier to apply. At the same time, the 
Working Time case demonstrates the limits of this strategy: first, it has to 
remain an exception, as it can be heavily contested; and second, the ultimate 
negotiation success might depend on contingent factors.  
5.3.4.1 Generating diversity and reshuffling the conflict structure 
In October 2007, a breakthrough in the stalemated negotiations entered 
the horizon. The Portuguese Presidency suggested a merge of the WTD and the 
Directive on Temporary Agency Work into one negotiation package. The 
obvious idea behind this strategy was to enable an exchange of concessions 
among governments, thus providing everyone with an opportunity to save face 
towards the domestic constituencies.  
Portugal, governed by a left party, had thus far positioned itself as a 
critic of the liberalization of the European working time regime. It, thus, 
represented the socially-minded coalition, whose demands to abolish the opt-
out remained ineffective, but which successfully managed to block a vote. The 
Portuguese delegation hoped to capitalize on the trust it enjoyed among its 
former negotiation companions.  
However, the idea of the merge was not a genuine Portuguese one; 
rather, it came from the Commission93. Despite being proposed two years 
before the revision of the WTD, the Temporary Agency Work dossier became 
stuck in 2003 (Europolitics, 14.11.2007). Member states were unable to find 
agreement about the transition period that has to pass before temporary 
workers benefit from equal rights as their contracted counterparts. After 
having mobilized Germany, Ireland and Denmark, the UK demanded as long 
transition periods as possible, whereas all the other member states and the EP 
                                                          
93  Interview, Member of the Portuguese Presidency Team, 09.12.2010. 
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were either satisfied with the six weeks proposed by the Commission or 
demanded an even shorter waiting period (Nedegaard 2007: 702).  
Although the Temporary Agency Work Directive was a pre-
Enlargement negotiation, the Commission must have known that the dossier 
was a largely neutral one to the CEE countries. Temporary work was a new 
phenomenon in these countries, and still rather rare. Besides, all CEE countries 
introduced equal (or comparable) treatment between temporary agency 
workers and contracted employees upon accession (Trade Union Congress 
2005: 14-20). From the institutional and regulatory perspective, CEEs must 
have been able to support a Directive that introduced such an obligation across 
the EU, as no adaptation costs were expected.  
The Commission furthermore knew how to make the merge attractive 
for the new member states: it threatened with infringement procedures, if the 
(new) member states do not adapt their working time regulations to the case 
law (Gazeta Wyborcza, 28.11.2007). It is plausible to assume that the 
Commission was informed about the tensions between the medical 
associations and the governments that accompanied the process of 
reorganizing working time in hospitals (Europolitics, 26.11.2007). That was 
the case in Poland, for instance. An adoption of the revised Directive would at 
least grant more time to establish compliance.  
From the strategic perspective, the purpose of the merge was to isolate 
the new member states from the UK and create a common interest between 
them and the social group. The plan worked and the CEE countries behaved in 
line with what the Portuguese Presidency and the Commission hoped for 
(Europolitics, 26.11.2007). Interestingly, few years back the new member 
states were reported to support the UK in its obstruction of the equal 
treatment provision for temporary workers (Nedegaard 2007: 702).  
The UK tried to regain control over its former allies. British Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown made a phone call to his Polish counterpart Donald 
Tusk and tried to convince him to block the merge of the Directives 
(Europolitics, 26.11.2007; Gazeta Wyborcza, 05.12.2007). Poland refused, 
arguing that it urgently needs an agreement on the WTD (Europolitics, 
07.12.2007). The Commission has been threatening Poland (as well as 
other countries) with infringement procedures (Agence Europe, 
07.12.2007). In fact, in summer 2007, Poland introduced a new hospital 
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law providing that the on-call time shall be regarded as working time, in 
line with the ECJ’s rulings. The amendment also introduced an individual 
opt-out upon doctor’s consent. However, with the opt-out being voluntary, 
the new law endangered the continuity of emergency services in Polish 
hospitals. Doctors unions’ called their members to agree only in exchange 
for higher wages (Gazeta Wyborcza, 28.11.2007). Reacting to this, the 
government suggested postponing the entry into force of the new law, 
albeit exposing itself to the Commission’s threat. An agreement on a 
revised Directive on European level would postpone Commission’s action. 
Moreover, it would grant Poland some more time and, with the distinction 
between active and inactive on-call time, more choice between different 
regulatory tools to reorganize the working time in hospitals.   
Poland not only abandoned the “destructive” coalition with the 
British, but also engaged in bilateral consultations with France, which had 
hitherto led the opposite coalition, the socially-minded Council group. 
Poland aimed at pursuing France to accept the opt-out provisions of the 
Portuguese Presidency in exchange for Poland’s and other CEEs support for 
the equal treatment provision in the Temporary Agency Work. Poland 
signaled that it would be willing to make concessions on the last open 
question regarding the opt-out application: the weekly working hours cap 
of 60 or 65 hours (Europolitics, 07.12.2007; Agence Europe, 07.12.2007). 
With this gesture, it manifestly softened its negotiation position. In fact, on 
the question of conditions of opt-out application, Poland has been 
softening its formal negotiation stance several times since late 200694.  
A representative of the Portuguese negotiation team recalls two 
sources of motivation to continue the search for compromise – the feeling of 
tiredness that spread across the Council members and the pressure from CEE 
countries, and particularly Poland, to finally adopt the legislation95. While 
proposing the package deal, the Presidency indeed set centripetal forces in 
motion – most member states gathered at the center of the political spectrum, 
showing acceptance to a more “liberal” WTD and a more “social” Temporary 
Agency Work (Agence Europe, 07.12.2007). However, supported by Germany, 
                                                          
94  Sejm RP, Biuletyn Komisji do Spraw Unii Europejskiej [Parliament of Poland, 
Minutes of the EU Committee], No. 49, 26.10.2006.  
95  Interview, Member of the Portuguese Presidency Team, 09.12.2010. 
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the UK insisted on a separate consideration of the two dossiers and did not 
accept the compromise (Europolitics, 07.12.2007). The Portuguese Presidency 
did not dare to put the dossier to vote, as it feared that this step would have 
negative consequences on the British ratification of the Lisbon Treaty 
(Financial Time, 06.12.2007; Europolitics, 07.12.2007).  
The case shows that both the higher number of member states and the 
increased diversity can be conducive to positive bargaining outcomes. The 
more actors and the more diverse their positions, the higher the possibility of 
finding some configuration of concessions that is acceptable to the majority 
required.  
This observation corresponds to Thomson’s account of Council 
robustness after the Eastern Enlargement. In his large-n study he was able to 
prove the positional diversity and the lack of structures in member states’ 
policy preferences both before and after Enlargement (Thomson et al. 2004; 
Thomson 2009). He hypothesized that this diversity leads to cooperative 
behavior of member states and mutual accommodation of policy concerns that 
goes beyond the procedural requirements. My case study exposes a different 
mechanism, one in which supranational actors – the Presidency and the 
Commission – use their informational advantage and the agenda power and 
arrange the bargaining situation in such a way that an agreement can be 
reached, if only at the lowest majority requirement.  
5.3.4.2 The conditions and limits of conflict management techniques 
The package deal suggested by the Portuguese Presidency paved the 
way for Council agreement. Before the analysis moves to the conditions and 
limits of this conflict management strategy, let us recall that the entrenchment 
of conflict in the Working Time negotiations generally made the work of the 
Presidency very difficult. It is fair to say that the WTD is a case, in which nearly 
all means and negotiation techniques at the Presidency’s disposal were applied 
and most of them failed.  
For instance, the shifting of bargaining areas did not work at all 
(Falkner 2011: 192-195). The Luxemburg Presidency tried to reduce the 
political complexity of the opt-out question and frame it as a technical issue – 
asking member states to provide reasons and specify (expected) applications. 
For that procedure to work, the uncertainty about best regulatory solutions 
across different sectors was too dominant. This was particularly the case of the 
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new member states, as discussed in the first part of the analysis. In turn, the 
Austrian Presidency relied on the “confessional procedure” and mini-lateral 
negotiations with high-level representatives of the large member states. This 
did not work either because the member states, which composed this mini-
lateral forum, all pursued hidden agendas. Germany “owed” Britain its support, 
as agreed between the two in a log-roll, whereas Spain and France pursued 
partisan and electoral interests respectively.  
Therefore, the case makes clear that the procedural imagination of the 
Presidency has its limits. Once the vote-richest countries are not ready to move 
for reasons that are exogenous to the policy negotiations in question, there is 
not much that a Presidency can do. It cannot force agreement at any price. In 
that point, the Eastern Enlargement did not change much. Partisan, electoral or 
strategic politics can influence the Council, irrespectively of the fact that it is 
composed of 12, 15 or 25 members.  
The package deal worked quite well, enhanced by the diversity of labor 
market policy positions in the enlarged EU. However, granting this conflict 
management strategy a “mechanic” or “default” character would not be 
appropriate. Several arguments speak against a more frequent recourse to 
explicit package deals. It is telling that a Presidency decided to employ this 
technique after several other strategies, such as streamlining, “confessional” or 
arena shifting, failed. Arguably, if used too often, package dealing could damage 
the Presidency’s image as “honest broker”, because it involves pressing the 
member states, the sovereigns of the EU, into compromise acceptance. The 
British example shows that member states know how to protect their voice 
being bypassed by the Presidency. Thus, the interest in formal agreement must 
outweigh potential legitimacy losses. In our case, the interest for agreement 
stemmed from regulatory considerations of member states: no member state 
denied the need to adjust the Directive to contentious ECJ rulings. The fear of 
lawsuits by doctors’ and the Commission’s threats to examine compliance with 
the Directive in each member state and eventually launch infringement 
procedures placed additional pressure upon the member states. The 
combination of these factors provides already a contingent condition for this 
package deal as a conflict management strategy to work in highly salient 
dossiers.  
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Another contingent factor that enabled the package deal strategy to 
work was the negotiation behavior of France. France was the pivotal member 
of the “social camp” – without French support, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Belgium 
or Hungary would have had no blocking minority. At the same time, the French 
negotiation strategy was driven by a peculiar mix of electoral and regulatory 
considerations. France was willing to accept far-reaching compromises and 
exceptions allowing the opt-out usage. In fact, it experimented with the opt-out 
in its own health sector legislation since 2003. Nonetheless, the French 
delegation was unable to accept an unlimited, generalized opt-out as practiced 
and called for by the UK. This stance can be explained by the domestic political 
context – the debate on “social Europe” as well as other EU-related topics, such 
as the Services Directive or the Constitutional Treaty (Crespy 2010). France 
went along with the package deal, because its policy-makers were willing and 
able to convince the French public that the idea of social protection has been 
preserved in EU-level social policy legislation. Recall that during the Finnish 
Presidency one year earlier, it was a short-term intervention of French 
President Chirac, in the context of the debate on EU Constitutional Treaty, 
which prevented political agreement in the Council. The impact of the domestic 
political context in France on EU-level legislative negotiations shows that 
contingent factors matter in Council politics and can be decisive for the very 
fact of reaching agreement and for the timing of that step.  
5.3.4.3 Summary 
The final section of the analysis examined the strategies of conflict 
management in the enlarged Council. Enlarged membership enabled the 
Council to close a package deal, since the new member states could have 
afforded more “social” policy preferences on the Temporary Agency Work 
Directive after they have initially supported a more “liberal” orientation of the 
Working Time dossier. It is interesting to note that the new member states 
enabled the conciliatory course of events, after they contributed to the 
intergovernmental conflict at the negotiation outset. A compromise, built on a 
more “liberal” WTD and a more “social” Temporary Agency Work Directive, 
has been achieved, which convinced France, the vote-richest member of the 
blocking social coalition to move.  
While enlarged membership can be seen as beneficial for issue-linkage, 
the case has also demonstrated several limitations of the conflict management 
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strategies in general. As expected, politicization – high salience and 
constituencies’ attention – limits the prospects of these strategies. Once the 
vote-richest member states value domestic constituency considerations more 
than the EU-level agreement, there is not much a Presidency can do. Council 
literature argues that “agreement” is a value in itself from member states’ 
perspective (Thomson 2011: 282). However, our case shows that, under given 
conditions, this is not the case. Member states preferred to disagree even 
though a revised Directive would have helped them to establish legal and 
regulatory compliance.  
The relevance of domestic politics in salient EU-level matters, especially 
within large member states, introduces an element of contingency into Council 
politics. Another contingent factor that intervened during the final stage of the 
analyzed negotiations was the timing and availability of another “unfinished” 
labor market dossier. Despite the substantial proximity between the two 
Directives, the procedure of package dealing has been contested in the Council. 
The fact that most member states welcomed it relates to the Commission’s 
threat to withdraw the dossier and launch infringement procedures against 
member states. Once these conflict dynamics are under way, the number of 
member states involved appears to occupy secondary importance.  
5.4 Conclusion 
The analysis of the intergovernmental negotiations on the revision of 
the WTD revealed four insights into the bargaining dynamics within the 
enlarged Council of Ministers. First, CEE countries have little domestic (policy) 
input to draw upon when forming negotiation positions for EU legislative 
negotiations. For that reason, they are easy “followers” – as they use 
bargaining opportunity structures created by more powerful and more skilled 
negotiators instead of crafting own strategies. This makes mobilization and 
mimicry important mechanisms of Enlargement accommodation. Third, first 
movers enjoy a bargaining advantage, especially when being numerous and 
coherent. Thus, when part of the avant-garde, the new member states can 
contribute to policy change. While the first movers’ advantage is nothing new 
per se, it seems that when confronted with a large, diverse and divided Council, 
Presidencies are determined to streamline the negotiations and do not shy 
away from contentious proposals once they promise (only thin) majorities. 
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Subsequent Presidencies stick to the policy direction chosen by the 
predecessor, which makes Council negotiations path dependent. Finally, the 
larger the group, the higher the chances to exploit the differences in underlying 
motivations and preference orders to overcome blockage and engineer 
agreement. Likewise, the case demonstrated that contingency is involved in 
making these strategies work (the pivotal country of the blocking minority 
must go along with the strategy, suitable “material” for the package deal must 
be available). Moreover, the contestation of the package deal in our case 
suggests that this can only be a strategy of last resort. 
In addition to these four process-related observations, the Working 
Time case nuances the diagnosis that there is “business as usual” in the Council 
after Enlargement. The continuity of output in numerical terms might involve 
shifts in the policy substance. The policy shift in the WTD consisted in the 
maintenance of an unlimited opt-out provision. The Eastern Enlargement 
encouraged this shift, because the new member states increased the 
bargaining leverage of the opt-out supporters, namely the UK and Germany. 
Evidently, the fact alone that CEE countries faced similar policy challenges and 
presumably shared the preference for more flexible solutions on the EU level 
was insufficient to bring about policy change. The analysis demonstrated that 
the reasons why the Commission’s proposal on the opt-out has been changed 
and why the Council finally agreed on a dossier that kept the contentious 
provision went beyond the structure of the decision situation and the 
distribution of formal power resources. The process-based explanation I 
offered was based upon interactions among member states, the timing and 
sequences of actors’ involvement and on the Presidency’s management 
strategies. All these three aspects had their role to play in the absorption of 
larger and more diverse membership. 
How generalizable are the insights from the WTD? Admittedly, several 
features of this legislation make it extremely conflictive: The history of the 
working time regulation in the EU, the zero-sum nature of the opt-out-issue, 
the symbolic value of this dossier for actors such as political parties, trade 
unions or the EP. The politicization that resulted from all these characteristics 
put some (old) member states’ governments in the necessity to respond to 
diverse needs: regulatory and political. This might be the reason why agency 
became so central in the case, as well as the bargaining resources, the timing 
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and sequences of the process and the context, i.e. conditions located outside 
the Council. The findings will be relevant for similar cases, namely highly 
conflictive and divisive cases, whose relevance extends beyond the very 
subject of the dossier. While these cases are arguably rare in EU politics, when 
they emerge, they attract great interest among researchers, practitioners and 
the general public.  
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6 The Adoption of the Patient 
Mobility Directive (2008-2010) 
 
The Patient Mobility Directive is another case of highly contested Council 
legislation. This time, the new member states together with the Southern 
countries worked against the codification of ECJ case law on free movement of 
patients. While Northern European member states saw codification as a 
“necessary evil”, Southern and CEE countries questioned this rationale, as they 
anticipated destabilizing impact of such legislation on their highly regulated, 
state-centered healthcare systems. Despite being numerically strong, the 
coalition failed and the opposing countries either gave up or were outvoted. I 
argue that this surprising dynamic exemplifies two consequential differences in 
member states’ legislative preparations and behavior. While the domestic 
engagement with the policy in question has an impact on the quality of 
bargaining positions, the type of power resource used when engaging in alliances 
matters for their sustainability and prospects. Confronted with asymmetrically 
distributed abilities of member states to argue for their own policy concerns, 
make them known and mobilize on these grounds, the Presidency strategically 
navigates towards a qualitative majority. 
 
6.1 Analytical leverage of the case 
The Directive on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border 
healthcare, also known as Patient Mobility Directive (PMD), is the first legally 
binding supranational intervention in the area of healthcare. Healthcare had 
hitherto been one of the policy domains reserved exclusively for member 
states, with the EU only equipped with supporting competences. Legislation in 
this area has been triggered by the growing body of ECJ case law, which has 
established the right of EU patients to transfer the entitlements from their 
public health insurance abroad and receive treatment in another country. Once 
the member states “have recovered from the case law-shock”96, they expressed 
                                                          
96  Interview, Permanent Representation of Germany to the European Union, 
02.12.2010.  
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the wish to clarify how far these rights actually go and how national healthcare 
systems can protect themselves against destabilizing organizational and 
financial consequences of increasing mobility of patients (Council 2006a).  
As the contentious case law was based upon the freedom of services, EU 
policy-makers addressed the delineation between individual rights and 
national healthcare institutions with the standard regulatory instrument of the 
internal market: the approximation of laws in the form of a binding Directive. 
However, the idea of intervening in healthcare systems when using internal 
market provisions met with vehement opposition of two large groups of 
countries: the Southern and the Central Eastern European member states. An 
arithmetically large opposition emerged, which managed to block a vote 15 
months after the negotiations started, yet dissolved soon after this success. The 
Directive was agreed with five member states, including Poland as the largest 
CEE country, refusing their support.  
The negotiations on the PMD are interesting to study in the context of 
post-Enlargement Council politics, because they represent one of the cases in 
which the conflict structure in the Council has been clearly affected by the 
Eastern Enlargement. The new member states did not share the case law 
codification-enthusiasm of their old, Northern colleagues. They anticipated 
that the principle of non-discrimination between different forms of supplying 
healthcare, which a Directive would necessarily embody in line with the 
Treaty, might threaten those healthcare systems, where the state controls both 
the financing and the organization of medical services. Having a limited 
experience with the ECJ, the new member states were critical about making 
potentially far-reaching legislative decisions based “only” on individual Court 
rulings. This hostility aligned them with the Southern member states.  
The contention represented in the Patient Mobility case comes close to 
two conflict dimensions often found and discussed in quantitative Council 
research: Integration versus independence as well as regulation versus 
market-based solutions (Thomson et al. 2004; Thomson 2009). On both 
dimensions, the new member states took clear positions alongside the 
Southern countries: Against policy-integration and in favor of stronger 
regulation by the state. Thus, the PMD is a case, in which the Eastern 
Enlargement has altered the hitherto Council majorities.  
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Interestingly, the majority shift had only a moderate impact on the 
bargaining dynamics and barely any impact on the legislative outcome. The 
bargaining dynamics reflected the conflict structure to the extent that the 
Southern and Central Eastern member states pooled their voting resources and 
blocked the proposal in December 2009. Nonetheless, the blockage was not 
sufficient to prevent the Directive. The opposing coalition already started to 
erode at the voting stage and subsequently lost its vote-richest member, Spain, 
which has become Presidency and switched sides. The remaining opponents 
have been outvoted.  
The PMD is puzzling due to the contrast between the clearly 
Enlargement-affected structure of the policy conflict and the very modest 
legislative impact of the Directive’s opponents from the South and the East of 
the continent. Why did they not manage to prevent the Directive? Why did 
members of such a large opposing coalition become either outvoted or finally 
complied with the majority, despite holding strong critical views on the 
Directive as a whole?  
This chapter argues that arithmetical strength and commonly held 
salient preferences can only transform into legislative influence if they are 
supported by a proper organization of the legislative behavior. Organizing 
legislative influence starts with position formation in individual member states 
and proceeds with coordination and leadership provision at the level where 
collective action is concerned. I show that the Southern and the Central Eastern 
member states evidently failed to put forward specific, well-founded 
negotiation positions – despite holding strong views on the Directive as a 
whole. Furthermore, they lacked coherence in their collective appearance and 
the largest members of this coalition – Poland, Italy and Spain – missed the 
opportunities to provide credible leadership.  
The case confirms that effective performance in EU-level legislative 
negotiations is driven by state administration and stakeholders’ involvement. 
Both not only represent a valuable negotiation resource, but they are also 
crucial for the early discovery of salience (Chapter 3). At the same time, the 
comparison between the “policy laggards” Poland and Spain and the “policy 
leaders” Germany and the UK marks the incompleteness of this account, 
showing that domestic engagement with EU policies is shaped by more broad 
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factors than simply the presence of relevant interest groups and a capable 
administration.  
Finally, the case stresses the Council Presidency’s ability to craft 
agreement out of diversity. In particular, the Presidency can exploit coalitions’ 
incoherence and strategically pull single countries out, which might help to 
establish a trend towards agreement. Admittedly, the Patient Mobility dossier 
is a relatively “easy” case for this mechanism to work given that abilities and 
preferences were not equally distributed across member states. The Directive’s 
proponents happened to be those with the highest organizational capabilities. 
Moreover, the negotiation did not involve manifest zero-sum issues, which can 
facilitate brokerage. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section provides a 
detailed description of the case, including the policy background, the 
Commission’s proposal, a brief overview of the Council negotiations and an 
assessment of the outcome. A three-step analysis follows. Section 2.1 argues 
that Southern and Central Eastern member states lagged behind their 
Northern counterparts already at the position-taking stage, as their lacking 
(domestic) engagement with the case law led to late, unspecific and poorly 
founded negotiation positions. The following sub-chapter unveils the 
organizational deficiencies of the Directive’s opponents and contrasts their 
poor coordination with bandwagon effects, from which the well-organized and 
proactive Directive’s supporters benefited (2.2). The final part of the analysis 
shows how the Swedish Presidency, relying on selective targeting of member 
states, was able to set a tipping point dynamics in motion, in which many 
members of the opposition have switched sides and agreed to the Directive 
(2.3). The final section summarizes the findings and concludes.   
6.2 Case information 
The Directive on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border 
healthcare, short the PMD, is the first binding EU legal act in the area of 
healthcare. The Directive clarifies the situation of patients who go abroad to 
receive medical treatment that is otherwise covered by their national health 
insurance. Previously, assuming healthcare abroad was only possible when 
relying on Regulation 883/2004, which provides for the coordination of social 
security systems. This regulation assured that EU citizens receive urgent in-
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kind medical care in another EU member states. In contrast, patients travelling 
purposefully to receive a specific treatment in another country were obliged to 
seek prior approval from their home insurance institution (de la Rosa 2012: 
17). Insurance institutions had to grant such an authorization when the 
treatment was included in the local healthcare benefits but could not be 
provided in the member state of insurance within a reasonable time limit97.  
6.2.1 The policy problem 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) called these authorization 
procedures into question. In the famous Kohll (C-158/96) and Decker (C-
120/95) cases, the Court interpreted medical treatment received abroad not 
exclusively as a matter of social security coordination, but rather it considered 
it through the lens of the internal market and individual rights. From this 
perspective, going abroad for medical treatment was a trade of services and 
the national authorization procedures represented a restriction of free 
movement. In several cases that followed Kohll and Decker the Court has 
developed a “parallel regime” of reimbursement of medical treatment  
assumed abroad (Hatzopoulos 2002; Hervey 2007: 261; Sauter 2009: 111-
113). For instance, the Court ruled that the authorization requirement for non-
hospital care distorts the freedom of services, although the procedure may be 
justified for hospital care when financial planning is involved. If in place, the 
authorization procedure should be transparent, timely, non-discriminatory 
and take into account international medical standards (Martinsen 2005: 1042). 
The ECJ also commented on the extent of reimbursement: If treatment abroad 
is sought actively by patients, national insurers only reimburse the amount 
that they would allocate for a domestic treatment (Sauter 2009: 112).  
Member states had been observing these developments with concern. 
The case law relaxed their control over the migration of patients. The outflow 
of resources posed a potential risk for financial stability of healthcare systems. 
Clarification was needed about what exactly Treaty-derived patients’ rights 
entail and how they should be exercised. As a result, member states had been 
sluggish in implementing the case law (Commission 2003: 8). Rather, demands 
for clarification of the legal framework at the European level had been voiced. 
Member states were united in their opinion that matters of healthcare should 
                                                          
97  Article 20 Par. 2 of the Regulation 883/2004. 
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not be left to Courts, but rather regulated in legislative procedures (Council 
2006a).  
6.2.2 The proposal by the Commission 
In the first attempt to codify contentious ECJ cases in a secondary law, a 
healthcare article was included in the famous framework Directive on services 
in the internal market. This radical step resulted from regulatory ambitions of 
the Commissioner Bolkestein and the DG Internal Market (Vollaard 2009: 532). 
However, the European Parliament and the member states preferred to 
exclude healthcare services from the framework Directive and deal with them 
in a separate legislative act. A high-level consultation process served as a 
preparation for this project. Health Ministers had a chance for an informal 
exchange of views on preliminary proposals presented by the Commission on 
the meeting in Aachen, organized by the German Presidency in April 2007 
(Vollaard 2009: 357).  
The Commission put the proposal forward in July 2008 (Commission 
2008). As expected, the proposal had been based upon the internal market 
Treaty Article (Art. 95 TEC) and not on the Article providing for EU’s support 
for the national healthcare policies (Art. 152 TEC). With 24 Articles organized 
in five chapters, the proposal proved rather extensive. The length reflected the 
fact that healthcare provision is characterized by considerable institutional 
diversity among member states and regulating it supranationally requires 
many clarifications.  
Content of the Proposal 
The proposal defined healthcare very broadly and denied any 
distinction among different organizational and financial characteristics of 
healthcare systems (Article 4). The rights of EU patients, which are at the core 
of the relevant case law, had been translated into (extensive) obligations of 
member states. Here, the proposal differentiated between member states of 
treatment (Chapter 2) and member states of affiliation (Chapter 3).  
Member state of treatment had to meet a range of criteria, such as 
quality and safety standards of healthcare (in accordance with international 
medical science), monitoring of thereof, patient information policies, 
complaints mechanisms, systems of professional liability insurance, privacy 
and data protection policies; There should be equal treatment and non-
 The Adoption of the Patient Mobility Directive (2008-2010)
 
145 
 
discrimination between foreign and domestic patients (Article 5). Member 
state of affiliation, meaning the member state where the patient is insured, 
would be obliged to reimburse the costs of the cross-border treatment up to 
the costs of the same or similar treatment at home (Article 6). Relevant 
administrative and financial mechanisms have to be set up, whereby domestic 
and outgoing patients should be subjected to the same criteria or conditions. 
Prior authorization of non-hospital care was prohibited (Article 7). In turn, for 
hospital care or specialized care defined on a special list (updated by the 
Commission), prior authorization might be required, but only under pre-
specified conditions (such as the financial balance or planning) and subjected 
to procedural constraints. Member states were obliged to establish a system of 
national contact points that would provide patients with information about 
their rights and assist them in case of harm.   
The proposal went beyond providing for a patient-friendly system of 
cross-border healthcare and established a duty for member states to cooperate 
in healthcare matters (Chapter IV). This cooperation should encompass 
medicine prescriptions, reference networks for healthcare providers, e-health, 
technology management as well as data collection for statistical and 
monitoring purposes. For several of these provisions, as well as obligations 
imposed on member states in previous chapters, the proposal envisaged an 
extensive assistance by the Commission and prescribed the Comitology 
procedure (Article 19).  
This case confirms that the legislative behavior of the Commission is 
largely driven by a strong preference for harmonization. The proposal followed 
a “familiar sequence whereby negative integration […] breeds the need for 
positive integration” (Sauter 2009: 131). The second part of the proposal 
established a basis for a common healthcare policy, since it provided for a 
Commission-assisted cooperation in procedures and standards. In the part that 
codifies the Courts’ case law, the Commission did not shy away from putting 
additional organizational obligations on the member states, such as the 
national contact points. This is notable, since the Treaty grants the EU only 
limited competences in public health. Furthermore, the Commission 
interpreted the Court rulings in an excessively patient-friendly way. For 
instance, the case law does not definitely prohibit prior authorization for non-
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hospital care and it is not as restrictive with the prior authorization for 
hospital care as the proposal proved to be (Krajewski 2010: 178-179).  
Evaluation 
The Commission responded to the need of case law codification with a 
far-reaching proposal. In a way, it was a progressive one, since it surrounded 
the Treaty-derived freedom of patients to choose the country of treatment 
with flanking provisions that make the execution of this right possible. On the 
other hand, the proposal imposed an impression that the Commission expands 
integration into a new area, one that had hitherto been sheltered from 
supranational influence. Such a strategy compelled a conflict between the 
Commission and the member states, which indeed materialized, with the 
proposal leaving the Council with considerable changes. 
What was less expected was that the Council would itself be divided 
over the core of this initiative, namely reconciling national healthcare systems 
with the imperative of the internal market. Already when the Court was 
debating the cases, Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer voiced that 
healthcare should not be treated as a “service” because it does not fall into the 
category of “economic activity”, especially when provided in kind (as opposed 
to in-cash)98. The Court did not follow this reasoning. However, this debate re-
emerged in the Council of Ministers and shaped the legislative dynamics.  
6.2.3 Legislative negotiations in the Council: an overview 
The Council started the work on the PMD in October 2008. It reached 
agreement in June 2010, after 23 months of work conducted under four 
Presidencies: France, Czech Republic, Sweden and Spain. While the first two 
Presidencies were primarily concerned with detailed article-by-article work, 
the latter two dealt with the remaining conflictive issues and focused on paving 
the way for a successful vote. Sweden undertook the first attempt to reach the 
qualified majority, but it failed in December 2009. The blocking minority 
comprised Spain, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia and Romania, supported by 
                                                          
98  Opinion of the AG Ruiz-Jarabo in Smits-Peerbooms (C-157/99) 
http://curia.europa.eu/en/actu/communiques/cp00/aff/cp0038en.htm 
[19.03.2913]; Opinion of the AG Ruiz-Jarabo in Müller-Fauré (C-385/99) 
http://curia.europa.eu/en/actu/communiques/cp02/aff/cp0285en.htm 
[19.03.2013].  
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several new member states99. However, the coalition collapsed after its most 
vote-rich member Spain assumed the Council Presidency and diametrically 
changed its handling of the dossier.  
What did the member states in the Council disagree about? The 
Directive did not contain specific zero-sum issues that would generate 
manifestly antagonistic preferences. Delegations were largely in agreement 
that the Commission went too far with the ambition to establish a general 
framework for an EU-wide health policy. However, opinions diverged 
concerning the question of how best to achieve the overrating purpose of this 
legislation, namely to reduce the uncertain implications stemming from the 
growing body of ECJ case law on patient mobility.  
Many delegations argued that a Directive on patient mobility is a 
“necessary evil”. Consequently, the totality of the relevant case law should be 
taken into account to prevent the Court from further advances. Indeed, this 
position was adopted by Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, France 
and the Scandinavian countries.  
The other group, comprising Spain, Portugal and Greece, openly 
mistrusted the idea of legislating on healthcare while relying on the legal 
framework of the internal market. This group was joined by Poland, Slovakia 
and Hungary and supported by almost all the other new member states, except 
the Czech Republic, which served as a Presidency. The group never openly 
admitted that it would prefer an unregulated status quo over a binding law, 
nor did it explicitly criticize the rationale that the member states should leave 
policy-making to the Court. Rather, as I will argue in my analysis, the content 
and style of those countries’ interventions in the legislative process indicate 
that they vehemently resisted embracing the issue of patients’ rights in cross-
border medical treatment.  
Domestic institutional and historical determinants  
What explains the geographic pattern of contention over the Directive? 
Institutional features of healthcare systems or past experiences with ECJ case 
law on patient mobility appear as potential explanations. Admittedly, state-
owned healthcare systems that provide in-kind benefits face more severe 
                                                          
99  With these five countries, a blocking minority was reached and the Presidency did 
not conduct a formal vote. In early December, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and 
Hungary supported the critique voiced by the blocking minority (Agence Europe, 
02.12.2009).  
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challenges when exposed to cross-border movement of patients (Hatzopoulos 
2002: 684). Therefore, we would expect countries with such systems to oppose 
an EU binding law. Furthermore, countries that experienced charges from 
Court rulings would be more open towards a binding legislation. In fact, the 
most prominent ECJ rulings on healthcare concerned Luxemburg (Kohll and 
Decker), the Netherlands or the UK (Watts).  
However, none of these explanations accounts fully for the North versus 
South-East divide that materialized in the negotiations. Firstly, among those 
who supported the idea of encompassing case law codification we find several 
state-run healthcare systems, such as the UK or the Scandinavian countries 
(Wendt et al. 2009: 75, 86). Secondly, both Southern and Eastern European 
countries had their experiences with ECJ case law on patient mobility. While 
cases involving Spain (Keller, Herrera) and Greece (Stamatelaki, Ioannidis) 
were treated by the ECJ between 2005 and 2007 (Sauter 2008: 23-28), the new 
member states they were obliged to implement the case law as acquis 
communautaires. Some of them, formally, did so (Földes 2009: Chapter 4). It 
seems that the new member states opposed the formal codification of case law 
that they had already accepted as part of their policies.   
Technical work: French and Czech Presidencies 
It took some time until the abovementioned conflict decisively shaped 
the work of the Council. The initial Presidencies avoided engaging in 
discussions about legitimacy of this project and, as I will show in the analysis, 
the concerned countries failed to propose specific amendments to the 
proposed text right from the outset.  
The French Presidency only dealt with the first 14 Articles and held ten 
Working Party meetings (Council 2008b: 2). It responded to the widely voiced 
preference for a weaker language of member states’ obligations vis-à-vis 
incoming or outgoing patients. In the compromise proposal from November 
2008, the Presidency introduced major changes to the Commission’s proposal: 
the respect of member states’ competences in healthcare has been stressed 
several times, monitoring of standards of treatment as well as procedural 
guarantees for patients’ complaints removed and the member state of 
affiliation’s scope for prior authorization broadened (Council 2008a). Already 
in that time, reservations towards the Directive as a whole have been voiced by 
the Southern and Central Eastern European member states. However, these 
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were of general nature, and besides being noted in progress reports, they had 
not been dealt with in greater detail (Council 2008b: 3).  
The Czech Presidency worked equally intensely with eight Working 
Party meetings (Council 2009c: 3). It continued the approach of the French for 
the second part of the proposal: the Commission’s role in the development of 
common health initiatives has been reduced and the range of member states’ 
cooperation narrowed. Furthermore, the Czech Presidency worked on the 
wording of the crucial provisions in the first part of the Directive: the definition 
of healthcare, the assumption of costs for cross-border healthcare and the 
procedures for prior authorization.  
Meanwhile, the general reservations towards the Directive as a whole 
took a more specific shape. More than a half of member states expressed a 
preference to exclude healthcare providers that do not have a contract with the 
public insurance institution form the Directive’s regulatory regime. The 
rationale behind this exclusion was that some member states differentiate 
domestically between “contracted” and “non-contracted” providers. Only the 
former are reimbursed by the insurer, who can control the prices and the 
quantity of assumed healthcare services through contracts. In EU law, 
discrimination between different forms of service organization is prohibited. 
The worry of the concerned member states was that the Directive, which in 
theory only applies to cross-border transactions, would be employed by 
domestic actors and will destabilize the national practices of contracting in the 
long term.  
The Czech Presidency classified this debate as one of “political nature” 
on which not many results could have been achieved (Council 2009d: 3). The 
Presidency itself was of the opinion that an exclusion of non-contracted 
providers, as demanded by Poland, Spain, Portugal, Slovakia and others is not 
possible because the ECJ itself never differentiated between different 
organizational types of healthcare provision (Council 2009d: 4). Thus, the case 
law codification would be incomplete and the objective of limiting the ECJ-
induced uncertainty not achieved. The Czech Presidency referred this question 
to COREPER and the ministerial forum, where the debate proved to be even 
more charged with emotions.  
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Majority voting politics: Swedish and Spanish Presidencies  
The strategy of the Swedish Presidency was focused on securing the 
necessary arithmetical support for the Directive. The Presidency did not wait 
too long with presenting first draft proposals, which were put forward as soon 
as in July 2009 (Council 2009b). This proposal contained a very explicit 
accommodation of the German preference for exclusion of the long-term care 
(Council 2009b: Article 2), in line with the wording proposed by the German 
delegation before and a sharpened wording of provisions important for the UK, 
namely the gate-keeping role of the General Practitioner in granting prior 
authorization (Article 8). On this way, the Presidency secured that the three 
largest member states, Germany, France and the UK, were on the supportive 
side.  
The Presidency also provided for the exclusion of non-contracted 
providers. However, this would be possible only if quality and safety issues 
were at stake (Council 2009b: Article 8.7). Such phrasing would not entirely 
meet the concerns of the countries demanding such exclusion, but the 
Presidency wanted to send an accommodative signal and wait for reactions. 
The opposition softened, but it managed to organize a blocking minority on the 
EPSCO Council in December 2009.  
Spain who led this opposition was about to become the next Council 
Presidency. Negotiation participants and observers did not believe that the 
dossier could be brought forward, since Spain was the most outspoken 
opponent of the project from the very beginning of the negotiations100. Spanish 
position towards the Directive was one of “general reservation”. Spain’s health 
minister argued in public that the Directive “treats health as a commodity”, 
“goes against the exclusive right of each State to organize their health services” 
and on this way “undermines the principles of social solidarity” (El Pais and 
Reuters, 01.12.2009, 02.12.2009).  
Nonetheless, Spain also had two more specific concerns. The first one, 
shared with many other member states, was the inclusion of non-contracted 
providers in the Directive’s scope. Patient’s insured in Spain are not allowed to 
use private clinics at tax payers’ costs. However, the Directive would afford 
them this right in cross-border transactions, which the government found 
                                                          
100  Interview, Council General Secretariat, 26.10.2010. 
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problematic for several reasons, ranging from fairness to control over quality 
and safety. The second problem concerned the situation of foreign pensioners 
residing in Spain, accounting for almost three million citizens. According to the 
Regulation 883/2004, their home-country insurance covers their medical 
treatment in Spain, transferring a lump sum of about 300 Euros per person 
every month (El Pais, 09.06.2010). With the new Directive, it was sufficiently 
unclear which country is the “member state of affiliation” obliged to grant 
prior authorization and, most importantly, to reimburse the treatment when 
these pensioners go abroad to receive treatment. Spain was afraid of a legal 
loophole that would cause it to bear some 2 billion Euro in additional costs 
when German pensioners residing in Spain returned to Germany for 
treatment101.  
This was what Spain decided to focus on during its Presidency102. It 
introduced a new article clarifying the relationship between the Regulation 
883/2004 and the Directive in the specific situation of pensioners returning to 
their insurance countries for medical treatment. There was no objection to this 
amendment103, so Spain proceeded to vote. It knew that the problems of its 
former allies remain unresolved, but with Spain voting in favor, there was no 
longer a blocking minority. In public, Spain defended its change of stance with 
the argument that it will now “avoid paying 2 billion Euros for pensioners” and 
that it “restricted medical tourism” (El Pais, 09.06.2010). Poland, Slovakia, 
Romania and Portugal were unable to support the Spanish compromise 
proposal and voted against or abstained.  
6.2.4 The outcome 
After the Council had given its political approval to the amended text in 
June 2010, the Directive on Patients’ Rights in Cross-Border Healthcare was 
officially agreed upon in early 2011. Compared to the Commission’s proposal, 
                                                          
101  Such a phenomenon was strongly anticipated on the grounds that people prefer to 
be treated where their families live, which is typically in the places from which 
they originate. 
102  Interview, Permanent Representation of Spain to the European Union, 28.10.2010.  
103  The pensioners issue has been raised in the Council before, but for some reason, 
Spain did not manage to get it sorted out in line with its preferences. According to 
the Spanish representative interviewed for this project, “only as a Presidency was 
Spain able to adjust this provision”, Interview, Permanent Representation of Spain 
to the European Union, 28.10.2010.  
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the most important changes were an inclusion of Article 168 TFEU104 (public 
health) as a second legal base - additional to the internal market article, an 
exclusion of long-term care form the Directive’s scope and more leeway for 
member states regarding prior authorization. The Council largely managed to 
shift the balance between member states’ obligations and rights towards the 
latter. The text repeats several times the need to preserve the member states’ 
competence. The extension of the legal base is “rich in meaning” here, since the 
Article 168 TFEU provides that the EU shall respect the responsibilities of 
member states in the organization and delivery of healthcare (de la Rosa 2012: 
27).  
The evaluation of this outcome is not without difficulties. The Directive 
has not yet been implemented105, so it is impossible to ascertain the extent to 
which the amendments introduced by the Council enabled member states to 
protect their structures and procedures from the imperative of Treaty-derived 
individual rights. It remains to be seen whether the new legislation will 
perhaps provide an opportunity for further complaints by patients in Court. 
Greer predicts such a development, pointing at the Directive’s lacking clarity 
(Greer 2013: 2-4). Interestingly, the Court itself seems to have reacted to the 
legislative intervention, as it “tempered” some of its arguments in most recent 
healthcare cases (Hatzopoulos and Hervey 2013: 3-4).  
Arguably, EU law – primary or secondary – will continue to pose 
challenges to healthcare systems in which the state bears the primary 
organizational or financial burden of delivering healthcare. The debate about 
exclusion of non-contracted providers illustrates that concern. Several 
member states vehemently opposed the scenario of public insurance 
institutions being pushed to settle their accounts with providers operating 
outside of the system of price and quantity regulation, namely the system in 
which the state or the public insurer is the dominant player. An explicit 
exclusion of non-contracted providers, as demanded by those states, has been 
deemed discriminatory and would go against the Treaty. There was not much 
debate how this problem could be dealt with. In the end, the Directive 
remained highly ambiguous regarding the reasons and conditions under which 
member states might restrict the right of a patient to choose where (s)he is 
                                                          
104  Ex-Article 152 TEC.  
105  Member states shall transpose the Directive until October 2013.  
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treated. The high number of outvotes suggests that this problem has rather 
been postponed than fully resolved.  
6.3 Analysis 
The description of the PMD, provided in the previous part of the 
Chapter, raises two puzzles. Firstly, why did a dossier that has been announced 
and prepared for several years, meet with such a general hostility by a 
considerable part of the Council? An opposition against the very fundaments of 
this legislative project only later on boiled down to very specific issues, such as 
the non-contracted providers. Second, how did the Council manage to 
overcome a quantitatively large coalition against transforming ECJ case law on 
individual patients’ rights into binding legislation?  
These are important questions highlighting that the structure of the 
decision situation in the Council, i.e. the distribution of policy preferences and 
the voting power that the conflictive parties dispose of, provides an incomplete 
account of how this body works and how it reaches its decisions. The puzzle(s) 
of the PMD are thus relevant for the broader debate concerning what features 
of the Council enabled it to cope efficiently with enlarged membership.  
The analysis reveals that inequalities among member states regarding 
their capacity to place their interests on the negotiation agenda and their 
ability to organize collective action have great influence on how a dossier 
passes the way from proposal to agreement. The first part of the analysis 
stresses the importance of country-level preparation and policy engagement 
for effective bargaining on the Council level. Council politics starts long before 
the formal agenda is set. The analysis continues with coalition politics within 
the Council. It shows that poorly coordinated and weakly organized groups of 
like-minded countries face high risks of becoming dissolved by the 
Presidencies, whereas early, well-founded and structured interventions of 
individual member states trigger mobilization processes and lead de facto to 
coalition building and collective influence. Finally, the section shows the Chair 
was able to set in motion a tipping point dynamics towards agreement, 
exposing the incoherence of the opposition and isolating the member states 
with decisive voting power.  
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6.3.1  Advancing own cause: North-East-South  
The PMD was a long awaited piece of legislation. The clarification for 
patients seeking healthcare abroad was welcome by both stakeholders and the 
member states, whose participation in the high-level group and whose 
responses to consultations served as a consent to proceed with the initiative. 
At first, no major conflicts were in sight. Stakeholders voiced the need for 
further specification of key terms or urged a stronger orientation of the 
proposal towards common values in healthcare, agreed by the member states 
in 2006 (Council 2006a). Hospitals’ associations and patients’ organizations 
differed in their views on the strictness of prior authorization (EurActiv, 
03.07.2008). As for the political parties, only some of them took a pronounced 
critical position: Those on the far-left side of the political spectrum criticized 
the “re-introduction of Bolkestein through the back door”, while the Liberals 
welcomed the first step towards a “free European patient area” (EurActiv, 
03.07.2008).  
All the more surprising was the discovery by the French Presidency 
that not all the member states were as enthusiastic about the project as 
previous announcements or actions at the high-level Council configuration 
would allow one to expect. Criticism of the specific content of the proposal was 
nothing unusual, given that the Commission was rather radical in its 
interpretation of the case law. However, as it proved, Spain, Portugal, Hungary, 
Slovakia, Poland and others questioned the project as a whole. In particular, 
the ministerial meeting of the EPSCO Council106 in December 2008 reaffirmed 
that fears about the loss of national sovereignty were vivid among these 
countries (EurActiv, 17.12.2008). These fears manifested themselves in an 
open criticism of the Directive as de-regulatory and violating member states 
competences, as well as the demand to replace internal market as the legal 
base by the Article 152 of the Treaty (public health)107. Indeed, this demand 
was rather symbolic, because Article 152 does not provide for binding 
legislation, but rather only for supplementary measures108.  
                                                          
106  Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council.  
107  EPSCO Council on 16.12.2008. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/videostreaming  
108  Interview, Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union, 
20.10.2010. 
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“Positions of principle” as such are nothing unusual on the ministerial 
level of the Council. However, interestingly, the interventions of Southern and 
CEE member states on the Working Party level were equally general and 
dismissive109. This attitude stood out because both the Presidency and other 
member states were determined to proceed with detailed article-by-article 
work and focus on key institutions of the proposal such as prior authorization, 
hospital care or the mechanisms of intergovernmental cooperation in 
healthcare.  
6.3.1.1 Position articulation: Cross-country comparison 
Germany and the UK serve as examples of this very specific, substantial 
and focused legislative work. Both countries started the negotiations with a list 
of amendments they wish to see in the proposal. The lists contained a top 
priority – the most salient issue from the domestic perspective. In the German 
case, this was the exclusion of the long-term care (Pflegedienste) form the 
Directive’s scope. The reason was the specific, encompassing character of long-
term care in Germany, which is not a medical service, but rather a “solidary 
support of the society for families who care for their members” (Ulla Schmidt, 
minister of health, quoted by TAZ, 30.12.20008; see also (Schulte 2009)).  
In turn, the UK wanted to ensure that general practitioners (GPs) retain 
their gate-keeping role in the British healthcare system and that regional 
health systems determine the scope of covered services - both being 
characteristic features of the British NHS (National Health Service). In a state 
funded health system, such as the British one, the individual doctor (GP) 
decides who should receive what treatment. This is distinct from healthcare 
systems, in which entitlements are decided by national legislation. As the 
British Minister for Health put it: "We want to ensure that […] the NHS retains 
the ability to decide what care it will fund”110. In practice, this meant that the 
Directive would take into account the decisive role of GPs and the fact that 
entitlements may vary across the NHS. Both Germany and the UK had a very 
specific idea about how the proposal should be changed to minimize the 
disruptive implications on their existing healthcare arrangements. 
                                                          
109  Interview, former employee of the Permanent Representation of France to the 
European Union, 15.12.2010 (phone).  
110  http://www.ehealthnews.eu/research/1351-uks-consultation-on-patient-
mobility-in-the-eu [24.05.2012]. 
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The negotiation positions of Spain and Poland illustrate how the 
negotiation behavior of Southern and CEE countries differed from the 
Northern ones. Spain was primarily surprised and disappointed to discover the 
central role of jurisprudence in the proposal, having itself argued in the 
consultation responses that the regulation of healthcare services on European 
level should go beyond the narrow question of mobility and include issues 
such as health information systems, coordination or common accreditation 
framework for medical establishments111. In other words, Spain took a 
pronounced position concerning what the project should be about, with little 
reference to the actual dossier112.  
In turn, Poland did not take any pronounced position at all, given the 
very general and rather uncritical nature of the negotiation instruction 
prepared by the government (Budzynska 2008: 16). In the formal negotiation 
position, the Polish government mentioned three substantial concerns, two of 
which were widely shared by other countries in the Council: the competence of 
the Commission to co-determine the range of medical services covered by the 
Directive (Article 8) and the division of labor between the Commission and the 
member states regarding the standards of quality and safety in healthcare 
(Article 5). In these two areas, the mainstream position in the Council was that 
the Commission’s competence creep should be contained. As a third point, the 
Polish negotiation instruction mentioned the principle of cost reimbursement 
to healthcare providers who do not have a contract with the public insurer. 
The Polish government considered the possibility that the Directive might be 
applied within the country, forcing the Polish national insurer to reimburse 
those providers on the domestic arena. In fact, this later became Poland’s main 
negotiation issue, as Poland demanded the exclusion of these providers from 
the Directive’ scope. Moreover, Poland voted against the Directive, because it 
did not see this interest being accommodated. However, in contrast to 
Germany or the UK, Poland was not particularly offensive about its top-issue at 
the negotiation outset. Why was this the case? 
                                                          
111  Response from the Spanish Ministry of Health and Consumer Affairs to the 
European Commission's consultation on Community action on health services, 
31.01.2007; http://ec.europa.eu/health/consultations/index_en.htm?Page=9 
[10.08.2012].  
112  Interview, Permanent Representation of Spain to the European Union, 28.10.2010. 
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A possible reason for this rather lukewarm stance was that Polish 
government was itself unsure about the relationship between the Directive’s 
provision and the domestic system of contracted healthcare. The question was 
whether the reimbursement rights codified in the Directive can also be 
enforced on the domestic arena. In that event, Polish patients using “private” 
non-contracted healthcare in Poland could claim reimbursement from the 
public insurer, pointing at the combination of the Directive’s content and the 
Polish constitution that provides for equal access to healthcare. Legal experts – 
the Polish government relied on four different pieces of expertise – had 
different opinions on the likelihood of such scenario to materialize. 
Consequently, the negotiation instruction left open how risky the inclusion of 
non-contracted providers in the Directive really is. Presumably, this 
uncertainty explains why Poland was initially reluctant to take a clear position 
on this issue and only later on became more assertive – when it saw that other 
countries also have this problem. 
Countries such as Spain and Poland did not contribute to the article-by-
article discussions in the Working Party. The discussions in the EPSCO Council 
in December 2008 leave no doubt that their positions were shared by other 
countries in the respective regions. Spain in particular became a very 
outspoken and assertive player and served as a leader of the Directive’s 
opponents. Referring to the negotiation behavior of these countries compared 
to other Council members, a Presidency representative admitted that they 
“were active, but active in blocking and not in making constructive proposals”, 
which was not considered helpful on the Working Party level113.  
Confronted with the prospect of achieving progress in at least the first 
few chapters, the French Presidency did not have any incentive to unpack the 
general, normative issues such as the EU’s mandate to intervene in healthcare 
markets. At this early stage of the legislative work, the Presidency preferred to 
deal with specific concerns and proposals advanced by determined and 
informed negotiators than to engage with member states still uncertain what 
their positions and their concerns actually are. For instance, a representative of 
the Presidency admitted that she never understood Poland’s problem with the 
                                                          
113  Interview, former employee of the Permanent Representation of France to the 
European Union, 15.12.2010 (phone).  
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non-contracted providers and the role played by the Polish constitution in this 
context114.  
Besides the institutional interest to advance the negotiations, France 
was also interested in the substance of the dossier and motivated to work on it. 
France itself reacted to ECJ rulings as early as in 2005 with an abolishment of 
prior authorization for non-hospital care. It claimed to understand the legal 
rationale behind the project and know the case law very well. Finally, it 
stressed several times that member states should legislate and not the Court. 
This was a very compelling communication strategy, since nobody in the 
Council objected this rationale. Both the French and the later Presidencies used 
it to motivate the Council to move forward.  
The positions of Southern and Central Eastern European member states 
did not have much impact on the negotiation process on that stage. These 
member states were not engaged with, whereas the UK, Germany and others 
were able to have at least some of their concerns accommodated. In the 
following section, I will explore why member states differed so much in the 
way they articulated their interest on the Council arena in greater detail. Why 
were some countries able to produce highly specific, informed and structured 
negotiation positions while others remained rather general and seemed to 
engage with the specific content of the proposal only very loosely?  
6.3.1.2 What explains the leader- and laggard positioning? 
The previous section has shown that the Council was largely divided in 
two groups of member states. Northern European countries, such as the 
Netherlands, the UK, Germany, France or the Scandinavians welcomed the 
initiative and invested utmost legislative efforts to tailor the proposal to the 
needs of their specific healthcare systems. On the other hand, Southern and 
Central Eastern European member states saw the Directive as major threat to 
their public healthcare, although they did not make specific suggestions how 
potential problems could be addressed. This conflict, in a way, corresponds to 
two substantial cleavage identified in the Council literature: The level of 
harmonization and the strength of regulation. In the first case, member states 
disagree about the need to adopt uniform regulations across the EU – while 
                                                          
114  Interview, former employee of the Permanent Representation of France to the 
European Union, 15.12.2010 (phone). 
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some argue that EU action is desirable, others prefer to keep the matter under 
the domestic sovereignty. In the second case, the balance between the market 
on the one side and the collective societal interests on the other side is the 
object of contention.  
However, this substantial dimension does not describe the conflict fully. 
Beyond their general views or attitudes, member states differed in the way 
they engaged with the dossier, producing negotiation positions of varying 
quality. I have argued above that the way preferences were articulated 
mattered for the legislative dynamics, since those countries that were able to 
put forward specific legislative demands had better chances of being 
accommodated by the Council Presidency. The obvious question is why did 
some countries engage with this dossier so intensely while others remained 
critical but also ignorant about it? I show that static domestic variables such as 
healthcare institutions or citizens’ attitudes only partly explain the variance 
and have to be complemented by insights from the dynamics of the domestic 
policy process. This “variable” encompasses policy activity before the formal 
beginning of the negotiations, engagement with the case law and the timing of 
stakeholder inclusion. 
The two main institutional types of healthcare systems in the EU, 
national health systems and social insurance systems, do not account for the 
North versus South-East cleavage, as observed at the outset of the Council 
negotiations (European Parliament 2007: 1). The National Health System in 
which healthcare is funded by taxation operates in the UK, the Scandinavian 
countries, as well as in Spain and Italy. While the UK, Sweden and Denmark 
supported the Directive, Italy and Spain vehemently opposed it. Social 
insurance systems financed by payment of premiums and administered by 
(independent) bodies can be found in continental Europe; for instance, in 
Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Poland, Czech Republic and 
Slovenia. Again, these countries differed regarding their general attitudes 
towards the PMD.  
A recent, more specific typology provides a more nuanced insight, albeit 
still far from a perfect match when compared to the conflict pattern in the 
Council negotiations. Böhm and colleagues classified healthcare systems 
according to financing, regulation and service provision, whereas all three 
tasks can be performed by the state, by societal or private actors (Wendt et al. 
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2009: 82; Böhm et al. 2012: 8). The UK, Scandinavian and Southern European 
healthcare systems remain in one group, although there is a differentiation 
within the insurance-based systems among the continental member states 
(Böhm et al. 2012: 18). Whereas societal actors take care of regulation and 
financing of healthcare (delivered by private actors) there is a division of labor 
between the state that regulates societal actors that administer and private 
actors that deliver healthcare in Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Luxemburg and 
Switzerland, in CEE, as well as France, Belgium and the Netherlands,115. On CEE 
healthcare systems, authors note that the role of societal actors is minor. The 
dominant role of the state in the healthcare system might be the reason why 
Eastern and Southern member states reacted with similar hostility and 
reservation to the EU project of patients’ rights Directive, despite 
organizational differences between their healthcare systems. Both regions 
experienced welfare state transitions in the (more or less recent) past. Today, 
they exhibit complex, incoherent and instable institutional systems which 
struggled with fiscal austerity from the very beginning (Moran 2000: 154; Toth 
2010). It is plausible to assume that governing such regimes and adapting 
them to legal developments at the EU level is demanding. On the other hand, 
regulatory adaptation is always a challenge for EU member states. Other state-
led healthcare systems, such as the British one, initially also ignored ECJ case 
law but changed their strategy over time.  
Might citizens’ attitudes offer an explanation? There is indeed a 
difference of awareness about the possibility to go abroad for treatment and be 
reimbursed. This awareness is around 71% among EU15 and 63% among 
NMS12. Nonetheless, there are also prominent exception, such as Germany and 
the UK, both of whom have low awareness rates (67%). Several Central 
Eastern or Southern member states score above average, such as Slovenia, 
Greece, Lithuania and Italy (Eurobarometer 2007: 6). There are no differences 
among member states regarding the percentage of citizens that actually 
received treatment, whereby the average of 4% covers both the EU15 and 
NMS12 (Eurobarometer 2007: 7)116. The average is again very similar 
regarding the willingness to travel abroad for treatment: 53% for EU15 and 
                                                          
115  This group is therefore called “Etatist Social Healthcare Insurance”.  
116  The only notable exception here is Luxemburg, where 20% of citizens had 
experiences with cross-border healthcare (Eurobarometer 2007: 7). 
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52% for NMS12. There are no systematic patterns here, with the exception of 
the Southern member states (Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece) whose citizens 
are particularly willing to assume healthcare abroad. Most new member states, 
but also Germany, score below average. Citizens’ attitudes towards cross-
border healthcare do not offer a strong explanation for the differentiated 
engagement of member states’ governments with the legislative project of 
PMD.  
Where the Northern, Southern and Eastern member states differ 
considerably is the process of domestic engagement with transnational aspects 
of healthcare provision. Countries from the three regions offered different 
responses towards the ECJ case law on patients’ rights. In general, Northern 
European member states reacted to ECJ rulings – albeit with different speeds 
and to varying extents – while Southern and Eastern member states largely 
ignored the case law, with few a minor exceptions117.  
Spain and Poland were aware of the rulings but no legislative changes 
had been performed (European Parliament 2007: 28, 36-37). As an acceding 
state, Poland was obliged to implement the rulings during the accession 
process. However, it changed its legislation only as much as the Regulation 
1408/71 later 883/2004) required it. Other new member states proceeded 
similarly. Hungary formally incorporated the Kohl/Decker procedure of cost 
reimbursement in the social security system, albeit without mentioning these 
cases as a source of law and without putting any implementing procedures in 
place (Földes 2009: 239). The management of the Slovenian public health 
insurance adopted a “wait and see” approach despite the Commission’s critical 
requests (Földes 2009: 214). In both countries, there was no pressure from 
patients - presumably, because the differences in costs of treatment in East and 
West would imply high level of co-payments. Czech Republic stands out among 
the new member states. Already before accession, the health insurance funds 
active in the Czech Republic established a Centre for International 
Reimbursements, which not only executed international payments for medical 
treatment of Czech patients but also provided information, legal aid and 
represented the insurance institutions vis-à-vis the government (European 
                                                          
117  Admittedly, there is not much literature on the reactions to ECJ case-law in the 
Southern and Central Eastern member states. By contrast, several country case 
studies are available on Belgium, Luxemburg, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Germany, the UK and France (Obermaier 2008a; Obermaier 2008b; Baeten 2012).  
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Parliament 2007: 33-34). Czech Republic assumed the Presidency during the 
Directive negotiations, making it difficult to tell whether its commitment to the 
Directive, which was exceptional among CEE countries, resulted from domestic 
adaptation undertaken or the function as Chair. The Czech Republic did not 
seem to have an open ear for its fellow countries’ concerns. While it labeled the 
demand to exclude non-contracted providers a “political” claim, it preferred to 
cede the question of exclusion to the Council’s Legal Service rather than 
working on specific proposals to remedy the problems that countries such as 
Poland, Hungary or Slovakia anticipated (Council 2009d: 3).   
If ignorance was an option, what motivated the Northern member 
states to react to ECJ rulings by means of legislative or administrative change? 
The Belgian example, where early response (1998) was due to the “fit” 
between the healthcare system and the rulings, serves as an exception rather 
than a rule. So do Luxemburg and the Netherlands, which were directly 
involved in the ECJ procedures and thus directly exposed to compliance 
pressure. All other member states initially rejected the case law, claiming that 
it does not apply to their specific healthcare arrangements. This changed in the 
mid-2000s at the latest. There were different domestic drivers of change.  
While the German government initially denied that ECJ rulings might be 
applicable to the German healthcare system, the associations of the statutory 
health insurance explored potential benefits from purchasing services abroad 
and thus pleaded for a strategic handling of Kohll and Decker cases (Obermaier 
2008a). Consultations with stakeholders as well as further ECJ judgments 
ultimately convinced the German government to take legislative action. The 
first SPD/Greens draft bill was still rather restrictive, but the conservative 
opposition demanded a more patient-friendly legislation. Consequently, the 
Social Security Code was amended in 2003, providing for the reimbursement 
of ambulatory care abroad, the choice of in-kind or in-cash benefits for insured 
members and the possibility of contracting foreign providers by funds 
(Krankenkassen); meanwhile, the prior authorization of hospital care has been 
maintained, albeit in a restricted manner (Obermaier 2008a: 5-6).  
When Germany assumed Council Presidency in 2007, stakeholders, 
such as the association of statutory health insurance, were involved in political 
debates about the future EU-level regulation of healthcare matters. They called 
for EU-wide compliance with ECJ rulings, stressing the complementary nature 
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of the new reimbursement regime – they saw no necessity for a new legislation 
in this area (GKV Spitzenverband 2007). Associations of statutory health 
insurance formed a working group “Europe” which remained involved in the 
preparation of national position on the Directive proposal (GKV 
Spitzenverband 2008).  
In France, the dominant driver of legislative change came from the 
domestic jurisprudence. Between 2000 and 2004, French courts of all 
instances made strong references to relevant ECJ judgments (Obermaier 
2008b: 743-744). In parallel, the healthcare administrator DSS (Direction de la 
Sécurité Sociale) issued an implementation note 2001 that provided for 
reimbursement of selected medical products purchased in another EU member 
state. The government softened its stance and in 2003, the Social Security Code 
has been complemented by four articles covering the usage of healthcare 
abroad: reimbursement of ambulatory care, limited prior authorization for 
hospital care and contracts between the French insurer and foreign providers 
(Obermaier 2008a: 7-8).  
The UK’s reaction to early ECJ rulings was characterized by a 
dichotomy: manifest political rejection was accompanied by gradual, limited 
but systematic relaxation of the restrictive territorial principles that had bound 
the NHS before. For instance, the NHS had been given some autonomy in 
purchasing healthcare abroad and a pilot scheme had been launched offering 
patients on waiting lists a choice between a treatment in England or in one of 
the NHS-contracted centers in another member state (Obermaier 2008b). It 
seems that the British government acted strategically, anticipating further 
pressure and lawsuits from patients. Furthermore, NHS reform – 
“modernization and marketization” was on the agenda of the Labour 
government regardless (ibid). Finally, the Watts case (-372/04), debated first 
by the British Administrative Court and later on by the ECJ generated 
considerable media attention and increased the pressure on the government 
regarding management of the (long) waiting lists in the context of the 
possibility to opt for the treatment abroad. In fact, the government issued new 
instructions to local NHS managers on how patients’ requests should be dealt 
with. At the time the Directive was proposed, outgoing patients were 
reimbursed on case-by-case basis. In 2007, NHS established a European Office 
to become involved in EU-level policy developments (Zanon 2010).  
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In all these examples, case law on patient mobility made it on the 
domestic political agenda through an interplay between judiciary, 
stakeholders’ activism, public attention and government politics. The role of 
the government appears particularly strong in the case of the UK, where 
anticipation of future problems as well as the will to tackle the problem of 
waiting lists led to gradual adaptation to the EU regulatory framework. Also in 
the Netherlands, adaptation to the case law coincided with a project of major 
healthcare reform (Baeten 2012: 36-39). Which one of these factors failed in 
the case of the “ignorant” countries? 
The Polish case is insightful. Two aspects of cross-border healthcare 
have been discussed in the media since accession: first, the case of Polish 
women giving “emergency” births in German border hospitals at the cost of the 
Polish public health insurance (Gazeta Wyborcza, 04.04.2008); and second, the 
economic potential of Polish clinics in attracting foreign patients, whereby the 
Association for Economic Tourism applied to the Ministry of Economy to put 
healthcare services on the list of “strategic” sectors (Gazeta Wyborcza, 
07.05.2010). Both phenomena generated considerable media attention, 
although no references to the case law or the emerging regulatory framework 
on the EU-level have been made, neither by stakeholders nor by state organs. 
Stakeholders such as the Polish Chamber of Physicians, Public Sector Medical 
Trade Union, Federation of Polish Patients, National Association of Non-Public 
Hospitals and the Institute of Patient Rights all supported the Directive on 
patients’ rights. In a joint letter to Polish MEPs, they urged a negotiation 
strategy that will make the adoption of the Directive possible and criticized the 
restrictions to free movement of patients that the Council has already imposed, 
such as prior authorization for hospital care (Rynek Zdrowia, 30.09.2010). 
However, this intervention came as late as in September 2009, when the 
legislative work on the Directive was very advanced and the Polish 
government had already positioned itself as one of the most skeptical players 
within the Council.  
Due to its short membership in the EU, Poland clearly did not have an 
equal chance to pass through such a rich domestic reflection process on cross-
border healthcare as the countries referred to above. On the other hand, there 
had been several occasions to start the preference formation process before 
the formal decision-making was launched. Poland participated in the ECJ 
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hearing in the Watts case in 2006, it responded to Commission’s consultation 
regarding Community action on health services (2006) and was part of the 
Council High-Level Reflection Group on Cross-Border Healthcare (2006-2007). 
Nevertheless, the Polish government only started examining EU-level 
framework once the Commission had presented the proposal in July 2008. 
During the position formation stage, the Polish government did not seek 
stakeholder consultation, nor public or parliamentary debate. A Polish 
representative admitted that the responsible ministerial unit had to learn 
whom in the Commission to contact about a certain issue118. Admittedly, 
making binding legislation in the domain of healthcare was new and thus 
challenging for many health attaches in Brussels. A factor facilitating early 
information here was the continuity of staff in national health ministries and 
Permanent Representations. However, with health being a “newly 
Europeanized” policy area, this continuity was not always given.  
This late timing might explain why Poland’s official negotiation position 
was so general, with little reference to specific articles, with no exact demands 
to be accommodated by the intergovernmental deliberation. The comparison 
with the UK and Germany is telling. Both countries signaled already in their 
responses to Commission’s consultations what aspects they would like to see 
dealt with. When the Commission drafted the proposal, both delegations used 
their networks within this institution to receive a copy of the draft. The UK 
even lobbied the Commission to insert rather general article stating the same 
conditions for staying and migrating patients. Subsequently, during the actual 
Council negotiations, the UK pushed to further specification of this provision to 
fit its interest. Clearly, an in-depth knowledge about the content of the 
proposal was a good base to prepare specific negotiation instructions. This 
type of intensive engagement was also lacking in the case of Spain, whose 
interaction with the Commission was limited to comments on the 
Commission’s impact assessment or the response to consultation119.  
6.3.1.3 Summary 
The section has examined the policy positions advocated by the 
member states at the outset of the Council negotiations. It has argued that 
member states not only took different positions in EU negotiations, but also 
                                                          
118  Interview, Ministry of Health, Warsaw, 26.04.2012.  
119  Interview, Permanent Representation of Spain to the European Union, 28.10.2010.   
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took their positions differently. First, while Northern EU member states 
acknowledged the necessity to codify ECJ case law, Southern and Eastern 
member states denied the EU the mandate to intervene in national healthcare 
systems when relying on the internal market provisions. The observation 
speaks to earlier findings whereby the level of harmonization and the strength 
of regulation form important cleavages in EU politics (Thomson et al. 2004; 
Thomson 2009). In our case, the Eastern Enlargement has strengthened the 
opponents of harmonization, since most CEE countries were not convinced by 
the need to transform case law into a binding legislation, despite declaring 
their sympathies for the idea of codification, and thus criticized the Directive as 
a whole.  
The critique of codification also suggests that the respective member 
states preferred to safeguard domestic collective institutions instead of 
promoting individual rights through EU policies. In the context of the Eastern 
Enlargement, it might appear puzzling that CEE countries, despite their 
“liberal” sympathies, advocate this option. On the other hand, CEE’s 
“liberalism” referred to the relationship between business and collective 
societal interests, whereas in our case, public institutions were at stake. 
Therefore, the case suggests that CEEs might struggle with reconciling state 
policies such as health with the imperatives of EU integration.  
Second, member states formed their positions differently. Quality of 
negotiation instructions varied from specific to general and so did the 
legislative interventions. The case has revealed that countries that had a good 
understanding of the dossier and specifically pre-formulated demands were 
more successful in placing their interests on the negotiation agenda. CEE 
countries did not belong to that group. The example of Poland has shown that 
the new member states struggled with uncertainty about the Directive’s 
implications for their domestic policies, they engaged with the dossier late and 
lagged behind other countries regarding the information about the proposal. 
The insight in the process of domestic preference formation revealed the 
national administration’s late reaction to the emerging EU-level legislative 
project and missing involvement of national stakeholders. Consequently, the 
case confirms the theoretical argument whereby the new member states would 
lack domestic resources and incentives to become intensely involved in EU-
level legislative work (Chapter 3).  
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At the same time, providing a comparison between “leaders” and 
“laggards” and the respective histories of engagement with patient mobility on 
EU level, the case sheds doubts whether the negotiation capacity – observed in 
the case of Northern and clearly lacking in the case of Southern and CEE 
member states – is adequately grasped with the presence or absence of 
effective state administration and established stakeholders only. The cases of 
France, Germany and the UK demonstrate that engagement with EU policies 
and accommodation of new legal developments is a long and complex process. 
In this process, actors such as the public or the judiciary also matter, as they 
establish collective awareness of individual occurrences and thus exercise 
pressure on the government to take action. Engagement with EU policies 
resembles an interactive push-and-pull process between different domestic 
actors. The process intensifies as time passes and is “progressive” in the sense 
that it starts from policy-makers’ denial or ignorance and leads gradually 
towards engagement and adaptation.   
Still, the relationship between institutional aspects of negotiation 
capacity, such as the quality of administration or stakeholders’ activism and 
the time-span of engagement with EU issues is an unclear one. In particular, 
the example of the Southern member states shows that even a 20-year-long EC 
membership does not automatically make a country a forward-thinking, well-
informed policy negotiator. Other context factors come to mind, such as culture 
or economic development. For instance Marlene Wind has shown that a 
country’s relationship towards supranational judicial review is related to its 
judicial customs, as well as the type of democracy practiced (Wind 2010: 
1039). Tanja Börzel, who has researched member states’ responses to 
Europeanization and has established a typology of pace-setters (active pushing 
for policies), foot-draggers (preventing or delaying costly policies) and fence-
sitters (indifferent attitude), argued that the level of economic development is 
crucial in determining both the policy advancement and action capacity of 
member states (Börzel 2002: 208)120.  
To sum up, the case of the PMD demonstrates that CEE countries lag 
behind old member states – at least old-Northern member states in the quality 
of their legislative contributions. In our case, the new member states did not 
                                                          
120  Admittedly, she has based her theoretical argument on empirical observations in 
the field of environment, where the link between material wealth and policy 
ambition is strong. 
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engage with EU policy and legal developments intensely and early enough to 
effectively formulate their concerns and place them on the legislative agenda. 
While state administration and stakeholders clearly underperformed in the 
domestic process of preference formation, it remains an open question 
whether they remain the sole reason for lacking engagement with the 
emerging health policy on the EU level. The literature suggests that 
accommodating and responding to EU policies not only requires time and 
experience, but might also be influenced by meta-factors such as culture or 
wealth. For these reasons, it remains open whether the new member states’ 
capacity to shape the policy process will improve in the future. 
6.3.2 Coalition strategies: Compounding versus mobilizing 
The previous section concentrated on the preparation and articulation of 
bargaining positions in the Patient Mobility negotiations. Drawing on specific 
examples of Poland, Spain, Germany and the UK, the section has argued that 
member states strongly differed in their ability to place their interests on the 
negotiation agenda and that these differences can be traced back to the 
domestic interplay between the judiciary, the stakeholders, the public and 
government policies. The following section asks how the two Council camps – 
the opponents and the supporters of the Directive – organized their legislative 
behavior in the course of negotiation. It finds a discrepancy between the 
arithmetical strength and inefficacy of collective action within the opponents’ 
camp. Furthermore, it argues that despite not aiming for one coordinated 
coalition, the supporters of the Directive were able to attract supporters for 
their claims and ultimately exercise collective influence.  
6.3.2.1  Pitfalls of numerical strength 
At the beginning of the legislative process, the opposition towards the 
Directive and its very purpose – codification of ECJ case law on patient mobility 
– was rather diffuse. Hesitant member states broadly criticized the project 
without making specific suggestions concerning how to improve it, while the 
French Presidency did not invest much effort in ascertaining what the actual 
problems were. However, the situation changed during the course of the 
legislative negotiation. In December 2009, Poland, Spain and their 
collaborators manifested their collective power and blocked the Directive in 
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the Council’s attempt to take a formal decision. However, shortly thereafter, 
the coalition collapsed, whereby Spain assumed the Council Presidency and 
dissociated itself from its former allies. While Spanish behavior put an 
immediate end to the blockage, I argue that the opposition started dissolving 
much earlier. I show that there was a discrepancy between the arithmetical 
strength of the opposition camp and an apparent organizational and 
coordination failure of this group.  
 Besides sharing the caution and the hostility towards the project of the 
PMD as a whole, Southern and Central Eastern member states had one specific 
concern in common, namely the worry about the non-contracted providers 
being included in the Directive’s scope (see section 6.2.3). The first country to 
voice this problem on the Council level was Ireland. Other countries, including 
Poland, subscribed to this concern121. At the beginning, the group faced a 
difficulty in defining what kind of healthcare professionals are actually meant, 
whereby the term “private providers”122 was in operation. This confusion was 
more than simply a brief situational misunderstanding. Apparently, the 
concerned countries failed to explain to the French Presidency why exactly 
“private” providers would be a problem. Rather than engaging with this 
difficulty, the French Presidency preferred to send a formal inquiry to the 
Council’s Legal Service whether an exclusion of “private” providers from the 
Directive’s scope was possible: the answer was negative (Council 2008c).  
After the non-contracted providers had been properly defined, the issue 
finally managed to enter the main Council agenda under the Czech Presidency. 
It had been discussed several times on the Working Party level. The Presidency 
noted that many countries had doubts about including non-contracted 
providers in the Directive’s scope and thus wished for an exclusion of these 
providers. However, the Chair warned the concerned countries that 
“exclusion” would be difficult since it represents a form of discrimination, 
which is prohibited by the Treaty. In fact, the language of the Treaty does not 
differentiate between organizational forms of medical treatment: healthcare 
provided for remuneration is a service and as such is subjected to one of the 
four freedoms (Council 2009d: 4). It seems that the group ignored the warning, 
given that it continued the demand for exclusion. Only Hungary proposed a 
                                                          
121  Interview, Ministry of Health, Poland, 26.04.2012. 
122  Private care, healthcare provided in private establishments.  
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sub-article few weeks later that abandoned the language of “exclusion” and 
instead suggested to limit the reimbursement obligation to publically financed 
providers when the national legislation imposes such a condition on domestic 
patients. Strikingly, this proposal only received reluctant and selective support 
from potential allies and passed largely unnoticed (Council 2009a: 52).  
Similar to the French Chair, the Czech Presidency was not ready to 
move on this point, opting for a Janus-faced strategy of evasion. On the one 
hand, it pointed at the Treaty and at the earlier opinion of the Council’s Legal 
Service on private care (sic!). On the other hand, it called the problem 
“political” and formulated a direct question to be answered by the COREPER 
and eventually the ministers: “Should all healthcare be incorporated into the 
scope of Directive?” (Council 2009e: 5). The ministerial debate confirmed that 
the worry about the non-contracted providers was widely shared. The 
Presidency noted that “more than a half of the member states expressed their 
preference for limitation to providers contracted to the local public health 
insurance or otherwise defined public system only” (Council 2009c: 3). 
Problematically, the concerned member states offered very different reasons 
why including non-contracted providers in the new regulatory regime would 
be risky. For instance, Poland stressed the state’s dwindling control over the 
quality and safety of healthcare services, while Portugal claimed that 
healthcare contracting is laid down in the Constitution, which the Directive 
would now violate. Slovenia and Slovakia pointed towards the financial crisis 
and the necessity to keep the public money in the public system, whereas 
Hungary and Lithuania suggested that reimbursing non-contracted providers 
offer cross-border patients more choice, thus generating inequality between 
outgoing and domestic patients123.  
Ministerial debate is, of course, only a tiny part of the legislative process 
and one could argue that the statements – delivered in short time-slots by 
politicians who lack detailed dossier knowledge – provide only a superficial 
explanation of member states’ preferences (“cheap talk”). Nonetheless, the 
Council’s debate on non-contracted providers is insightful from the perspective 
of collective legislative action. It suggests that concerned member states 
missed an opportunity to position themselves as a coherent coalition. The 
                                                          
123  EPSCO meeting on 09.06.2009. Council videostream.  
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arguments they provided were too diverse to establish a coherent story line. 
Compelling and consistent story line has been shown essential for effective 
coalition building (Nedegaard 2007). In our case, the issue of non-contracted 
providers has been framed as a problem of finance, of social justice, of safety 
and quality or of compatibility of EU law with national constitutional 
principles. As I will show later in the chapter, the Council Presidency exploited 
this diversity strategically, as it responded selectively to the different 
implications of the non-contracted provider issue and thus was able to pull 
member states out of the hesitant group.  
Finally, member states that wished to exclude non-contracted providers 
from the Directive’s scope lacked a clear leader. While Spain and Poland could 
have performed this role, given that both are large member states, neither of 
them assumed leadership. Poland evidently struggled with the uncertainty 
concerning how problematic the inclusion of non-contracted providers 
actually was for the country’s healthcare system. The pieces of expertise – with 
different conclusions – were at the government’s disposal already at the 
position formation stage. However, it seems that Polish policy-makers only at 
later stage of negotiations decided to attach high salience to this issue. Only in 
December 2009, after the first attempt to vote, which was blocked by Poland, 
did the Polish Health Minister Ewa Kopacz first publicly admit that the 
government’s greater worry is that domestic non-contracted providers will use 
the Directive’s provision to obtain reimbursement from the public healthcare 
fund (Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, 26.11.2009). Such a development would 
generate huge additional costs (estimated 7% of the national insurance’s 
budget), given the number of patients who use “private” healthcare and 
nowadays pay for it out of pocket. The problem of non-contracted providers 
had been discussed in the Polish Parliament, albeit only in June 2010, after the 
political agreement in the Council, although the parliamentary Committee for 
European Affairs had dealt with the Patient Mobility proposal four times since 
the European Commission launched the negotiation process124.  
Why did Poland “discover” the salience of non-contracted providers so 
late? Two types of explanation come to mind. The first is related to the 
                                                          
124  Sejm RP, Komisja do Spraw Unii Europejskiej [Parliament of the Republic of 
Poland, EU Affairs Committee], Protocolls from meetings on 12.09.2008, 
12.12.2008, 03.06.2009, 27.11.2009. Biuletyn [public note] nr 56, 80, 122 and 154. 
Retrieved from http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/SUE6.nsf/GlownyWWW?OpenFrameSet 
[18.4.2012]  
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domestic coordination of preference formation and postulates 
disconnectedness between the administrative and the political level within the 
relevant ministries. According to this explanation, attaching salience is a 
matter of political judgment and thus is performed by high-level policy-
makers, such as the minister herself125. If the minister does not become 
involved sufficiently early to proclaim an issue as salient, the negotiating team 
does not have the necessary incentive to mobilize all the resources it has. In 
fact, Council policy-makers often mentioned in the interviews for this project 
the “disconnectedness between Brussels and the capital” as a general feature 
of CEE countries in EU-level negotiations126. This observation find 
confirmation in the literature on public administrations in the region (Goetz 
2001: 1038). The second, complementary, explanation is that Poland gradually 
focused on the issue as it discovered that other countries have the same 
problem – so it is a legitimate concern. This account assumes that bargaining 
positions are not fixed before the negotiation, but develop through interactions 
with other countries. However, also in this explanation, late timing would be 
the main component of organizational deficiency.  
The opponents of the Directive – Spain, Poland as well as other 
countries of the region (Portugal, Slovakia) – started organizing more 
effectively when it became evident that the Swedish Presidency would like to 
hold a vote. They met regularly to anticipate Presidency’s compromise 
proposals and prepare a common reaction to them127. With the two large 
countries on board, it was not problematic to commit a blocking minority. 
However, the blocking minority was thin, with several former members of the 
“coalition” either compromising (Ireland) or seeking concessions on their own 
(Hungary) at that stage. Subsequent section shows how the Swedish 
                                                          
125  This is how it worked in Germany in the present case. The relevant EU unit from 
the Ministry of Health prepared a list of policy issues within the Directive and 
suggested what the German position might be. The Minister Ulla Schmidt accepted 
all the suggestions except one, namely the inclusion of long-term care in the 
regime, stressing that this is important for her. This is how “long-term care” 
became the German negotiaion priority. Interview, Permanent Representation of 
Germany to the European Union, 02.12.2010. 
126  Interview, Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union, 
20.10.2010; Interview, Permanent Representation of Germany to the European 
Union, 02.12.2010. 
127  Interview, Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union, 
20.10.2010. 
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Presidency exploited the looseness and lacking coherence of this coalition to 
break the opposition.  
Certainly, the opponents of the Directive are a case of a failed coalition. 
They had a common interest – to prevent the Directive as a whole or at least to 
make sure that it will not pose any risk to the national systems of contracting - 
which would have lent itself to collective legislative action. Nonetheless, 
lacking coordination, organizational deficiencies and missing leadership by 
large countries prevented the group from seeing the interest accommodated.  
6.3.2.2 Mobilizing for individual and collective interests 
How did the supporters of the Directive organize their legislative 
behavior? Unlike the case of Directive’s opponents, we would not necessarily 
expect one large consistent coalition here. The general purpose of the Directive 
– stopping uncontrollable case law development – did not need much collective 
lobbying, given that the Commission, the Presidencies as well as the EP stood 
behind it. Widely shared among member states, even those criticizing the 
Directive as a whole, was the postulate to limit the Commission’s competence 
creep in coordinating national healthcare systems. The interests – having the 
Directive agreed with as much state autonomy preserved as possible – can be 
characterized as diffuse. Usually, diffuse interests do not yield incentives for 
actors to invest resources in organizing collective action (Olson 1965).  
The second reason not to expect coordination of Directive’s supporters 
would be a high specificity of member states’ individual demands. As shown by 
the example of the UK and Germany, member states tried to make the Directive 
respect the “special features” of their healthcare systems. The UK wanted to 
see the gate-keeping role of general practitioners preserved and the regional 
differences in healthcare entitlements respected. Germany’s aim was to keep 
its encompassing social system of long-term care out of the Directive’s scope. 
Such demands might be too country-specific to recruit allies. Therefore, 
concerned member states could opt for highly individual and more targeted 
strategies – such as purposeful lobbying with the institutional players, such as 
the Commission or the Presidency (Panke 2012).  
Such a strategy can indeed be found in the UK, albeit only before the 
Council formally started negotiating. Britain insisted that the Commission 
writes down a paragraph saying that “the same conditions and criteria of 
eligibility and regulatory and administrative formalities” apply to outgoing and 
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staying patients. The objective was to start with a general, cursory sentence in 
the Commission’s draft before specifying it further later on in the Council, 
adding elements that would make the provision compatible with the NHS’ 
modus operandi, such as “regional level” (where the entitlements in the UK are 
determined) or “assessment by a healthcare professional” (which is necessary 
to pursue further treatment). The UK managed to accommodate its interests 
with various strategies. At the Commission, the British delegation targeted 
various levels (both officials and the cabinet) as well as various DGs involved in 
the drafting process. As a British representative admitted, the Commission is 
generally interested in member states’ opinion128. However, the work has been 
carried out in the Council with the help of various other member states, whose 
support the UK managed to win.   
The Commission was also well aware of the German position on long-
term care129. However, it ignored it and did not explicitly exclude the long-term 
care from the Directive. The reason might be that the Commission received a 
complaint of a German citizen who wished to transfer the entitlement to care 
services to Austria where his wife resided. The Commission might have wanted 
not to take such a radical position as an exclusion of long-term care from the 
Directive, before this case had been closed.  
Both the UK and Germany communicated openly and intensely about 
their wishes and priorities concerning the Directive130. Germany stressed that 
if long-term care remains in the Directive, it will vote against it. At the same 
time, the delegation invested significant effort in explaining the particularities 
of the German system of long-term care and why it should not fall within the 
scope of the Directive. The UK also invested in explanatory work, yet it 
refrained from threats. Within a few months, both countries managed to 
assemble a firm circle of supporters. Germany gained support from Austria, 
Slovenia, the Netherlands and Luxemburg, all of whom subscribed to German 
wording proposals of long-term care exclusion (Council 2009a: 39). The UK 
convinced Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Denmark and others to back the provisions 
                                                          
128  Interview, Permanent Representation of the UK to the European Union, 
01.12.2010.  
129  Interview, Permanent Representation of Germany to the European Union, 
02.12.2010. 
130  The whole paragraph is based on interview evidence, see above.  
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on gate-keeping131. This alliance is particularly puzzling because Portugal and 
Spain (as well as Ireland, initially) rejected the project as a whole and actually 
belonged to the opposite camp.  
Two mechanisms are responsible for the emergence of these very issue-
specific coalitions. Firstly, both the UK and Germany were the first ones to 
raise the issues of gate-keeping or long-term care on the Council forum. 
Representatives of both delegations claimed in the interviews that delegations 
report to their capitals what other member states criticize in a project and 
national ministries examine these issues more closely. When the protagonist 
member states, besides raising awareness, also submit specific wording 
proposals, the chance is high that at least few member states will realize that 
the suggested amendments are good for them.  
The second mechanism responsible for the British and German success 
in mobilizing allies is that both countries gained “respect and trust”132 for their 
numerous interventions on those parts of the Directive which were not 
directly related to these specific demands. Besides lobbying for their “special 
wishes”, the UK and Germany were very determined to weaken those 
provisions of the Directive provisions that would lead to further 
supranationalization of healthcare policy, such as the Comitology procedure, 
the Commission’s say on quality and safety standards or national contact 
points for patients seeking cross-border treatment. Both countries, together 
with others, lobbied for a stronger procedure of prior authorization in hospital 
care133. Legal expertise and knowledge of the case law was needed here, 
because the ECJ has not been clear concerning whether and when prior 
authorization of hospital care is permitted and the Commission prohibited it all 
along in its draft134. Not all member states had the necessary understanding 
                                                          
131  Interview, Permanent Representation of the UK to the European Union, 
01.12.2010. 
132   Interview, Council General Secretariat, 26.10.2010.  
133  Another example of individual member states dedication to shared concerns was 
the British-Irish-Danish recital proposal, according to which patients cannot 
derive from the Directive any rights of entrance, stay or residency in the country of 
treatment  (Council 2009a: 33).  
134  The UK already offered an alternative legal interpretation of the status quo to the 
Commission’s view in the consultation responses. See:  UK consultation response 
to Commission Communication on Health Services; 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/healthcare/consultations/results_open_consultation_
en.htm [16.08.2012]. 
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and command of the legal matter for this type of interventions135. The Patient 
Mobility proposal was a large and complicated piece of legislation and thus 
challenging for policy-officers working on it. For this reason, Council members 
highly valued those member states that were ready to advocate shared 
concerns.  
One possibility to empirically grasp member states’ activism is to sum 
up their interventions: corrections, amendments, wording proposals or 
reservations (Table 1). The data is only available for one period of Council 
work, right in the middle of the negotiation process, from March to May 2009 
during the Czech Presidency (Council 2009a).  
 
Figure 7 MS interventions in the Working Party on Public Health Mar-May 
2009 
Source: Author’s compilation based upon the note form the General Secretariat to the Working 
Party on Public Health, 11.05.2009, Annex II (Council 2009a).  
 
As the table shows, the UK was the most active member state during 
this period, followed by Italy and smaller old member states, such as Belgium, 
Denmark and Ireland, while Germany ranked seventh. The table shows an 
apparent contrast between old and new member states, as the latter made only 
four interventions on average. Southern member states perform better, except 
Greece136. Spain’s 13 interventions appear modest given its political weight 
and positioning as the leader of the opposition.  
Despite the first mover advantages and the “respect” from which both 
the UK and Germany benefited, it took several months until the two countries 
                                                          
135  Interview, former employee of the Permanent Representation of France to the 
European Union, 15.12.2010 (phone); Interview, Permanent Representation of 
Sweden to the European Union, 20.10.2010.   
136  Greece made only one intervention in the period of investigation. A member of the 
British delegation that Greece “did not say anything in the working party. Only at 
the end, it said it was against” Interview at the British Permanent Representation, 
01.12.2010.  
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saw their interests accommodated. In the German case, the early Presidencies 
(France and Czech Republic) were hesitant to respond to the demand of long-
term care exclusion. In the past, the Court already interpreted care services as 
medical services (AOK Bundesverband 2008: 6). Moreover, there were cases 
pending during the negotiations (Chamier-Glisczinski, C-208/07). The Czech 
Presidency argued that, sooner or later, the Court will subject long-term care 
to the same legal regime as medical services (Council 2009c: 6). Despite its 
own resistance, Czech Presidency formulated an open question to the 
COREPER and the ministers, whether they think the Directive should exclude 
long-term care. In the ministerial debate, Germany was able to win even more 
support than it previously had, securing Estonia, Latvia and Portugal on its 
side137. No minister explicitly objected the idea of long-term care exclusion 
(Agence Europe, 06.06.2009). The German position was fully accommodated 
by the following Swedish Presidency.  
The Directive’s supporters, exemplified here by the UK and Germany, 
did not aim for explicit coalitions, as their demands were highly specific. They 
did not engage in coordination with other countries. Moreover, they were able 
to attract numerous supporters and ultimately, exercise collective influence. 
Thanks to early position formation and open and systematic communication of 
their preferences, both countries benefited from “bandwagon effects” – a 
mechanism whereby other delegation recognize the interests as their own and 
subscribe to the claims made by others.  
6.3.2.3 Summary  
We have seen here two strategies of collective action in the Council. 
Southern and Central Eastern European member states opted for what can be 
called compounding. Having similar fears about EU-level legislation in 
healthcare, these countries “naturally” came together, implicitly encouraging 
each other to work against the Directive. The primary strength of this coalition 
was its sheer size and the fact that it represented two important regional 
clusters of member states. The other strategy consisted in active seeking of 
allies. Countries applying it advocated highly specific individual interests, but 
were also active on issues that all member states considered important, like 
limiting the Commission’s new powers in shaping healthcare cooperation. The 
                                                          
137  EPSCO Council Meeting on 09.06.2009. Council videostream.  
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core of British and German coalition-activities was mobilization. The countries 
exploited the first movers’ advantage, making other delegations aware of 
important corrections to be implemented to the proposal. Furthermore, they 
supplied legal expertise in areas of common interest, which brought them trust 
and respect, perhaps even inducing “loyalty” relations?  
Our analysis suggests that mobilizing allies has some advantages over 
compounding into large numerical coalitions. The latter’s most pronounced 
action takes place on the voting stage, as large coalitions can easily bloc a 
decision. However, capitalizing on only one resource, the numerical strength, 
makes these alliances fragile. Precisely in the vote situation, large coalitions 
are difficult to maintain, because they are subject to pressure by the 
Presidency, as the following section explains in more detail. The repertoire and 
the time-span of actions are broader for mobilized alliances, as they can 
approach the Presidency throughout the process, several times, and ask for 
accommodation of their specific demands. Both coalitions require some 
coordination effort if they are to persist. Compounded coalitions have to see 
that there is sufficient discipline when voting. In turn, mobilized coalitions 
need a very specific “input”, such as wording proposals, expertise or legal 
arguments to support these proposals. Nonetheless, the risk of losing members 
is higher in the former case. The pitfall of regional alliances – the kind of 
collective action that the Eastern Enlargement made more likely - is that the 
countries might bet too much on their numerical strength, while 
underestimating the risks involved and ignoring the alternative tactics.   
6.3.3 Dealing with fragmentation: The Presidencies’ brokerage tactics  
Previous sections have revealed that CEE countries as well as Southern 
member states failed to attract the Presidency’s attention and managerial 
commitment. Possibly, the broad critiques and far-reaching, unrealistic 
demands discouraged the Presidencies from working more intensely on their 
problems. Confronted with this type of position articulation, the Presidencies 
opted for a strategy of evasion. For instance, the French Presidency forwarded 
the question of “exclusion of private care” to the Council’s Legal Service and 
did not deal at all with the underlying reasons and worries that accompany this 
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demand138. In turn, the Czech Presidency framed the exclusion of non-
contracted providers as a “political question”, given that such a move would 
openly ignore what the Treaty says. Such question should be answered by 
COREPER or the ministers.  
It is surprising that an obviously important question – whether the 
Directive will have an impact on the national systems of contracting healthcare 
– was dealt with in such a “superficial” way, at least by these first two 
Presidencies. Focusing on smaller issues that can more easily be edited and 
make the concerned delegations satisfied is arguably more in line with the 
Presidencies’ institutional interests than opening “black boxes” of domestic 
implications of the EU law. In the case of the PMD, the initial Presidencies were 
confronted with these two types of concerns and it seems that they chose to 
attend to those demands which were critical of the proposal, but supportive 
about the whole project, and ignore those positions, which in their radical 
version, would perhaps question the Directive’s rationale, namely codifying the 
ECJ’s case law. The assumption, which this reasoning is based upon, is that the 
Presidency wants to be an effective manager and achieve visible legislative 
progress, because this is what makes up for a “good” Presidency.  
The evasion, applied by the French and the Czech Presidencies towards 
the Directive’s opponents, did not discourage them from taking more 
determined action. When the Swedish Presidency proceeded to vote, the 
opposition blocked the proposal. However, this turned out to be a sporadic 
success. As I will argue here, the Swedish Presidency had a major share in 
dissolving the opposition. Although Sweden itself did not achieve the political 
agreement in the Council – this has been possible six months later – it 
succeeded with winning a solid majority in favor of the proposal and exposed 
the weakness of the opposition. The dynamics that Sweden set in motion can 
be characterized as a “tipping point”. This mechanism comprises a large-scale 
change – in our case from criticism to support – occurring within a short 
period, as if a critical threshold has been reached.  
When the Czech Presidency, the second Chair working on the dossier, 
finished its work in June 2009, it noted all but agreement in Council 
discussions (Press release 9721/2/09). The Council struggled with many open 
                                                          
138  Interview, former employee of the Permanent Representation of France to the 
European Union, 15.12.2010 (phone); Interview, Ministry of Health, Poland, 
26.04.2012.  
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issues, such as the legal base, the long-term care, the non-contracted providers, 
the possibility to refuse prior authorization and the cooperation on healthcare 
(ibid). When Sweden assumed the Presidency, it provided the delegations with 
a redrafted proposal already in the first month of its Presidency, in July 2009. 
With this gesture, it signaled that it is determined to work hard and finalize the 
legislative process during its mandate. Thus far, Sweden has been one of the 
most favorable countries towards the Directive’s project. 
The Swedish Presidency made a proposal that contained many 
concessions on issues previously debated in the Council. These concessions 
were designed as direct responses to the demands voiced earlier by various 
actors. For instance, the proposal contained an explicit exclusion of  the long-
term care, as wished by Germany (Council 2009b: 12); A new recital and 
paragraph allowed for exclusion of non-contracted and/or non-accredited 
providers, yet only in case of legitimate concerns about quality and safety 
(Council 2009b: 22); A new paragraph facilitated the refusal of prior 
authorization, providing examples of reasons for which this could occur 
(Council 2009b: 23)139. Furthermore, the Swedish Presidency has rewritten 
Chapter IV of the Draft (cooperation on healthcare), stressing the voluntary 
character of cooperation, reducing the Commission’s contribution from 
“guidance” to “assistance” in cooperation and introducing precautionary 
paragraphs preserving member states’ responsibilities in healthcare despite 
emerging supranational cooperation.  
The Presidency’s strategy was twofold. First, Sweden wanted to make 
sure that the supporters of the project do not have any outstanding 
concerns140. Having some large member states on the positive side was the 
first step towards winning a potential vote. Once a majority becomes visible, 
the remaining member states mobilize and aim at sorting out their issues 
before they got outvoted. While subjecting the Council to this soft time 
pressure, the Swedish Presidency also signaled the willingness to work on the 
contentious issue of non-contracted providers. This was the second part of the 
Swedish strategy.  
                                                          
139  This was what the UK requested under the Czech Presidency (Council 2009a: 55) 
140  Interview, Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union, 
20.10.2010. 
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The Czech Presidency noted in the protocol that more than half of 
member states had a preference for exclusion. Sweden rejected such a radical 
solution, arguing that it would mean an open discrimination between different 
forms of healthcare organization, thus violating fundamental principles of EU 
law. The Presidency pointed at the Commission and Legal Services’ strong 
views on that point. However, Sweden was not discouraged by the dimension 
of the opposition and it decided to explore how the concerned countries would 
react to compromise proposals.  
The Presidency proceeded gradually. First, it suggested recitals that 
said that member states could refuse reimbursing the non-contracted 
providers when they violate safety and quality standards. Subsequently, it 
proposed a recital saying that the Directive will have no impact on the 
organization of healthcare and social security systems in the member states. At 
this point, the opposition still comprised nine delegations141. The provision has 
been purposefully framed as a recital. However, the Presidency was prepared 
to shift it in the operative part of the Directive and present this move as a 
compromise142.  
In parallel, the Swedish Presidency approached Hungary – the only 
country which has been previously trying to work on some solutions to the 
non-contracted providers problem, beyond exclusion of thereof. Hungary 
drafted own paragraph specifying conditions, under which providers might be 
excluded from reimbursement. Sweden and the UK helped with the specific 
wording143. Consequently, a long, unclear and blurry paragraph emerged, 
whose legal significance and practical implications were assessed as low144. 
However, after this paragraph was included in the Directive, several smaller 
member states cancelled their opposition, namely Latvia, Slovenia and Ireland.  
                                                          
141  HU, SK, IE, PL, LV, SI, RO, ES and PR (Council 2009f: 1) 
142  Interview, Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union, 
20.10.2010. 
143  Interview, Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union, 
20.10.2010. Interview, Permanent Representation of the UK to the European 
Union, 01.12.2010. 
144  [reimbursement might by limited to providers that] “meet at least the same of 
equivalent standards and guidelines on quality and safety, including provision on 
supervision, as defined for providers that are part of the statutory social security 
system or national health system in the Member States of treatment, whether 
these standards and guidelines are given by laws and regulations or through 
accreditation systems or other systems of equivalent effect in the statutory social 
security system or national health system in the Member State of treatment” 
(Council 2009f: 31).  
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Next to Hungary, the Swedish Presidency also targeted Italy for 
bilateral work. Italy was previously quite vocal in its opposition and it had 
several more specific problems (see the number of interventions in section 
2.2.2). During the Czech Presidency, it subscribed to wording proposals that 
would limit the definition of a “health professional” to contracted providers 
(Council 2009a: 43). However, it was no longer found in this camp a few 
months later.  
One of Italy’s concerns was the notion of the patient’s “informed 
choice”. Italy wanted the Directive to make sure that patients who go abroad 
understand the risks and the potential differences in safety and quality 
compared to those they are used to. During the course of negotiations, Italy 
drafted paragraphs that would allow member states to establish procedures to 
ensure that all migrating patients have the knowledge about their provider of 
choice. These suggestions have been ignored by the Czech Presidency (Council 
2009a: 51). In turn, Sweden was more accommodative and suggested 
developing the notion of “informed choice” in the recitals (Council 2009f: 13). 
Italy still had reservations, although it agreed to refrain from blocking.  
 The bilateral work with Hungary and Italy were important carriers of 
change within the Council and of high symbolic value. The case of Hungary 
suggested that what had hitherto been debated as a fundamental contradiction 
in Treaty law and national healthcare systems could be overcome in detailed 
phrasing of paragraphs, if only there was a readiness to negotiate. As for Italy, 
the Presidency was proud to have a former vocal opponent on its side. Of 
course, it remains an open and a provocative question whether it was indeed 
Sweden’s legislative work - these few corrections performed in a hurry and 
under pressure - that caused Hungary and Italy’s changes of strategy. An 
alternative interpretation would be that those countries simply wanted to get 
on board and searched for a good pretext. If we assume that there had been no 
relevant domestic change in these countries during the last 17 months (the 
course of the negotiations so far), according to the logic of a two-level game, it 
must have been a Council-level factor that was responsible for these countries’ 
switching sides: lacking hope that the opposition would stand united and 
achieve its aims or a political bandwagon effect, understood as a move 
alongside the majority.  
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 The pressure for agreement not only came from the Presidency’s side. 
As a great enthusiast of having a Directive rather than Court rulings, the UK 
became proactive after having all of its own concerns satisfied, and approached 
the opposing countries informally. There was a dinner between the British and 
Polish delegation, during which the UK explained to Poland that it had the 
same problem with non-contracted providers145: they are not reimbursed 
domestically, but this discrimination cannot hold in cross-border transactions. 
Poland’s wish to exclude these providers from the regulatory regime of the 
Directive would contradict what the Court has been arguing for years. While 
this circumstance is politically uncomfortable, it has to be accepted. Poland 
replied with a power-argument: all large member states had their interests 
accommodated and given that Poland is a large member state, it should also 
enjoy this privilege. At this point, it became clear that Poland and its close 
supporter Slovakia would be available for compromise. Poland’s demands 
were no longer dealt with, neither by the Swedish nor the upcoming Spanish 
Presidency.  
6.4 Conclusion 
The PMD provides an example of Council decision-making in which the 
very fundaments of the given policy have been heavily contested. The main 
legislative contention touched upon the question whether ECJ case law on the 
rights of individual patients’ should be transformed into rules that would bind 
all health systems across the EU.  
The Eastern Enlargement affected the structure of this conflict. The new 
member states reacted to the project, the origins of which dated back to the 
time before accession, with hostility and they refused to support EU legislation 
that could potentially have disturbing implications for their state-centered 
healthcare systems. The fact that member states with similar healthcare 
systems have already dealt with the challenge of the case law, did not alleviate 
CEEs’ opposition. The Southern member states held similar views on the 
project, although due to their longer membership, one could expect a closer 
familiarity both with the case law and with the idea of codification.  
The analysis demonstrated that lacking domestic engagement with the 
emerging health policy at EU level prevented both the Southern and the CEE 
                                                          
145  Interview, Permanent Representation of the UK to the European Union, 
01.12.2010; Interview, Ministry of Health, Poland, 26.04.2012. 
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member states from forming viable negotiation positions on the new Directive. 
The countries were unsure about what they actually wanted, they made 
unrealistic and poorly founded demands or discovered the issue salience too 
late (the case of Poland). Despite their arithmetical strength, they did not 
manage to have their substantial concerns accommodated – such as the 
exclusion of non-contracted providers - and they opted for the ultimate 
influence strategy, namely blocking. Nonetheless, the group was not 
sufficiently coordinated and organized to sustain this strategy. Subjected to 
“divide and rule” tactics of the Chair, the group has been gradually loosing 
members, until the vote-richest and most vocal opponent, Spain, after 
assuming Presidency, applied the “small compromise” method to itself and 
switched sides. Organizational deficiencies of Southerners and Central Eastern 
Europeans were manifest on the level of single countries, but also in the way in 
which these countries coordinated their legislative behavior among 
themselves. Clearly, the organizational deficits of the Directive’s opponents are 
relative, i.e. they became apparent when compared with the proponents’ 
bargaining strategies.    
The PMD provides strong empirical support to the argument that 
agency matters in Council politics. The distribution of policy preferences and 
the voting power, which the conflictive parties dispose of, are important, but 
what ultimately happens in the Council and how agreement is reached 
depends on the means and methods with which member states place their 
interests on the negotiation agenda, as well as on how they organize their 
legislative behavior. The case shows that policy expertise, anticipation (of how 
other delegations will approach the dossier) as well as the strategic ordering of 
negotiation priorities serve as important negotiation resources. The 
observation that delegations vary in how (if at all) they order their preferences 
suggests that the process of determining salience works differently in different 
member states.  
Conceiving and implementing effective negotiation strategies remains a 
major challenge for Central Eastern European member states, even five years 
after their EU accession. Direct causes for their lacking impact on EU-level 
negotiations lie within the poorly coordinated administrations and inertial civil 
society, which lends plausibility to the theoretical argument developed in 
Chapter 3 of this thesis. However, the comparison with selected Northern and 
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Southern member states sheds doubts whether the static factors such as 
“administration” or “civil society” provide the full explanation for lacking 
domestic engagement with EU policies in CEE countries. The advancement of 
regulatory policy might also be driven by more general factors, such as wealth, 
culture or simply time and experience. 
Moreover, the domestic preparation of EU-level positions is not the 
only challenge that the new member states confront. The faith of the Patient 
Mobility-opposition shows how fragile large, but fragmented coalitions are. 
They are particularly prone to domino-kind dissolution, which the Presidency 
can easily initiate. When acting together, the new member states will 
necessarily form fragmented coalitions, because they are numerous yet 
(mostly) small.  
Despite being appealing, the findings warrant a healthy dose of caution. 
There are two policy characteristics of the PMD that might have influenced the 
negotiation dynamics, thus making this dossier distinguishable among other 
Council businesses. First, the dossier is a case of strong pressure for 
agreement. The purpose of the Directive was to prevent the ECJ from further 
advances on individual patients’ rights. The normative argument that 
“legislation by the Council is always better than the legislation by the Court” 
was constantly brought up by the Commission, the EP and the Presidencies146 
(Agence Europe, 30.09.2008). The maintenance of own authority demands that 
member states go along with this argument. In fact, the Directive’s opponents 
never openly admitted that they would prefer an unregulated status quo, 
although their behavior provides strong support to this presumption.  
Second, healthcare policy-making on the EU level is accompanied by 
very high degree of uncertainty. The future magnitude of patient mobility 
cannot be accurately predicted, because individual behavior in this sensitive 
area depends on numerous factors ranging from social status to values. For the 
time being, it is not apparent what the material costs and benefits of facilitated 
patient mobility will be for EU member states, since both inflow and outflow of 
patients might pose problems and all EU countries are potentially confronted 
                                                          
146  The Presidencies additionally argued that the omission of healthcare services from 
the Services Directive has left a grey area to be filled. MEPs stressed that through 
Directives like this one, Europe is “doing something” for EU citizens (Agence 
Europe, 30.09.2008). Interview, Permanent Representation of Sweden to the 
European Union, 20.10.2010; Interview, former employee of the Permanent 
Representation of France to the European Union. 
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with both dynamics. In the PMD, typical zero-sum conflicts, such as 
redistribution or regulatory competition, were not apparent. The situation was 
aggravated by the fact that health remains a new topic for national EU-
politicians and the EU a new topic for national health policy-makers. In 
general, these policy characteristics favor “integration by stealth” (Majone 
2005). In our specific case, they might have skewed the bargaining process 
towards achieving a legislative decision. 
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7 Drawing Lessons – Refining the 
Explanation 
 
 
This chapter reflects upon the case study findings, tying them up to the process-
centered explanation of the Council’s post-Enlargement legislative robustness as 
developed earlier in the book. The cases provide similar insights on the core 
elements of the theoretical framework, from the new member states’ bargaining 
performance to the role of the Presidency in efficiency promotion. In contrast, the 
cases differ with regard to politicization and the preference constellations among 
the largest member states. I argue that these two differences do not contradict 
my claim about the secondary role of enlarged membership and of CEE countries 
for the legislative dynamics within the Council. While both cases demonstrate 
that the Council is an internally differentiated institution, driven by asymmetries 
and fragmentation, it remains unclear what the crucial difference among 
member states is: their ability to get their policy interests across or their 
ambition to shape EU-level policies. The distinction between ability and ambition 
is relevant for the enlarged Council, because these two explanations yield 
different predictions on CEEs’ future bargaining behavior. While abilities can be 
enhanced by learning, ambitions are unlikely to change. The last section argues 
that more research on the domestic processes of preference and salience 
formation is needed to advance our understanding of these two notions and their 
relationship.  
 
7.1 Synthesis of the case study findings 
What are the major lessons to be drawn from the case studies about the 
negotiation dynamics in the enlarged Council? In both analyzed dossiers, the 
Eastern Enlargement visibly affected the structure of the Council conflict. The 
new member states from Central Eastern Europe proclaimed shared “bloc” 
policy preferences. Furthermore, they positioned themselves alongside the 
familiar conflict lines, harmonization and regulation, known from pre-
Enlargement analyses of the Council’s political space. These lines have been 
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traditionally occupied by alliances of Northern and Southern member states. 
Our cases confirm that this dualism persists and is now supplemented by a 
variable Eastern bloc.  
Both the Working Time Directive (WTD) as well as the Patient Mobility 
Directive (PMD) revealed a contrast between the conflict structure, which was 
clearly affected by the Eastern Enlargement, and the dynamics of Council 
negotiations, where the impact of enlarged membership and of the new 
member states was much less discernible and ambiguous, at best. The detailed, 
sequence- and interaction sensitive analysis of the legislative process revealed 
that, although CEE governments took bloc-like positions, signaled salience, 
participated in relevant coalitions and did not shy away from casting votes, 
they were not the drivers of the legislative dynamics. Rather, they went with 
the negotiation flows initiated and controlled by other players, such as the 
large member states or the Presidency. If anything, the Eastern Enlargement 
only aggravated bargaining dynamics, which would have most likely been set 
in motion anyway. It appears that enlarged membership is reflected in Council 
politics to a much lesser extent than it is in the positional structure of the 
decision situations. This observation – common for both cases - lends 
plausibility to the analytical reasoning outlined at the very beginning of the 
book. In the first three chapters, I argued that the absorption of the Eastern 
Enlargement should not be reduced to the question where the new member 
states are positioned in the (aggregate) conflict structure relatively to the old 
members, but that it is the process within the Council – the interactions 
between the countries and how these are channeled by the procedures – 
where the effects of large numbers and diversity are cushioned.   
7.1.1 The key observations  
The case studies offered four main insights on what happened with the 
enlarged membership on the long way from the formal opening of the Council 
negotiations until member states achieved political agreement through the 
vote. Firstly, the new member states from Central Eastern Europe faced severe 
problems defining their policy interests, explaining them coherently and 
putting them across the legislative arena. The late timing of position formation, 
uncertainty about the domestic implications of EU policies, lacking policy 
knowledge or late discovery of salience prevented these countries from 
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autonomous and persuasive interventions in the policy-making process. In the 
WTD, this led to CEEs’ policy positions being exogenously- rather than 
endogenously-driven. The manifest liberalism of the newcomers was more 
strongly linked to the mobilization efforts by the UK, than to the domestic 
process of preference formation, as the latter was characterized by uncertainty 
what to do. In the PMD, the newcomers had quite distinct domestically-derived 
policy preferences, characterized by the hostility towards the project and the 
worry about the non-contracted providers being included in the Directive’s 
scope. However, they failed to translate these preferences into compelling and 
well-grounded bargaining positions. In both cases, CEEs lacked domestic policy 
input as well as the domestic engagement with the relevant issues to capitalize 
upon when entering the EU-level legislative arena.  
The new member states’ deficiencies in formulating and advancing own 
policy interests had implications for the collective dynamics within the Council, 
such as coalition processes or the management of the negotiations by the 
Council Presidency. CEEs compensated their limited capacity to craft individual 
bargaining strategies through subscribing to established member states’ 
positions and blending into their negotiation tactics. In both analyzed cases, 
alignments of considerable size between old and new member states emerged: 
In the WTD an alliance between the UK, Germany and the CEEs, in the PMD one 
between Spain, Portugal, Italy and the CEEs. Nonetheless, how these alliances 
ultimately shaped the negotiations and the extent to which they achieved their 
negotiation objectives was highly dependent on the resources and strategies 
that the respective initiators were willing and able to employ. Thus, the second 
important observation about the post-Enlargement Council is that member 
states with high mobilization capacities – those that can intervene on behalf of 
a group – are empowered by enlarged membership, because they benefit from 
fellowship of CEE countries.  
Thirdly, while large member states, such as the UK or Germany, seem to 
have benefited from the Eastern Enlargement, size appears as a necessary, but 
not a sufficient condition for member states’ control over the legislative 
process. Early preparation of the bargaining activity and anticipating and 
including others in own strategic choices, boost member states’ chance to 
transform their numerical voting power into legislative influence.  
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Finally, the decision-making in the Council has an in-built asymmetry in 
that the policy decisions taken within the first few months crucially affect 
further legislative work. The “path dependency” of the legislative dynamics is a 
by-product of the Council Chairmanship. While early Presidencies do not shy 
away from amendments of the proposal – if that is what promises to advance 
the dossier, the subsequent ones proceed incrementally and draw upon the 
predecessors’ achievements.   
The new member states’ constrained ability to produce their own 
legislative contributions turns these countries into amplifiers of old member 
states’ bargaining behavior rather than a powerful coalition capable of shifting 
the decision-making process in their preferred direction. Accordingly, the 
ultimate drivers of Council politics have remained unaffected by the Eastern 
Enlargement. In both case studies, old, large member states, such as the UK, 
Germany, France and Spain provided the most significant input into the 
legislative process and largely controlled the bargaining dynamics. 
Consequently, an EU that has managed to secure a legislative decision despite a 
disagreement among the largest member states has a good chance of 
overcoming conflicts among 25 members. This is all the more true as the 
Presidencies’ brokerage techniques have an even greater efficiency leverage 
when applied in a larger environment.  
7.1.2 Differences between cases and what we learn from them 
The WTD and the PMD originated from the most encompassing policy 
area the EU legislates on, the regulatory policy. The dossiers dealt with rules 
(labor market, health systems) and rights (internal market), as well as with 
questions related to state’ intervention (as opposed to individual freedom) and 
national competences (as opposed to EU-level harmonization). The cases 
represented a certain type of Council politics, namely instances of antagonistic, 
symmetrically distributed preferences, high conflict and salience, understood a 
priori as a potential for all governments to become interested and involved in 
the legislative negotiations.  
While it is important to stress the similarity of insights the two cases 
provided on new member states’ agency, the coalition dynamics and the 
management of conflict, it is also interesting to ask about the differences they 
reveal. Indeed, the negotiations on the WTD and the PMD differed on three 
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dimensions: the intensity of the policy conflict, the politicization and the 
preference constellation among the largest member states. I argue that these 
differences lend further plausibility to the claim of limited impact of the 
Eastern Enlargement on the Council’s legislative performance and internal 
dynamics. The intensity of contestation along the left-right dimension does not 
directly depend on the number or identity of group members. Furthermore, 
the apparently pivotal status of preference alignment between Germany, 
France and the UK only supports my presumption that member states exercise 
highly unequal influence on the bargaining process. 
7.1.2.1 Conflict intensity 
The WTD generated a more severe conflict among member states than 
the PMD, although both dossiers match several criteria of “conflictive” policy-
making147. In fact, the former came much closer to legislative paralysis than the 
latter. While the WTD spent in the Council 45 months (2,7 of the average148), 
the PMD needed “only” 23 months to become agreed (1,4 of the average). A 
package deal was necessary to reach agreement on the Working Time, while no 
such operation was needed in the Patient Mobility case. Finally, the WTD 
ultimately failed in the inter-institutional legislative deliberation between the 
Council and the EP. The disparity of positions between the Council majority 
and the EP majority, which accounts for this failure, had been also present in 
the legislative bargaining within the Council, although the latter was ultimately 
able to deliver the political agreement. Plausibly, the variance of the conflict 
intensity could relate to one or both remaining differences between the 
dossiers, politicization and preference configuration among the largest 
member states.  
7.1.2.2 Politicization 
Politicization means that increasingly polarized opinions, interest or 
values are publicly advanced towards the process of policy formulation (De 
                                                          
147   There is no universally accepted measure of conflict in the Council of Ministers. 
Clearly, both dossiers analyzed here were conflictive. The distribution of policy 
preferences was antagonistic and regionally structured, as the geographical blocs 
of member states (North, South and East) advocated different positions. In both 
cases, the number of outvoted countries exceled the Council average of three 
negative votes (Plechanovová 2011: 91), as four delegations denied their support 
in the Patient Mobility case and five rejected the Council agreement on the 
Working Time Directive. 
148  Median of 500 days for a directive (Hertz and Leuffen 2011: 199).  
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Wilde 2011: 572). In the practice of EU politics, this often includes the 
involvement of competitive party politics in response to the demands of mass 
public or other constituencies (Magnette and Papadopoulos 2008: 5).  
The WTD differed from the PMD in that it became politicized along the 
left-right dimension149. Social-democratic parties and trade unions became 
interested in the WTD, because the EU-wide working time limit of 48 hours per 
week was seen as a social counterweight to an otherwise business-friendly 
orientation of the European integration project150. The revision of the Directive 
in mid-2000s became for these actors yet another occasion to demonstrate 
their commitment to the idea of social Europe151.  
Without entering into details of this aspect of the policy-making 
process, the case study revealed that this occasion has been seized: by trade 
unions, by the socialist group within the European Parliament152, by social-
democratic governments of Spain, Italy and Belgium (Almeida 2012: 131-132) 
as well as by the French government and Presidency, who ever since 2005 had 
been challenged domestically by the Parti Socialiste about the neo-liberal 
direction in which the EU integration is heading (Crespy 2010: 1261-1265). 
The politicization, which also included extensive media coverage on this 
Directive, can explain why the progress of the negotiations in the Council was 
hampered by “non-negotiable positions of principle”, such as represented by 
Spain or the United Kingdom, or occasional hardening or softening of 
governments’ positions, such as in the French case. The politicization of the 
opt-out issue effectively countered the main motivation to conclude the 
                                                          
149  This is quite rare in the Council. Ministers are seen as guided by “national 
interests” – technical or economic in nature, rather than by political ideas. Only 
few empirical studies find the influence of the competitive left-rights dynamics in 
the Council of Ministers (Aspinwall 2006; Hagemann and Hoyland 2008).  
150  This is, in fact, the genesis of the 1992 Working Time Directive. In addition, in 
several EU countries, such as France, Ireland or Italy, the implementation of the 
Directive was part of the social-democratic labour market reforms in the late-
1990s, in line with the idea that diminution of working hours might contribute to 
unemployment reduction (Falkner 2005: 103-110). The history of the dossier 
certainly contributed to its symbolic character too. In particular, as the opt-out has 
been introduced as a temporary exception at UK’s wish, later demands to make it a 
permanent institution might have appeared unfair to those countries which, back 
in the 1990s, made this concession.  
151  In the mid-2000s, following the Services Directive and the Constitutional Treaty, 
the Working Time Directive became a representative of wider debates on social 
versus liberal Europe (Dimitrakopoulos 2013; Statham and Trenz 2013: 970-977).  
152  Almeida notes that the Socialist Group within the EP has voted rather coherently 
on this issue, British Labour MEPs including. Only Greek PASOK MEPs differed 
from the majority of their Socialist colleagues (Almeida 2012: 131).  
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legislative process, namely the wish of all EU governments to “correct” ECJ’s 
interpretation of on-call time as working time.  
Most countries attached higher salience to the redefinition of the on-call 
time and the introduction of the “inactive on-call time”-notion, than to the opt-
out issue. We know this thanks to the recently released DEU data set, for which 
experts and participants had been a posteriori interviewed about their issue 
positions and the salience (Thomson et al. 2012). Only Spain, Estonia and the 
UK attached the same salience (80/100, 90/100 and 90/100 respectively) to 
both issues153. The salience distribution would suggest that governments 
should prefer solving the on-call problem instead of letting the opt-out issue 
paralyze the negotiations. However, the politicization has pushed the latter in 
the foreground of the decision-making process and can account for conflict 
entrenchment and several months of blockage in the Council.  
The PMD had also been described as highly salient by the interviewees. 
The dossier had been anticipated and the long duration of the drafting process 
within the Commission already suggested that significant regulatory 
challenges would emerge at the Council’s negotiation table (EUobserver, 
19.12.2007). However, politicization along left-right dimension was missing 
here. After the exclusion of health services from the Services Directive, the EP 
positioned itself as a supporter of a Healthcare Directive, perceiving an 
opportunity for patients’ equality and freedom to become strengthened by EU 
rules (EUobserver, 23.05.07). Subtle signs of a left-right conflict within the EP 
appeared later on, when Green and far-Left MEPs voted against the proposal 
on the grounds that it would only benefit wealthy citizens (EUobserver, 
23.04.09).  
Although the arguments made in the Council by Southern and Eastern 
delegations sometimes invoked the notion of solidarity with poorer citizens 
being the fundament of public healthcare systems, it was rather unclear how 
these calls related to the Directive’s wording. To put it bluntly, Council debates 
in the Patient Mobility case were about interpreting the case law, rather than 
about the presence or absence of a “simple” provision, like in the WTD. This 
might be one reason for missing politicization. The other reason could have 
been that, according to Eurostat, more than 50% of European citizens would be 
                                                          
153  The data is available under http://www.robertthomson.info/research/resolving-
controversy-in-the-eu [21.08.2013].  
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willing to travel to another country to receive medical treatment 
(Eurobarometer 2007: 5). If presented to the broader public, the Directive 
would have presumably enjoyed popular support.  
7.1.2.3 Preference configuration among the largest member states 
The remaining significant difference between the two cases refers to 
the preference configuration among the six largest member states, namely 
Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain and Poland154. The WTD 
witnessed an almost symmetric distribution of the large countries on the 
opposite sides of the policy conflict, whereby Germany, the UK and Poland 
supported the opt-out and France, Spain and Italy opposed it. In the PMD, there 
was also a three-against-three division, although this time the European North 
– Germany, France and the UK – advocated shared preferences for constrained 
codification, whereas the South-East had quite deep difficulties accepting 
internal market law being applied to the domestic healthcare systems.  
Can it be that the constellation of member states, independently of the 
power equivalence between the “camps”, shapes the likelihood of a dossier to 
pass the Council? Indeed, a blunt conclusion to be drawn from our two cases is 
that once there is preference convergence among the large Northern European 
countries, there is a good chance for the Council of 25 members to succeed in 
passing legislation. Clearly, two legislative cases represent an extremely 
narrow empirical base to make such a bold claim. However, there are further 
empirical observations that lend plausibility to this conclusion.  
In his widely acknowledged book, Moravcsik has argued that the large 
stations of the EU integration project can be explained by the preference 
convergence between Germany, France and the UK (Moravcsik 1998). Börzel 
has shown – albeit with no explicit reference to the countries’ size – that once 
the Northern EU countries push for an EU-level decision and exercise policy-
leadership, the South can hardly prevent law adoption (Börzel 2002)155. 
Finally, in her expert interview-based inquiry about the different power 
dimensions in the Council, Bailer found that the “overall power” of similarly 
large delegations is assessed strikingly differently: while the scores of UK, 
                                                          
154  Size is defined here as the number of votes each of these countries hold: 29 votes 
for DE, UK, FR and IT, 27 votes for ES and PL. 
155  Similar findings provided by Genschel (2002) in his analysis of EU taxation 
policies.  
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France and Germany were around 90, Spain scored 75 and Italy only 70 (Bailer 
2006: 366).  
The French-German-British constellation shows up in Plechanovová’s 
analysis of voting patterns in the enlarged Council. She argues that a core-
periphery dynamics operates in the Council, whereby a supportive “core” 
exercises centripetal effects on those “peripheral” actors who are prone to 
contest a decision (Plechanovová 2011: 102-104). Before Enlargement, the 
“core” cluster156, which included France, Germany and the UK, exceeded the 
qualitative majority (QM) requirements by ten votes. This means that any of 
these large countries might not have been needed to approve a proposal 
(Plechanovová 2011: 103). After Enlargement, the most probable positive 
coalition no longer includes the UK and lacks 26 votes to reach the QM. The 
probability of a contested legislative act to pass QMV now depends on more 
frequent naysayers joining the core cluster. This might be Poland, Spain or the 
UK or a combination of the smaller countries who find themselves outside of 
the core, namely Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Czech Republic, the Netherlands 
and Lithuania (Plechanovová 2011: 95). While agreeing on a dossier without 
Germany, France and the UK being on the same side is possible, Plechanovová’s 
findings suggest that the position of the UK in relation to France and Germany 
is now more critical for the chance of a winning coalition to emerge than prior 
to the Enlargement. 
What all these findings subtly point at is the “oligarchization” of the 
enlarged Council. The “iron law of oligarchy” presumes that, once a group 
becomes larger, the demand for leadership grows and can only be satisfied by 
the “few”. Consequently, some actors accumulate more influence than others 
(Michels 1962 quoted after Bailer et al. 2009: 165). From this perspective, the 
impact of Enlargement on a group is that it deepens and aggravates the 
functional differentiation among the group members.  
The “oligarchization” hypothesis is compatible with the analytical 
reasoning this project relies on. In the literature review, I expressed strong 
skepticism about the assumptions of member states’ uniformity and equality, 
as embodied in the “cooperative culture” approach. The argument advanced in 
Chapter 3 postulated that CEE countries will deliver a distinct bargaining 
                                                          
156  The core cluster in the analysis of Council voting represents the group of countries 
which most often agree, i.e. vote in the same way (most probable coalition).   
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performance when co-deciding EU policies. Pointing at the likelihood of the 
Central Eastern European member states experiencing shortcomings in 
defining and advancing their policy interests, I expected a limited (direct) 
impact of these countries on the negotiation process. I supported this 
expectation with information we have on executive administration in Central 
Eastern Europe and interest group coverage, both important pre-requisites of 
shaping supranational policy-making.  
The case studies confirmed that administration as well as stakeholders’ 
involvement matter for how countries negotiate EU law. Evidently, these two 
constituted a handicap of the new member states. However, the sketchy 
comparison of domestic engagement with EU affairs among selected Eastern, 
Northern and Southern member states, which the case studies also included, 
suggested that EU-level legislative agency comprises more than simply the 
ability to formulate a position; rather, it is shaped by more complex factors 
than merely the professionalism of the public service and the presence of 
relevant interest groups. Going beyond ability leads us to the notion of 
ambition (Kassim 2000: 243-254). Whereas the theoretical framework of this 
project explicitly targeted the question of ability, ambition to shape policies 
pro-actively might also play a role for how (CEE) countries practice their EU 
membership and their performance in the Council of Ministers. In the 
following section, I argue that differentiating between the two has implications 
for the time horizon of the project’s findings, particularly concerning the 
question of whether learning effects inherent to EU membership will increase 
CEEs’ impact on EU-level policy formulation. Furthermore, I examine the 
empirical evidence pertinent to EU-related ambitions of the new member 
states.   
7.2 Refining the agency-based argument: Ability versus 
ambition 
Is CEEs modest contribution to Council politics a question of lacking 
ability or lacking ambition? The distinction between ability and ambition was 
introduced sketchily by Kassim and colleagues, along the way of mapping and 
explaining the diversity of coordination structures in EU member states 
(Kassim et al. 2000; Kassim et al. 2001). The authors argued that the sources of 
national variations in abilities and ambitions for making EU-level policies 
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include the administrative and political opportunity structures as well as 
values related to the exercise of public power and domestic perceptions of the 
EU (Kassim 2000: 250). Arguably, administrative and political opportunity 
structures come very close to the notion of ability, as they directly concern 
those parts of the domestic polity that directly prepares negotiation positions 
for the Council delegations. In turn, national policy styles and attitudes 
towards the EU dive deep into the world of domestic politics and relate rather 
to ambitions. The missing ability to put forward a negotiation position might 
be transitory. Individuals in administration, interest intermediation and 
government, who are central in the process of position formulation, reflect the 
successes and failures. They can learn. In contrast, ambitions will only change 
very slowly, as values and conceptions of public authority or the country’s role 
in a broader political context, are deeply enrooted in culture, history as well as 
in economic and political structures.  
7.2.1 Missing ability? CEEs’ prospects to learn legislative influence 
The notion that civil servants who work in Brussels gradually change 
both their attitudes and their actions when regularly exposed to collective 
legislative work with colleagues from other EU countries is a famous argument 
in EU studies (Lewis 2003; Beyers 2005; Checkel 2005; Zürn and Checkel 
2005)157. Therefore, we can plausibly assume that the individuals responsible 
for a country’s legislative actions learn, which might have a positive impact on 
the country’s ability to maneuver in the EU’s legislative system. Consequently, 
as time passes national delegations might become more effective in advancing 
their interests and thus have greater impact on Council politics.  
What kind of learning effects can the length of EU membership trigger 
in CEE countries and to what extent can we expect a change in their bargaining 
agency over time? I argue that three elements of legislative behavior can be 
directly influenced by individuals, such as Brussels-based staff or top-level civil 
servants: the information flow about upcoming legislative initiatives, group 
coherence when aligning with other CEEs and the recourse to recorded 
discontent.  
                                                          
157  How far these changes go and whether they cause a shift from national towards 
European loyalty, is not yet clear (Lewis 2005; Lewis 2008b). 
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As time passes, CEEs Brussels-based civil servants will expand their 
networks within EU institutions. On this way, they are likely to be better 
informed about upcoming policy initiatives and can pass this information on to 
the domestic arena. With this part of CEEs’ bargaining agency becoming more 
efficient, the domestic administration and stakeholders will have more time to 
prepare negotiation positions and bargaining strategies.  
The reasons to expect more group coherence among CEEs are twofold. 
First, coherent appearance is a matter of coordination among delegations and 
this is what Brussels-based staff usually does. The better CEE staff know each 
other, the higher the chances that network resources will be effectively 
exploited. Second, interviewees for this project often mentioned that Southern 
member states were much better at establishing a “collective appearance” than 
the CEEs158. Given that cultural and historical similarities to draw upon are 
present in both regions (Beyers and Dierickx 1998; Naurin and Lindahl 2008), 
only the duration of EU membership sets these groups apart. Arguably, with 
the CEE region being more fragmented than the EU South, collective action 
might be more difficult to achieve.  
The final change of behavior, which the enduring EU membership 
already seems to have triggered, is a more assertive usage of negative votes. 
While the new member states have casted relatively few negative votes or 
abstentions in early days of their EU membership, the numbers started to grow 
slightly some two years after accession (Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse 
2007: 17-19). Presumably, the new member states understood that casting a 
negative vote is a perfectly legitimate expression of own standing in the 
Council, when vital national interests are at stake. One exception to this pattern 
was Poland, whose behavior has been described by Council practitioners as 
disturbing the established practices (Novak 2013: 8). Council participants, 
interviewed by Novak, made clear that Poland differed from other member 
states in the way it expressed dissatisfaction: It pointed to “vital interests” too 
often, was too explicit about its intend to vote “no”, announced this too late and 
in wrong moments (Novak 2013: 8, 11). Meanwhile Poland’s rates of recorded 
                                                          
158  Interview, Council General Secretariat, 19.10.2010; Interview, Permanent 
Representation of Slovenia, 25.11.2010; Interview, Member of the Dutch 
Permanent Representation and the Presidency Team, 26.10.2011. Interview, 
former employee of the Permanent Representation of France to the European 
Union, 15.12.2010.   
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disagreement have declined, which could be interpreted as a sign of 
learning159.  
Can these three effects increase the quality and impact of CEEs’ 
legislative contributions? There are good reasons for skepticism, the first of 
which relates to the likelihood of these learning effects. One condition for 
learning is a sufficiently long appointment of Brussels officials (Beyers 2005: 
921). However, precisely the discontinuity of staff was one of the major 
problems of CEE countries in the first years of their EU membership160 
(Puetter 2008: 487). Furthermore, for reasons related to group size, CEE 
countries only gain the opportunity to assume the rotating Council Presidency 
later in their membership and less frequently than their older counterparts. 
Yet, country literature suggests that chairing the Council is an important 
component of a country’s “apprenticeship” in the European Union (Laffan and 
O'Mahony 2008: 60-77).  
The second reason for skepticism relates to the question what part of 
the complex phenomenon of legislative agency do the three elements discussed 
above actually cover? Arguably, efficient information flows, an ability to create 
a coherent group appearance and the assertiveness when voting are important 
tools for exercising more influence in Brussels. Nonetheless, for tools to be 
used, goal orientation, motivation and conviction are necessary. These are 
generated within the domestic rather than the Brussels-based national 
apparatus and seem to involve bottom-up rather than top-down dynamics. In 
fact, timely, specific, structured and extensively argued negotiation positions 
represent a conditio sine qua non of effective participation in Council decision-
making process. For these to be produced, a high level of responsiveness of 
domestic policy-makers towards EU-related issues is needed, involving an 
interplay of attention, expertise and coordination.  
Finally, the already differentiated landscape of policy positions in the 
European Union might provide a disincentive for the newcomers to develop 
their own policy input. This is where my argument meets with Thomson’s 
                                                          
159  In Plechanovova’s dataset (2004-2006) Poland ranks fourth, behind Sweden, 
Denmark and Ireland, just before the UK, Germany and the Netherlands 
(Plechanovová 2011: 92). VoteWatch has collected more recent data (2009-2012). 
Here, Poland ranks seventh after UK, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Portugal (VoteWatch Europe 2012: 12).  
160  Puetter notes that this was partly due to the lack of qualified staff, partly to 
political appointments by changing governments (Puetter 2008: 487). 
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observation on the EU’s conflict structure. There is already a great deal of 
policy contestation in the European Union (Thomson et al. 2004; Thomson 
2009). Why should the newcomers bother evaluating Commission’s proposals 
thoroughly on their own, when there are diverse policy positions already 
available? As our case studies have shown, aligning with large, old and 
resourceful member states can serve as a perfectly rational bargaining 
strategy, as it not only shortens the process of position formation but also 
makes negotiations more predictable. Subscribing to the positions of others 
will remain an attractive bargaining strategy as long as there is no domestic 
critical feedback about the choices that CEE governments make in Brussels.  
7.2.2 Missing ambition? CEEs’ policy passivity as a structural problem 
In both cases analyzed in this thesis, the lack of domestic engagement 
with EU-level policies inhibited the CEE countries from making autonomous 
and effective contributions to the Council’s legislative process. Interestingly, 
this poor domestic engagement did not prevent CEE governments from 
attaching high salience to the dossiers at stake, i.e. from recognizing them as 
important. Note that in large-n Council studies and in formal modeling, 
salience is crucial in understanding member states’ bargaining success 
(Arregui and Thomson 2009; Cross 2013). 
For the WTD, expert assessment of issue salience for every EU member 
state is available from the recently released DEU data set161. According to this 
data, the issue of on-call time definition was highly salient for new and old 
member states alike and the opt-out issue enjoyed medium salience levels in 
all member states with the exception of France, the UK, Spain, Estonia, Italy 
and Malta. While standardized salience data is not available for the PMD, we 
can infer the salience from the negotiation behavior of CEE countries. The 
more advanced the negotiations, the more involvement CEE countries showed 
in making proposals (Poland, Hungary) and ultimately voting against the 
Directive (Poland, Slovakia). This type of behavior would suggest that the 
dossier was salient to those countries, although salience has potentially not 
been realized from the very beginning of the process. In sum, CEE governments 
might find EU-level policy issues important, but nonetheless lack domestic 
                                                          
161  The data is available under http://www.robertthomson.info/research/resolving-
controversy-in-the-eu [21.08.2013]. 
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policy engagement, which subsequently prevents them from contributing to 
the Council policy process.  
Apart from acute bargaining situations in the Council, CEE policy-
makers seem to ignore the substance of EU-level regulatory policies and 
neglect their potential impact. Potentially, what characterizes CEEs as Council 
participants is a modest policy ambition and not just constrained ability? 
Drawing on the framework sketched by Kassim and colleagues (Kassim 2000: 
250-251), one can see policy ambition as shaped by attitudes towards EU 
membership (pragmatic or symbolic, offensive or defensive, policy-selective or 
holistic) as well as by the domestic style of policy-making (active or reactive; 
positive action or disasters prevention; impositional or consensual). Given the 
complexity of this topic, I will provide only few empirical observations 
showing that CEEs EU-related policy ambitions might indeed by distinct for 
historical and economic reasons. 
The way in which member states practice their EU membership 
depends on how the respective political elites answer the question “what is 
Europe for?” (Bulmer 1983: 350; Copsey and Haughton 2009: 284). The 
literature about the origins and drivers of the Eastern Enlargement 
demonstrates that CEE countries demanded accession because they were 
committed to liberal democratic values and because they hoped for financial 
assistance and economic modernization driven by foreign direct investment 
(Mattli and Plümper 2002: 557-558). This appears quite distinct to the 
motivations of the EU’s founding fathers, whose primary objective was to 
retain strong state control over the expanding industrial and agricultural 
markets (Milward 1992: Ch. 4; Moravcsik 1995: 126). For CEE countries, EU 
accession served as a finale of transition – a historical change of political and 
economic regime and a “return to Europe” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2002: 520). Moreover, there was also a geopolitical dimension to it. EU 
membership assured that CEE countries are free from political influence by 
Russia as a successor of the Soviet Union. This factor presumably explains such 
vivid interests of CEE elites in EU’s Eastern policies.  
 A recent study examining the activities of Polish MEPs supports the 
claim that EU-related policy interests of CEE elites are rather selective. The 
study finds that Poles are overrepresented in EP committees dealing with 
foreign policy or budget, although these are areas of quite limited impact of the 
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EP, whereas they are underrepresented in politically more influential 
committees working on environment, health, international trade, justice and 
home affairs, economic and monetary affairs, financial crisis and constitutional 
affairs (Szczepanik and Kucharczyk 2012: 17)162.  
Turning to policy-making and policy style in CEE, we find the famous 
“dead letter” hypothesis advanced by Falkner and colleagues in research on EU 
law implementation. Having observed a “gap between the law on the books 
and the practice on the ground”, they claim that despite correct and timely 
transposition of EU Directives, the latter are not systematically applied and 
lack effective enforcement mechanisms (Falkner and Treib 2008: 303). This 
suggests that CEE policy-makers might pay only limited attention to the 
societal outcomes produced by public policies.  
Some observers of Central Eastern European politics go much further, 
arguing that it was precisely the process of EU accession that deprived political 
competition in CEE its substantial significance. Because CEE countries had to 
swallow the EU’s regulatory model in the form of the acquis communaitaire, 
important debates about core issues of public policy, such as the function and 
form of state action, were pushed aside (Grzymalala-Busse and Innes 2003: 
71). Since no political party assumed accountability for the policy outcomes, 
substantial conflicts, such as those around which Western party systems 
evolved, have been vanished from the electoral competition (Innes 2002: 102). 
Today’s consequence is that issues related to market regulation fail to attract 
and mobilize CEE policy-makers (Rybář 2011: 166).  
Finally, scholars of comparative political economy argue that the 
primary nexus of economic decision-making in CEE is located outside the 
domestic polities (Orenstein 2010: 1). Following the “varieties of capitalism” 
framework163, CEE countries have been characterized as “dependent market 
economies”, because foreign ownership dominates the export-oriented 
branches of the economies, such as automobiles, manufacturing and 
                                                          
162  Polish MEPs’ priority issues were Eastern Neighbourhood, energy security, EU 
budget and climate policy, whereas they have pushed for a more extensive EU-
level policy in the first three and took a more defensive stance in the latter 
(Szczepanik and Kucharczyk 2012: 5-7). 
163  The framework differentiates between liberal and coordinated market economies, 
whereas in the former the relationships between factors of production are fluid, 
short-term and competitive, in the latter these relationships are institutionalized, 
long-term and cooperative (Hall and Soskice 2001).  
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electronics; the same is true for the banking and insurance sector (Nölke and 
Vliegenthart 2009: 681). Selective case study evidence suggests that some 
aspects of economic policies in CEE – such as taxation – are directly negotiated 
between the governments and the investors (Bohle and Husz 2005: 92-93). Of 
course, dependency on foreign capital does not have uniform, automatic 
consequences on the domestic policy-making across the region (Bohle and 
Greskovits 2012). However, one could infer from the dependency-hypothesis 
that CEEs might not be fully sovereign in or, at least, lack a tradition of 
sovereign economic policy-making. Expecting that countries that have been 
historically constrained in their policy choices will actively shape 
supranational regulatory regimes would thus involve placing too great 
demands upon them.  
7.3 Suggestions for future research 
Is the smooth legislative work of the enlarged Council of Ministers a 
transitory phenomenon, as the new member states from Central Eastern 
Europe need yet to build up the ability of advancing their interests more 
assertively? Alternatively, did a set a countries join the European Union that - 
for reasons related to political traditions and economic structures - do not 
attach great ambitions to shaping the supranational regulatory regimes? The 
distinction is tempting, as it paves the way for different predictions. Compared 
to abilities, ambitions are less likely, although not impossible, to change over 
time. Unfortunately, the case studies presented in this book did not offer 
sufficient empirical information to differentiate between the two explanations. 
The initial intention of the analysis was to show the pathways of how 
individual legislative action – whether (in)capacity-, ambition- or indifference-
driven – translates into the collective dynamics that make the Council so 
robust and productive.  
The boundary between ability and ambition will possibly turn out 
rather blurry, as the two might be related. Where there is a will, there is a way, 
as conventional wisdom says. Furthermore, ability can drive and increase 
ambitions. This would hold for large, vote-rich countries in the first place, as 
they already hold one important resource for negotiation impact. Our 
understanding of EU member states’ abilities and ambitions as well as of the 
relationship between the two concepts could be enhanced in comparative 
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research on linkages between the domestic policy-making and EU 
membership.  
One research strategy could be to investigate the dynamics of interest 
intermediation, including the interplay between interest groups, governments 
and the public. It would be important to go beyond the mere description of the 
interest intermediation systems, rather considering what type of policy input 
interest groups generate (how representative is it?) and how this input affects 
the policy process. Do interest groups go public, do they mobilize and what 
difference does it make to governments’ actions? Conducting this type of cross-
country comparative inquiry in highly “Europeanized” policy fields, such as 
labor market, agriculture of justice and home affairs, would provide us with 
valuable information about the national policy styles. In turn, national policy 
styles matter for the notion of ambition, as countries with proactive and 
responsive policy styles are more likely to be influential on the EU level.  
Another possibility to inform the notion of ambition empirically would 
be to deepen our understanding of values associated with EU membership 
within the public spheres across Europe. Such inquiry – again preferably of 
comparative nature – would focus on patterns of political competition and 
encompass political parties and their communication, mass media and the 
public opinion. Arguably, linking this part of national polity to a governments’ 
performance in EU-level policy-making is much more challenging here than in 
the former research suggestion. However, as all EU member states are 
democracies, the public sphere constitutes an important context condition of 
government action both domestically and supranationally.  
 I argued in the literature review that factors of static nature, located on 
EU-level have played a prominent role in recent Council research, whereas 
bottom-up dynamic factors which would bring domestic politics back in have 
been neglected. For reasons mostly related to methodology, the “cooperative 
culture” managed to crowd out a debate about how individual resources and 
strategies, short the diversity of member states, affects the work of the 
enlarged Council. Helen Wallace, one of the most devoted observers of EU 
politics,  once warned against looking at the Eastern Enlargement through a 
narrow institutional lens and instead encouraged taking interconnections of 
diverse kinds into account (Wallace 1999; 2005). Following her perspective, 
this project has shown how domestically enrooted asymmetries between 
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member states and the internal differentiation of the Council they produce – 
not uniformity and equalization – make Council of Ministers what it is, a 
productive institution.   
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8 Conclusions  
 
This chapter restates the argument of the dissertation and discusses the 
contributions that the empirical findings make to broader debates. The puzzling 
legislative productivity of the Council of Ministers, despite the external shock of 
the Eastern Enlargement, has been shown to result from member states’ 
differential abilities and ambitions to channel their interests towards the 
negotiation arena. Agency effects were complemented by the leverage of the 
Presidency’s brokerage strategies. These findings demonstrate that the 
cooperative culture of reciprocal relations among member states, stressed in the 
existing Council literature, is not the only mechanism that moderates the impact 
of large numbers and diversity on Council decision-making. Despite limitations 
inherent to any research in the small-n tradition, the empirical findings 
presented here are relevant, as they contribute to our better understanding of 
member states’ legislative influence and the ways in which institutions shape 
intergovernmental interactions.  
8.1 Project synthesis 
How come such a major change in membership as the Eastern 
Enlargement did not affect the policy-making productivity of the EU Council of 
Ministers? Continuously high rates of legislative output and the lack of other 
visible signs of institutional inertia are puzzling for researchers and 
practitioners alike. Theoretical reasoning suggests that the larger a group, the 
more difficult it is to perform collective action and effectuate a change of the 
status quo (Olson 1965; De Witte 2002: 247; Tsebelis 2002; Tsebelis and 
Yataganas 2002: 304; Baldwin and Widgrén 2004; König and Bräuninger 2004: 
430). As for the practitioners of EU politics, they expected more intense policy 
conflicts as well as occasional demonstration of regional power, as the EU had 
been experiencing those after the Southern Enlargement (Verdun and Croci 
2007: 14-17). In fact, neither did the Council become less effective, nor have 
any other major problems in the conduct of the policy process been discovered 
so far.  
The purpose of this thesis was to expose the mechanisms of Council 
politics that enable this institution to cope with large numbers and 
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heterogeneity of member states, the latter being now exceptional in EU’s 
history. The argument, developed and tested in the present research, drew 
upon two key notions: member states’ capacities to contribute to EU’s policy-
making and the effects of procedures on member states’ interactions. These 
two factors have been only superficially dealt with in large-n, formal Council 
research, which has been developing rapidly in recent years. I argued that 
standardized data makes it very difficult to embrace the context sensitivity as 
well as the interaction elements inherent to negotiation behavior and 
institutional “shadows” upon collective dynamics.  
My study sought to demonstrate that Council politics is not solely 
driven by member states’ preferences, their distribution and the voting power 
involved, but that it is strongly shaped by the highly differentiated ways in 
which member states prepare and organize their legislative action. Because 
these differences are domestically enrooted and because they not necessarily 
correspond to salience differentials, the asymmetry of bargaining capacities 
appears constitutive for how the Council makes its decisions. Presumably, 
discrepancies of abilities and ambitions have been present in the EU already 
before the Eastern Enlargement. However, after 2004 they have deepened, as 
CEE countries exhibit structural predispositions to lower capabilities and their 
negotiation behavior has confirmed this hypothesis. Furthermore, as it became 
deeper and more encompassing, internal fragmentation of the Council is now 
more than ever likely to fuel directly and more explicitly into the legislative 
dynamics. The case studies demonstrated that asymmetries in position 
formation – broadly understood as the timing of involvement, the structure of 
interventions and the factual, argumentative support employed – not only 
influence individual member states’ chances to accommodate their interests, 
but also decisively shape the coalition dynamics. While representing a rational 
interaction for both more and less capable negotiators, mobilization-mimicry 
sequences - which are present in both case studies - provide the former with 
additional empowerment.  
Differentiated capabilities provide a fertile soil for collective dynamics, 
such as mobilization and mimicry, yet they do not produce robust legislative 
outcomes by themselves. Thus, I argued that procedures matter. The 
reputational costs of voting “no” became greater in a larger setting and 
blocking minorities are likely to be more fragile. Thus, the majority voting 
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system maintained its disciplining qualities. However, more importantly, the 
Presidency, guided by institutional interests, puts its powers and impressive 
strategic abilities to the service of the legislative progress. Since I have not 
provided a pre- and post-Enlargement comparison, I can only speculate that 
the Presidency’s readiness to play the role of a majority crafter, rather than the 
one of the honest broker, has increased. The fact that unanimity is less likely to 
be achieved with 27 or 28 member states only encourages the Presidency to 
make that shift.  
The Presidency’s assertiveness in pushing majority politics has an 
interesting by-product: path dependency of Council negotiations. Because 
future Chairs tend to stick to brokerage choices made by the predecessor, early 
months of negotiations are crucial, providing advantages to first movers. The 
argument makes a circle here, as path dependency is yet another example of 
asymmetry in post-Enlargement Council decision-making.  
8.2 Contributions of the study  
Having adopted a process- and politics-centered approach to the 
Enlargement puzzle, this study dealt with several aspects of Council politics: 
from country-level action to collective dynamics and conflict management. 
Consequently, the empirical findings speak to broader debates in EU research. 
In particular, I offer two theoretical and one methodological contribution. The 
theoretical contributions relate to the nature of member states interactions, in 
particular the question of legislative influence as well as to the practice of 
brokerage by the Council Presidency. The methodological innovation consists 
in an “instrumental” usage of case studies. Whereas process tracing had been 
most often used in EU studies to account for particular policy outcome, I have 
employed this technique to probe and refine my explanation of an institutional 
macro-phenomenon. 
8.2.1 Interactions in the Council 
Academic debates about the interactions within the Council of Ministers 
are, with all their theoretical and methodological diversity, characterized by a 
surprising degree of agreement. Most observers agree that consensual 
decision-making captures the inner workings of this legislative body best 
(Heisenberg 2005; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006: Ch. 11; Thomson 2011: 
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Ch. 7). Instead of engaging in rivalry, competition and open, hard-nosed 
conflict, national governments rather cooperate, make concessions and 
accommodate each other’s needs. The underlying reasons for this 
counterintuitive legislative behavior are not yet well understood and subject to 
diverse hypotheses. While some authors attribute consensus to norms and 
socialization (Checkel 2005; Heisenberg 2005; Lewis 2005), others claim that 
member states can afford mutual courtesy thanks to the certitude that their 
interests will be heard and respected when it really matters for them (Arregui 
and Thomson 2009; Thomson 2011; Veen 2011). Irrespective of the 
interpretation, consensual decision-making does not to leave much room for 
strategic, resource-based legislative behavior. No Council observer would 
probably neglect that these exist, but it seems that they do not belong to the 
constitutive features of the Council’s decision-making mode. 
The insights provided by this study encourage more skepticism about 
this “smooth and cozy” image of Council politics. Overly strong confidence 
about consensual practices within the Council obscures the internal 
differentiation of this institution, its fragmentation and asymmetries in how 
strongly both policy processes and the outcomes reflect the formal 
membership. The case studies analyzed in this book have demonstrated that 
member states differ strikingly with regard to the ambition, effectiveness and 
the impact with which they prosecute their interests during the Council’s 
bargaining game. Differences between effective, high impact member states 
and those less effective and less impact ones do not exclusively manifest 
themselves in explicit controversies that are won or lost by one side or 
another. The fragmentation of agency within the Council also shows in alliance 
formation, where low-impact member states subordinate their bargaining 
strategies to those of resourceful and more effective negotiators. The case 
studies drew a picture of an “oligarchic” institution in which bargaining choices 
of few pivotal players decisively structure the bargaining dynamics and thus 
reduce the complexity of the decision situation.  
What sets these “few” apart from the rest? With only two cases, I am not 
in the position to answer this question exhaustively. However, my results 
suggest that two factors leverage member states’ potential to make a complex 
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legislative process predictable: size and bargaining organization164. Certainly, 
large countries are natural “pivots” of enlarged Council’s negotiation activity. 
However, while size is an important, it is by no means a sufficient component 
of influence. Large countries count more, although they depend on coalitions to 
shape the policies substantially or eventually prevent decisions. While 
coalitions can emerge naturally, whereby countries with similar preferences 
may simply “compound”, they are more effective and more sustainable when 
organizational efforts such as mobilization and coordination have been 
invested (Nedegaard 2007). Large member states can transform their voting 
weight into legislative impact when they are proactive, search allies broadly 
across the entire Council spectrum and are willing to intervene in the name of 
the group. Organization matters in that early formed, specific and well-
explained preferences considerably boost the chances of bargaining success.  
My case studies provided several examples of large member states 
losing control over the bargaining dynamics or failing to have their positions 
accommodated. For instance, Spain and Italy punched below their weight in 
both dossiers. In the WTD, together with France, they underestimated the 
necessity to organize their “social” coalition early to defend the Commission’s 
proposal against the Dutch Presidency’s attempts to change it. With France 
fancying its own, independent bargaining strategy and Italy having changing 
governments (and policy positions), Spain was only able to continue carrying 
the social coalition thanks to the EP’s involvement. In the PMD, both countries 
clearly underestimated the substance of the case law and neglected the 
codification paradigm strongly favored by other member states, the Presidency 
and the Commission. With Poland, the assessment is not as easy. It clearly 
failed to shape the outcome of the PMD, sticking to the radical demand that 
went against the ECJ case law. In the WTD, Poland was on the winners’ side. 
However, the impact it had on the bargaining process was fully conditioned by 
the UK’s bargaining strategy. Besides, I argued that Poland’s domestic 
regulatory needs would have been satisfied with less radical demands. One 
                                                          
164  In line with Scharpf’s actor-centered institutionalist framework, an analytical tool 
often used in EU politics, one could label these two „power resources” and 
„strategy” (Scharpf 1997). I prefer the terms „size” and „organization” as they are 
more specific. Size relates to the number of votes member states hold in the 
Council, i.e. one very specific power resource. Organization relates to one 
particular aspect of strategy, namely the preparation of the bargaining activity – 
information gathering, position formation and position articulation. 
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could speculate that with a bargaining strategy closer to the actual domestic 
needs, Poland could have prevented an entrenched conflict paralyzing the 
Council for years. After all, getting the WTD revised was in the interests of all 
member states, including Poland and other CEE countries.  
The variation in member states’ approaches to organize their legislative 
activity revealed that non-negligible part of “Council politics” happens actually 
outside the Council both in the spatial and in the temporal sense. Member 
states gain information, develop positions and articulate them long before the 
formal negotiation process starts. Intensive interactions between the 
Commission, the member states and the Presidency take place on the agenda-
setting stage165. Anticipation and adaptation matter in Council politics, as they 
shape policy and strategy choices of member states and institutional players 
alike. These aspects should be taken into account in future systematic analyses 
on how the Council works 
The contribution of these observations is to raise attention to the 
subtlety, with which the games of national interests are played within the 
Council. The rivalry for policy influence does not necessarily take the form of a 
clash of opposing demands. In Council politics, switches are worked on the 
preparatory stage, through informal contacts with the institutional players or 
in intergovernmental interactions that escape a clear classification as 
adversarial (“hard”) or cooperative (“soft”). Member states which turned 
influential in our case studies often combined in their strategies threats with 
explanations as well as purposeful lobbying for own cause with more holistic 
engagement, keeping track of collective, shared interests pertinent to the inter-
institutional game. These are, of course, no new discoveries. However, if we 
acknowledge the subtlety of influence as a systematic feature of Council 
politics – and it seems systematic given the links between supranational 
influence and domestic underpinnings of agency - we need to rethink or at 
least further specify the notion of cooperation.  
 “Cooperation” serves as an explanation of the Council’s ability to 
overcome conflict. It makes strong, but apparently incorrect assumptions 
about both member states motivations as well as about Council processes. 
Voluntary and purposeful accommodation of mutual demands among member 
                                                          
165  We know from Diana Panke’s research that these informal contacts are practiced 
with different intensity by different member states and our cases studies confirm 
this (Panke 2012). 
Legislative dynamics and performance in the enlarged Council of Ministers 
212 
 
states can be challenged in the light of unequally distributed bargaining 
capacities and very different patterns of engagement with the supranational 
policy process. When member states realize their interest later in the 
bargaining process and are thus in a much weaker position to make EU-level 
policies reflect their preferences, we cannot speak about a fully sovereign 
choice of a bargaining strategy. The equalizing nature of the bargaining 
processes, which implies the same level of satisfaction with the overall 
outcomes across member states and policies, also seems a myth, although it 
cannot be refuted with only two cases. Observations supporting the skepticism 
include the determinacy of the Presidency to achieve legislative progress, 
irrespectively of the nature of counterarguments, as well as the diverse 
substantial weights of “policy concessions” member states obtain. While some 
shape a dossier thoroughly and co-edit entire articles, others secure selective 
or even symbolic provisions, which are just sufficient for them to formally 
agree and save face. It is difficult to believe that both will be equally satisfied 
with the negotiation outcomes.  
One could argue that my skepticism about equalization and uniformity 
has a strong methodological component, as I have studied the cases with all 
their complexity and followed member states’ actions step-by step to evaluate 
their impact. However, similar views have recently been voiced in Council 
studies using different methods. Golub ascertained that there are systematic 
differences in member states’ bargaining success, which cannot be fully 
explained by “static” factors such as voting power or network capital (Golub 
2012: 1296-1298). Furthermore, Novak demonstrated that what looks like 
consensual behavior and self-restraint might in reality be a strategy of blame 
avoidance (Novak 2013: 2-4). With non-opposition towards Council legislation, 
member states might simply express resignation, as opposed to certitude that 
their interests will be taken into account another time.  
Member states practice their EU membership differently and it is 
perfectly legitimate for them to do so. Nonetheless, it will be very enriching for 
research concerned with supranational legislative politics to further explore 
the internal fragmentation of the Council and integrate it in the key analytical 
concepts.  
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8.2.2 The practice of brokerage and legislative efficiency 
Beyond the question how member states’ perform as EU co-legislators, 
the case studies inquired how the diversity of demands, bargaining styles and 
strategies is managed by the Council Presidency. The underlying hypothesis 
was correct when attributing to the Chair a strong capacity to channel 
intergovernmental interactions with large numbers towards agreement. 
My findings speak to two major topics of the Presidency-literature: the 
Chair’s managerial activity (Tallberg 2004: 999) and the type of interest which 
the Presidency-holding countries pursue. Regarding the latter, there is a 
debate about the relationship between the presiding member state’s policy 
interests and the conduct of the Presidency. The state of the art in large-n 
research is that member states holding the Presidency have a chance to push 
the policy output closer to their preferences166 (Schalk et al. 2007; Thomson 
2008; Warntjen 2008). My study is not in a position to question this claim, but 
it suggests that a reverse mechanism also is possible, whereby member states 
holding the Presidency “manipulate” their own policy positions. Spain in the 
Patient Mobility Directive and Portugal in the Working Time Directive were 
ready to accept policy decisions they had previously been rejecting, after either 
minor substantial changes (PMD) or a strategic package deal (WTD). In 
addition, in both cases analyzed, the policy- and framing-decisions taken in the 
very beginning of the negotiations were in line with the presiding countries’ 
preferences. Both France (PMD) and the Netherlands (WTD) were very much 
in favor of EU legislative action in the relevant areas. Of course, this could 
result from sheer luck; however, it might also be that the timing of the formal 
release of Commission’s proposals was strategically chosen.  
However, and most importantly, my cases provide rich empirical 
backing for the claim that the Presidencies have strong institutional interests 
in legislative effectiveness and legislative progress. It is this attitude, which 
motivates the Presidencies to exploit the diversity of preferences and 
bargaining resources strategically. As this diversity has become greater after 
the Eastern Enlargement, we can assume that the leverage of the Presidency’s 
brokerage strategies also increased.  
                                                          
166  In Schalk’s and Warntjen’s research this effect applies only to Presidency-holders 
in the final months of the negotiation.  
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Examples of such leverage include inducing the tipping point dynamics, 
to which the enlarged Council seems particularly susceptible. We have 
observed this dynamics operating in the PMD, when several CEE countries 
withdrew their opposition after the Presidency negotiated one small provision 
with Hungary. In turn, the Working Time negotiations provided an example of 
a spectacular package deal, which became possible thanks to distinct labor 
market conditions in the new member states. In both cases analyzed, the 
Presidencies invested significant effort in brokerage and were determined to 
reach agreement. Clearly, as both the WTD and the PMD were important 
dossiers in their policy areas, countries assuming the Chair might have wanted 
to show commitment and cultivate their reputation. Nonetheless, there is also 
another explanation for the Presidencies’ determinacy, namely a latent 
anticipation of more cumbersome decision-making with 27 member states, 
creating high pressure for the Presidencies to deliver.  
The prominence of strategic brokerage in the final phase of the 
negotiations should not obscure the Presidency’s roles earlier in the process. 
The Chair pursues “majority politics” from day one of the negotiations and this 
strategy has far-reaching consequences for the subsequent bargaining 
dynamics. While making first substantive amendments to the Commission’s 
proposal, the Presidency defines the basic direction in which the Council 
debate will go. In other words, it sets a policy frame around which further 
efforts to build a majority will concentrate. In the WTD, this was embodied by 
the pragmatic decision by the Dutch Presidency to keep the opt-out, yet 
eventually strengthen the constraints that accompany this derogation. In the 
PMD, the French Presidency established the necessity to codify ECJ case law 
and framed the dossier as a chance for member states to rescue their 
sovereignty before the Court further gears into it. In both cases, none of the 
subsequent Presidencies seriously questioned the basic policy direction 
chosen by the first Chair, despite contestation among member states. Thus, 
Council negotiations seem “path dependent”, whereby policy decisions made at 
the beginning determine the further course of the legislative process.  
At the middle stage of the legislative negotiations, the Presidencies’ 
conduct appears to be norm guided, in line with constructivists’ predictions 
(Niemann and Mak 2010: 730-731). This is the time when all member states’ 
problems are unpacked and potential solutions explored. Member states are 
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invited to make proposals and there is no need for the Presidency to take a 
manifest stance. Instances of collective action provide the current Presidency, 
as well as future Chairs, with valuable information about member states’ 
determinacy to pursue their policy goals. At this stage, it is in the Presidency’s 
interest to have all national concerns recorded and, when possible, dealt 
with167. Impartiality and conciliatory attitude not only represent appropriate 
behavior of the Chair, but are also “useful” in the sense that they contribute to 
the Presidency’s reputation and are indispensable for effective brokerage.  
The Presidency becomes strategic again, when it passes into the vote. 
The decision is based upon the accumulated knowledge about the delegations’ 
preferences and underlying motivations and it sometimes involves great deal 
of risk, as the cases of the Finnish Presidency (WTD) or the Swedish 
Presidency (PMD) have shown. At this point, the Chair re-orients its strategy 
towards the cost-benefit calculation, the adoption representing the benefit and 
substantial changes to the dossier representing the costs. Our cases confirm 
that the Presidency is only interested in satisfying as many opponents as 
necessary for the QMV (Novak 2010; 2013). At this point, the Presidency will 
have very well understood the reasons of member states’ reluctance to go 
along with the majority. The Chair will use this knowledge to strategically 
exploit the differences among the remaining opponents. In the PMD, the 
Swedish Presidency managed to pull Hungary, Slovenia, Ireland and Latvia out 
of the opposing coalition while turning the earlier Hungarian proposal into an 
additional paragraph, coated by the veil of vagueness. In the WTD, a legislative 
package deal had satisfied the French constituency’s demands for more social 
Europe. In both cases, the Presidencies did not shy away from letting part of 
the opposing coalitions outvoted.  
These observations show that casting the “shadow of the vote” is a 
sequential, rather than a linear process. They support Golub’s argument that 
decision-making rules do not have an automatic, deterministic impact on 
legislative effectiveness but rather interact subtly with member states’ 
preferences (Golub 1999: 752). Apparently, the interactions between the 
Presidency and the member states take different shapes at different stages of 
the legislative process, with “majority politics” being most pronounced at the 
                                                          
167  As the Patient Mobility case shows, the Chair can also refer the policy problem to 
the Council’s Legal Service.  
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very beginning and the very end of Council negotiations, i.e. when the 
Presidency makes first corrections to the Commission’s proposal and when it 
envisages a formal closure of the intergovernmental bargaining. In contrast, 
between those two stages, the Chair can afford more inclusive and consensual 
leadership style.  
8.2.3 Exploring the strengths of qualitative inquiry  
The methodological strategy employed in the project can be 
characterized as a midway between two research approaches towards the 
Council. One approach is represented by policy studies, in which researchers 
examine on case-by-case basis the substance of the Council’s outcomes and 
explain how it emerged (see contributions in: Falkner 2011). Alongside this 
strongly qualitative and largely explorative research tradition, a rapidly 
growing research branch has developed, primarily interested in formulating 
and testing theoretical models of Council politics (see contributions in: 
Thomson et al. 2006).  
In this project, I draw upon both approaches by combining a strong 
interest in key analytical categories of Council politics with the qualitative 
method. Case studies have been used instrumentally, i.e. theoretical interests 
preceded the ambition to explain policy outcomes. The primary purpose of 
process tracing was not to show why the Directives gained the substantial 
shape that they have, but rather to explore whether there is a causal link 
between the agency of the member states and that of the Presidency and the 
Council’s ability to make legislative decisions.  
An instrumental usage of case studies for theory-related purposes is 
rather rare in Council research, yet it enjoys growing popularity (Aus 2008; 
Pollack and Shaffer 2008; Panke 2010b; Warntjen 2013). The present study 
has highlighted three merits of this approach. Firstly, process tracing allows 
circumventing static formulas of Council politics – such as the famous 
“consensus” or “diffuse reciprocity” – and opening-up the inquiry towards 
more dynamic or sequential scenarios. Our case studies have demonstrated 
that key drivers of Council politics actually operate differently on different 
stages. For instance, power resources that the member states explicitly draw 
upon in their bargaining strategies shift from “soft” ones such as information, 
expertise and networks at the beginning of the legislative process towards 
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voting power and external resources at later stages. The Presidency pursues 
different strategies depending on how a dossier progresses. Of course, these 
are conclusions drawn from only two case studies, so further research is 
necessary to confirm and further specify the sequential nature of Council 
decision-making.  
Secondly, process tracing is very well equipped to deal with the reactive 
components in legislative actors’ behavior. These are present in the Council. 
Anticipation of other member states’ preferences matters. Member states can 
turn it into a power resource, when they strategically incorporate other 
member states in own bargaining strategies. Less resourceful member states 
engage in mimicry, as they subscribe to other delegations’ claims and 
bargaining strategies, compensating for the deficits of the domestic processes 
of position formation. Information, anticipation and response should be taken 
into account in research dealing with preference formation, one of the basic 
ingredients of Council politics. Model- and standardized data-based research 
often assumes that actors’ preferences are exogenous to the decision-making 
process, uniform and stable, yet this assumption seems to rest on shaky 
foundations (Hörl et al. 2005: 601-602; Richardson 2006; Princen 2012: 625-
630). Finally, anticipation matters for the Presidencies, which prepare their 
brokerage choices based upon the knowledge they have about member states’ 
past negotiation behavior. Tipping point dynamics and path dependency are 
further examples of complex, reflexive interactions in the Council.  
The final merit of process tracing for theory-oriented Council research 
consists in its capability to include contingency in the analysis of politics. 
Situational, non-systematic factors pour into the legislative dynamics in the 
Council. Our cases suggest that situational occurrences relevant for the 
legislative dynamics can be located both outside and inside the Council. The 
debate on the European Constitution and the ratification of the Constitutional 
Treaty, which intervened in the Working Time negotiations, can be seen as 
situational occurrences exogenous to the Council. They additionally boosted 
the power of large member states, France and the UK, and enabled them to 
control the negotiation progress. Endogenous contingencies would include 
who becomes Council Chair at which point of the legislative process. As the 
Spanish example in the PMD has shown, becoming a Presidency can change a 
blocking country’s cost-benefit calculation. Situational factors have a role to 
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play in the conflict dynamics and conflict intensity, in that they can contribute 
to conflict entrenchment, but also induce deus ex machina situations, in which a 
conflict is suddenly repealed.  
 The account of Enlargement absorption by the Council, presented in 
this dissertation, clearly differs from the one provided by large-n researchers. 
Thomson or Veen, who addressed the Enlargement question in their books, 
focus on variable coalitions among member states and hypothesize about 
diffuse reciprocity resulting from this condition (Thomson 2011; Veen 2011). 
By contrast, the politics- and process-based explanation, developed with 
qualitative methodology, is more fine-grained, given that it draws upon very 
specific instances of member states’ negotiation agency, such as position 
formation and articulation, the emergence and development of coalitions and 
ultimately, the specific behavior in voting situations. By means of a plausibility 
probe, these micro-observations were obtained and linked to the puzzling 
macro outcome of Council robustness.  
Note that this move did not imply a new theory of how the Council 
arrives at its decisions; rather, insights in the form of causal mechanisms were 
offered. These mechanisms do not fundamentally question the established 
accounts of the Council’s activity, several of which have been gained through 
systematic analysis of large data sets. These “big pictures” comprise variable, 
issue-based positional alignments, as well as the prevalence of “consensual 
behavior” over power politics. The mechanisms described in the dissertation 
reveal how these characteristics of Council politics emerge, as well as what 
they imply. Thus, the conclusion for the methodology of Council research is 
that aspirations for complementarity between large-n and small-n insights is a 
promising path to pursue, and presumably more fruitful than arguments over 
the “best” ways to study the Council (Heisenberg 2008; Schneider 2008).  
8.3 Limitations of the argument  
Two case studies represent a microscopic portion of the Council’s 
legislative activity, as the latter counts about 200 legislative acts per year 
(Häge 2012b). The obvious limitation of qualitative research is that 
generalization to the entire population is impossible. Thus, this section clarifies 
how exactly the choice of cases limits the argument and defines the conditions, 
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under which the conclusions drawn from my findings could be applied to 
further instances of Council politics.  
One part of my research strategy was to narrow down the population of 
Council cases to the regulatory policy. The reasons for that choice included the 
share of this policy type in the overall Council activity as well as the limited 
role of the Council of Ministers in redistributive policies, which are determined 
outside of the Council. Now when the analysis of the cases is completed, 
another feature of regulatory policy becomes apparent, which sets this policy 
(or at least parts of it) apart from other areas, such as redistribution, foreign or 
home and justice policies. Finding out what the national interest is in the area 
of regulatory policy represents a major challenge for governments, as they 
have to take into account the domestic legal and institutional status quo, the 
interests of stakeholders and finally the EU-level legal status quo. For this 
purpose, governments have to rely on extensive policy and legal knowledge as 
well as on optimized executive organization. Defining national position might 
be easier in the remaining policy areas, where basic data on economic wealth 
(redistribution) or simply the geographical location (foreign policy) offer 
already sufficient input.  
Position formation representing a major challenge was an assumption 
that justified my analytical interest in the role of the domestic polity for EU-
level bargaining performance. I claimed that the way in which the process of 
domestic screening of the relevant policy environment is performed can boost 
or inhibit the negotiation performance of member states. Nonetheless, what if 
this assumption does not always hold to the same extent, whereby forming 
national position is easier in some policies than others? Arguably, the latter 
might be the case when existing EU legislation is revised or updated. Here, 
governments can draw upon already accumulated information and policy 
positions from the past. In policy areas in which position formation is trivial, 
bargaining asymmetries between member states – inequality of information, 
engagement and timing – are less likely to feed into the collective dynamics. 
Mechanisms such as mobilization and mimicry are less likely to occur. 
Furthermore, coalition politics based upon mobilization and mimicry is 
likely to operate in dossiers that are salient to the majority of governments, i.e. 
dossiers, in which member states’ governments want to get involved. An 
opposite to this type of dossier would be a highly specialized, technical 
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legislation that applies to a branch of economy this is only present in a handful 
of member states. Arguably, the dynamics of conflict among only a few actors 
might differ from that involving the whole group. In the former, mechanisms of 
collegiality including cooperation and (diffuse) reciprocity might indeed be 
those that determine the legislative dynamics, as quantitative Council 
researchers claim. In these cases, the demand for conflict management by the 
Presidency will be smaller and conversely the brokerage strategies will be less 
prominent.  
These two limitations outline the subset of Council politics, for which 
my argument about the collective implications of individual bargaining 
capacities and the role of strategic brokerage, might be applicable (Mahoney 
and Goertz 2006: 238). A transfer of the argument – or parts of it – appears 
possible in cases, in which EU-level rules have cross-sectorial implications. 
When legislation penetrates into economies and societies, one can expect from 
democratic governments to care and invest at least some effort in examining 
the domestic implications of the supranational rule. These cases will most 
likely generate conflict, as the diversity of traditions and material conditions in 
EU countries will produce different responses of member states towards EU-
level legislative proposals. Clearly, a priori ascribing “importance” or “societal 
impact” to pieces of EU legislation is a not without problems and there will 
probably never be a standard metric for this procedure (Golub 1999: 754-
755). However, the likelihood of legislative cases of broad impact and high 
concern appears higher in some policy areas than in others. Social policy, 
employment, environment, health and consumer policies, transport, taxation 
and company law seem the most likely to bring about this class of cases, as 
opposed to fisheries or industrial policy, for instance.  
8.4 Outlook  
The purpose of this project was to show how domestically enrooted 
differences in member states’ bargaining performance – in addition to the 
distribution of national policy preferences – provide the Council of Ministers 
with the ability to cope with enlarged membership. I have shown that 
fragmentation of negotiation abilities and ambitions leads to asymmetric forms 
of collective action, in which leaders mobilize, followers mimic, first movers 
arrange and latecomers adapt. Such dynamics, on the one hand, greatly reduce 
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the complexity of the decision situation, yet, on the other hand, make Council 
processes and outcomes only selectively responsive towards the formal 
membership. I have furthermore argued that Council Presidencies handle the 
diversity of member states’ bargaining modes strategically, employing diverse 
techniques of negotiation management to achieve formal agreement. Both the 
“oligarchization” of the Council and the increased leverage of the Presidency’s 
procedural strategies seem to be process-level changes that the Eastern 
Enlargement has brought about.  
At the end of the research process, the satisfaction from advancing and 
probing the argument is far from unblemished. There is uncertainty 
concerning the extent to which the argument will hold in other cases and 
whether the conditions for the aforementioned mechanisms to operate are 
properly and sufficiently specified. Moreover, the argument unveils how much 
we still have to learn about the relationship between the member states and 
EU politics.  
Further cross-country comparative research is needed to gain a 
broader empirical base for the mechanisms described in this report. Is the 
mobilization-mimicry mechanism, which suggests that member states engage 
in an exchange of bargaining resources (voting and numerical power against 
intervention skills, good timing and organization), the core of effective 
collective action within the Council? Are Council processes indeed path 
dependent, whereby the managerial, efficiency-oriented choices of the 
Presidency in the very first months determine further bargaining dynamics? 
These hypotheses require further probing, preferably in cases both similar and 
distinct to those analyzed here.  
In terms of the complex relationship between the EU and its member 
states, my study suggests two research directions. As the previous Chapter has 
argued, member states’ performance in the EU-level policy process is closely 
related to “abilities” and “ambitions”. While both result from domestic politics, 
we only have a vague understanding about the determinants and pathways 
involved. In previous systematic research on the Council, domestic politics has 
only been included insofar as the impact of institutional constraints such as 
strong parliaments on the influence over the bargaining outcomes has been 
tested with negative results (Bailer and Schneider 2006: 176). However, the 
paradox of weakness seems too narrow cut. Domestic factors can also play an 
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enabling role. Admittedly, researching national pre-requisites for influencing 
Brussels is a demanding task, as it requires extensive insights into domestic 
political and administrative processes. In particular, the administration’s 
engagement with EU affairs often takes place at the level of routines and daily 
working practices, as available country studies have shown (Mastenbroek and 
Princen 2010; Haverland and Liefferink 2011; Braun and Berg 2013). With 
these challenges in mind, there is much to be learned about the ways in which 
domestic politics influence supranational legislative agency. 
Finally, Council researchers should engage in more systematic analysis 
of how governments manage the demands, pressures and constraints from the 
domestic and the supranational arena. Putnam himself stressed that 
negotiators “reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously” 
(Putnam 1988: 460). My analysis has demonstrated that input from the 
supranational arena, such as the positions of other negotiation players (both 
member states and the institutional actors), is taken into account in domestic 
processes of position formation, at least in some member states. Furthermore, 
balancing the arenas is a dynamic exercise: while some governments prefer to 
soften their preferences when the voting approaches, others do not shy away 
from being outvoted. Thus, more systematic knowledge is needed about the 
(domestic) circumstances under which governments enjoy autonomy over the 
bargaining position. For instance, when can they “manipulate” the latter 
depending on how the international bargaining is going? To what extent do 
governments engage actively and deliberately in positionality, i.e. strategically, 
formulate bargaining position, searching proximity to the European 
Commission (Bailer 2004: 102, 115)? 
While Council research has rapidly developed in the last few years, 
much remains to be learned about key mechanisms of intergovernmental EU-
level policy-making. Council analysts have an impressive theoretical and 
methodological diversity at their disposal. Furthermore, they can draw upon a 
growing body of macro- and micro-level findings when taking up the challenge 
of refining the basic concepts and advancing our understanding of causal 
relations across governance levels. We can look forward to engaging findings 
and theoretical advancement.  
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